Re: E language over I2P

On Sat, 2008-03-01 at 23:08 -0800, Mark Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 1, 2008 at 11:01 PM, Derick Eddington
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >  I2P provides destination (Vat) location resolving using a distributed
> >  hashtable.
> 
> How do you resist Sybil attacks?

>From http://www.i2p2.de/how_threatmodel#sybil :

        We currently have not implemented any particular technique to
        address Sybil, but do include placeholder certificates in the
        router's and destination's data structures which can contain a
        HashCash certificate of appropriate value when necessary (or
        some other certificate proving scarcity).

And http://www.i2p2.de/techintro.html :

        To take into account Sybil attacks on the netDb, the Kademlia
        routing location used for any given key varies over time. For
        instance, rather than storing a routerInfo on the peers closest
        to SHA256(routerInfo.identity), they are stored on the peers
        closest to SHA256(routerInfo.identity + YYYYMMDD), requiring an
        adversary to remount the attack again daily so as to maintain
        their closeness to the current routing key.

As I mentioned, I'm out of the loop about I2P, and I was never fully
familiar with it all.  I brought it up because I have always hoped to be
able to do E over an anonymizing network so that linkability of
participants is not feasible.  I'm not partial to I2P.  I thought it has
some aspects that would work well with E, but that might not be the
case.

Has anyone previously thought about doing E over an anonymizing network?
(Change the subject if you reply, I suppose.)

-- 
: Derick
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