Re: Re: Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between

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Jon,

The problem, as I see it, has not been a philosphical issue for many, 
many centuries. In the Middle Ages it was. - But, as CSP noted, by his 
time it had become a very different question. - By which I mean: No 
question at all!

I do not have time or patience to look up the exact quote by CSP. But 
there certainly is one to find.

By the time of CSP, nominalistic viewpoint had shifted its cultural 
position from a philophical dispute (demanding grounds and logical 
inferences) into a culturally prevailing common sense.

As all with any knowledge of the logic of questions ans answers know, no 
answer to any question can undermine the presupposition involved in the 
question.

A part of the nominalistic world-view is that  one is able to state 
one's presuppositin. - Sorry, that is not possible!

No one is conscious (knows) ones 'presuppositions'. - There always is a 
ground.
And that ground is culturally formed. Not just by knowledge or 
consciously builded up inferencess.

Understanding is not the same as knowing and knowledge.

When you took up (in your earlier post) the Abysmal, from I Ching, it 
was understanding that guided you, not knowledge. (As it is currently 
understood.)

Kirsti



Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 14.1.2017 17:15:
> Peircers,
> 
> We've been through the nominalism versus realism question so many times 
> that
> I can't think of anything fresh to say about it.  When the use of words 
> like
> Universal, General, Continuous vs. Particular, Singular, Individual 
> comes up
> I find it more useful to focus on the pragmatics of language use 
> relative to
> the context of interpretation, frame of reference, sign relational 
> space, or
> universe of discourse at hand than to go chasing after ontological 
> absolutes.
> 
> But I did find this previous comment on Houser on Forster on Peirce 
> while
> I was looking for something else, and it reflects my sense that 
> Peirceans
> have more trouble controlling that slippery slide toward what I've 
> called
> “essentialism” or “ontologism” than they do checking nominalistic 
> drift.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/09/21/nominalism-and-essentialism-are-the-scylla-and-charybdis-that-pragmatism-must-navigate-its-middle-way-between/
> 
> On 9/20/2012 6:10 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> Peirce Listers,
>> 
>> Earlier this summer, Ayşe Mermutlu posted a notice of Nathan Houser's 
>> review
>> of Paul Forster's "Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism" on the 
>> Facebook page
>> of the Charles S. Peirce Society and a brief discussion ensued.
>> 
>> 1. http://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/
>> 2. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29410-peirce-and-the-threat-of-nominalism/
>> 3. 
>> http://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/permalink/147723215363679/
>> 
>> My initial comment was this --
>> 
>> JA: Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis
>>     that Pragmatism must navigate its middle way between.
>> 
>> On being asked what I meant by "essentialism",
>> I glossed it as follows --
>> 
>> JA: This is idea that all phenomena are explained by absolute
>>     (monadic, non-relative, or ontological) essences inhering
>>     in objects, as opposed to any notion that some phenomena
>>     can be explained only in terms of relations among objects.
>>     For instance, in semiotics, essentialism leads to the idea
>>     that signhood is a permanent essence inhering in something,
>>     as a matter of its ontology, as opposed to a role that
>>     something performs within the setting of a sign relation.
>> 
>> On further interrogation, I added this --
>> 
>> JA: If nominalism is the doctrine that generals are only names and
>>     only individuals have objective existence, then essentialism is
>>     the doctrine that all names (logical terms) refer to properties
>>     of individuals.  So a term like “father” is only a relative term
>>     relative to the perspective of a non-omniscient being who cannot
>>     see what individuals are destined to be fathers and what not.
>> 
>> I think it's fair to say that most of the Peirce crew is handy enough
>> when it comes to steering clear of nominalism's rock-monster, but not
>> so well-drilled in navigating safely by essentialism's whirly places.
>> At any rate, I keep seeing a drift in that direction pulling the good
>> ship Pragmatism into the eddy of a most likely futile sea battle, and
>> I thought it incumbent on the duty of my watch to report what I see.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 


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