Doctrine Of Individuals

Peircers,

The =93doctrine of individuals=94 is one of those subjects that
we return to every 2 or 3 years hereabouts, just for example:

=95 http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virtual-earth.de/C=
G/cg-list/msg03592.html

I'll try to find the excerpts and comments I posted,
along with the discussions that followed at the time.

Regards,

Jon

> CG: Doctrine Of Individuals
>
> To: Conceptual Graphs <[email protected]>, Stand Up Ontology <standard-upper-=
[email protected]>, ...
> Subject: CG: Doctrine Of Individuals
> From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
> Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 22:14:10 -0500
> Delivered-To: [email protected]
> Reply-To: [email protected]
> Sender: [email protected]
>
> =A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4
>
> 'A Simple Desultory Philippic'
>
> | In reference to the doctrine of individuals, two
> | distinctions should be borne in mind.  The logical
> | atom, or term not capable of logical division, must
> | be one of which every predicate may be universally
> | affirmed or denied.  For, let A be such a term.
> | Then, if it is neither true that all A is X nor
> | that no A is X, it must be true that some A is X
> | and some A is not X;  and therefore A may be divided
> | into A that is X and A that is not X, which is contrary
> | to its nature as a logical atom.  Such a term can be
> | realized neither in thought nor in sense.  Not in sense,
> | because our organs of sense are special -- the eye, for
> | example, not immediately informing us of taste, so that
> | an image on the retina is indeterminate in respect to
> | sweetness and non-sweetness.  When I see a thing, I do not
> | see that it is not sweet, nor do I see that it is sweet;
> | and therefore what I see is capable of logical division
> | into the sweet and the not sweet.  It is customary to
> | assume that visual images are absolutely determinate
> | in respect to color, but even this may be doubted.
> | I know of no facts which prove that there is never
> | the least vagueness in the immediate sensation.
> | In thought, an absolutely determinate term cannot
> | be realized, because, not being given by sense,
> | such a concept would have to be formed by synthesis,
> | and there would be no end to the synthesis because
> | there is no limit to the number of possible predicates.
> | A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve
> | for its precise determination an endless process.  We can
> | only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate,
> | may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be
> | made absolutely determinate.  Such a term as "the second
> | Philip of Macedon" is still capable of logical division --
> | into Philip drunk and Philip sober, for example;  but
> | we call it individual because that which is denoted
> | by it is in only one place at one time.  It is a term
> | not 'absolutely' indivisible, but indivisible as long
> | as we neglect differences of time and the differences
> | which accompany them.  Such differences we habitually
> | disregard in the logical division of substances.
> | In the division of relations, etc., we do not,
> | of course, disregard these differences, but we
> | disregard some others.  There is nothing to prevent
> | almost any sort of difference from being conventionally
> | neglected in some discourse, and if 'I' be a term which
> | in consequence of such neglect becomes indivisible in that
> | discourse, we have in that discourse,
> |
> |                    ['I'] =3D 1.
> |
> | [ Note.  Previously in this text, Peirce writes (CP 3.65):
> | |
> | | | I propose to denote the number of a logical term by
> | | | enclosing the term in square brackets, thus, ['t'].
> | |
> | | The number of an absolute term, as in the case of 'I',
> | | is just the number of individuals that it denotes.
> | ]
> |
> | This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and
> | that which is one in number from a particular point of view
> | is shadowed forth in the two words 'individual' ('to atomon')
> | and 'singular' ('to kath ekaston');  but as those who have
> | used the word 'individual' have not been aware that absolute
> | individuality is merely ideal, it has come to be used in
> | a more general sense.  (CP 3.93;  CE 2, 389-390).
> |
> | Charles Sanders Peirce,
> | "Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
> |  Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus=
 of Logic",
> | 'Memoirs of the American Academy', Vol. 9, pp. 317-378, 26 January 1870;
> | 'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149); 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-42=
9).
>
> Incidental Musements:
>
> http://www.songfta.com/songs/songindex.html
> http://www.songfta.com/songs/pssb-asdp.html
> http://imv.aau.dk/~jfogde/lyrics/parsley.html
> http://members.nbci.com/elstongunn/simple.html
> http://www.songfta.com/songs/X0008_asimpledesultory.html
> http://www.stockmail.ru/~simon/acc/acc.asp?title=3Da-simple-a
> http://www.stockmail.ru/~simon/acc/acc.asp?title=3Da-simple-b
>
> More, Later,
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
> =A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4~~~~~~~~~=A4

-- =


academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache