Re: Log4j issue
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.jakarta.log4j.user |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20211220151504.Horde.sRa99fFBB2aLmsBxSekBxWe@webmail.virtualcdc.com> |
Is that your means have to search "${ctx" in Log4j-config.xsd file ?
Would you say exactly what parameters need to remove from
Log4j-config.xsd file?
Quoting Tushar Kapila <[email protected]>:
> Exact plain string (Non regex) to search would be
> "${ctx"
>
> "somekey" is a placeholder for name of variable.
>
> On Mon, 20 Dec, 2021, 16:29 , <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> I searched ${ctx:somekey} in the log4j-config.xsd file but could not
>> find anything .
>> Is that means that is enough If we upgrade to 2.17 or just remove the
>> class file?
>>
>>
>> Quoting Ralph Goers <[email protected]>:
>>
>> > Removing JndiLookup helps by preventing the JNDI attack. You
>> > absolutely need to do this if you do not upgrade.
>> >
>> > For item 2 look at your log4j2 configuration file. If it contains
>> > ${ctx:somekey} then you need to understand how somekey is being
>> > populated. I would venture to guess that most Log4j2 configurations
>> > won’t have ${ctx: in them in which case there is nothing to do.
>> >
>> > Ralph
>> >
>> >> On Dec 19, 2021, at 9:54 PM, [email protected] wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Dear team
>> >> Hi.
>> >>
>> >> According to Log4j vulnerability as I know one of the solution was
>> >> remove JndiLookup.class file from log4j-core-*.jar file .
>> >>
>> >> But now we see other vulnerability :
>> >>
>> >> upgrade to 2.17 or
>> >> Otherwise, in the configuration, remove references to Context
>> >> Lookups like ${ctx:loginId} or $${ctx:loginId} where they originate
>> >> from sources external to the application such as HTTP headers or
>> >> user input.
>> >>
>> >> 1- Is that your mean remove class file (JndiLookup.class) cannot help
>> us ?
>> >> 2- Would you please say how we can do this on Linux systems ?
>> >> in the configuration, remove references to Context Lookups like
>> >> ${ctx:loginId} or $${ctx:loginId} where they originate from sources
>> >> external to the application such as HTTP headers or user input.
>> >>
>> >> Best regards.
>> >>
>> >>
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>> >>
>> >
>> >
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>>
>>
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