[jira] [Updated] (JAMES-4195) JMAP - Allow configurable OIDC user identifier field

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JAMES-4195?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Jean-Baptiste updated JAMES-4195:
---------------------------------
    Description: 
*Current Context:* In the current implementation of {{JWTAuthenticationStrategy}} (notably used by the *JMAP* endpoint), the user identity is strictly extracted from the {{sub}} claim of the JSON Web Token. Additionally, the public keys used for signature verification are typically loaded from local files or static configurations.

*Problem 1: Hardcoded "sub" claim* In many modern Identity Providers (IdP) like Keycloak, Auth0, or Okta, the {{sub}} claim is an immutable internal UUID (e.g., {{{}f:836c-22...{}}}). Apache James, however, requires a email format username  (like {{{}[email protected]{}}}). Currently, there is no way to tell James to use another claim (e.g., {{{}preferred_username{}}}, {{{}email{}}}, or {{{}uid{}}}) as the source of truth for the user identity.

*Problem 2: Static Public Key Management* Modern OIDC/OAuth2 architectures use *JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)* endpoints to expose public keys. These keys are subject to rotation for security reasons. Relying on a local static file for the public key makes rotation complex and prone to service interruption.

 

*Proposed Changes:*
 # *Configurable Username Claim:* Introduce a configuration parameter to define which JWT claim should be mapped to the James Username.

 # *JWKS Endpoint Support:* Allow James to fetch and cache public keys directly from a standard OIDC/JWKS URL instead of a local file.

  was:
*Current Context:* In the current implementation of {{JWTAuthenticationStrategy}} (notably used by the *JMAP* endpoint), the user identity is strictly extracted from the {{sub}} claim of the JSON Web Token. Additionally, the public keys used for signature verification are typically loaded from local files or static configurations.

*Problem 1: Hardcoded "sub" claim* In many modern Identity Providers (IdP) like Keycloak, Auth0, or Okta, the {{sub}} claim is an immutable internal UUID (e.g., {{{}f:836c-22...{}}}). Apache James, however, requires a email format username  (like {{{}[email protected]{}}}). Currently, there is no way to tell James to use another claim (e.g., {{{}preferred_username{}}}, {{{}email{}}}, or {{{}uid{}}}) as the source of truth for the user identity.

*Problem 2: Static Public Key Management* Modern OIDC/OAuth2 architectures use *JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)* endpoints to expose public keys. These keys are subject to rotation for security reasons. Relying on a local static file for the public key makes rotation complex and prone to service interruption.


> JMAP - Allow configurable OIDC user identifier field
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: JAMES-4195
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JAMES-4195
>             Project: James Server
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: JMAP
>            Reporter: Jean-Baptiste
>            Assignee: Antoine Duprat
>            Priority: Major
>
> *Current Context:* In the current implementation of {{JWTAuthenticationStrategy}} (notably used by the *JMAP* endpoint), the user identity is strictly extracted from the {{sub}} claim of the JSON Web Token. Additionally, the public keys used for signature verification are typically loaded from local files or static configurations.
> *Problem 1: Hardcoded "sub" claim* In many modern Identity Providers (IdP) like Keycloak, Auth0, or Okta, the {{sub}} claim is an immutable internal UUID (e.g., {{{}f:836c-22...{}}}). Apache James, however, requires a email format username  (like {{{}[email protected]{}}}). Currently, there is no way to tell James to use another claim (e.g., {{{}preferred_username{}}}, {{{}email{}}}, or {{{}uid{}}}) as the source of truth for the user identity.
> *Problem 2: Static Public Key Management* Modern OIDC/OAuth2 architectures use *JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)* endpoints to expose public keys. These keys are subject to rotation for security reasons. Relying on a local static file for the public key makes rotation complex and prone to service interruption.
>  
> *Proposed Changes:*
>  # *Configurable Username Claim:* Introduce a configuration parameter to define which JWT claim should be mapped to the James Username.
>  # *JWKS Endpoint Support:* Allow James to fetch and cache public keys directly from a standard OIDC/JWKS URL instead of a local file.



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