Re: [Caja] Important new paper: The Need for Capability Policiies
Mark Miller <[email protected]> Sun, 7 Jul 2013 12:32:26 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.lang.e.general |
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| Message-ID | <CAK5yZYj5byqZKEeQ8w7T4NHZn+r-mmfnMY8DMTUQFWSKtx=N9Q@mail.gmail.com> |
[+kosik] [-google-caja-discuss, -cap-talk] Use e-lang as the only list for further discussions. Hi Mike, relevant to this is Matej Kosik's ocap taming of Benjamin Pierce's Pict Language: http://www2.fiit.stuba.sk/~kosik/doc/sofsem2008.pdf http://www2.fiit.stuba.sk/~kosik/doc/tamed-pict--standard-library.pdf It would be interesting to see * This concrete example coded in Tamed Pict, * The specs from the position paper formally restated in these spatial and temporal types, and * A proof (or even informal argument) that the Pict implementation satisfies these types. On Sun, Jul 7, 2013 at 10:43 AM, Mike Stay <[email protected]> wrote: > [+ Greg Meredith] > > You can think of pi calculus as being an ocaps language where channels > are facets. The nice thing about pi calculus is that there's a very > clearly defined notion of a process and a tremendous literature on > typing, whereas "objects" aren't nearly as well defined. Spatial and > behavioral types like those of Luis Caires [1, 2, 3] look like they > could (or could easily be extended to) encode the policy language > described here. > > Greg, care to comment? > > [1] Caires, Luís. "Behavioral and Spatial Observations in a Logic for > the π-Calculus". In FoSSaCS, pages 72–89, 2004. > [2] Caires, Luís and Luca Cardelli. "A spatial logic for concurrency > (part i)". Inf. Comput., 186(2):194–235, 2003. > [3] Caires, Luís and Luca Cardelli. "A spatial logic for concurrency > (part ii)". Theor. Comput. Sci., 322 (3) : 517–565, 2004. > > On Sun, Jul 7, 2013 at 9:27 AM, Mark S. Miller <[email protected]> wrote: > > (John, could you forward to David Mazières? Thanks.) > > > > A position paper at <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2489804.2489811 > > > > and > > <http://types.cs.washington.edu/ftfjp2013/preprints/a6-Drossopoulou.pdf>. > I > > think the investigation they outline is the next important research step > > that object-capabilities need to take. Without something like this, it is > > hard to see how we could preserve security under code maintenance -- for > the > > reasons they state. Although the form of specification they suggest would > > apply to both ocap OSes and languages, the corresponding analysis would > seem > > to apply much more to ocap languages. Thus, I suggest that further > general > > discussion should occur only on the e-lang list. (Subscribe at > > <http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/e-lang>. You need to subscribe > to > > post.) > > > > I have separately been discussing with several of you the adaptation of > > other formalisms -- decentralized info flow, separation logic, and (with > the > > authors) ownership types -- to serve as a specification language for > > checking ocap implementations. But these discussions have not had clear > > goals about what needs to be specified. The specification needs > explained in > > this paper, concretely in terms of this example, sets good challenge > goals. > > How might these or other formalisms contribute towards specifying, > > verifying, or enforcing such policies? > > > > > > The Need for Capability Policiies > > > > by Sophia Drossopoulou and James Noble, (cc'ed) > > > > The object-capability model is one of the industry standards adopted for > the > > implementation of security policies for web-based software. > > Object-capabilities in various forms are supported by programming > languages > > such as E, Joe-E, Newspeak, Grace, and the newer versions of Javascript. > > Unfortunately, code written using capabilities tends to concentrate on > the > > low-level mechanism rather than the high-level policy. > > > > In this position paper, we argue that current specification methodologies > > cannot adequately capture all aspects of the capability policies > required to > > support object-capability systems. We outline informally the features > that > > such security policies should support, and we demonstrate (also > informally) > > how we can reason that examples satisfy the capability policies. > > > > > > -- > > Cheers, > > --MarkM > > > > -- > > > > --- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Google Caja Discuss" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to google-caja-discuss+unsubscribe-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFF+G/[email protected] > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > > > > -- > Mike Stay - [email protected] > http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~mike > http://reperiendi.wordpress.com > > -- > > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Google Caja Discuss" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to google-caja-discuss+unsubscribe-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFF+G/[email protected] > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- Text by me above is hereby placed in the public domain Cheers, --MarkM _______________________________________________ e-lang mailing list [email protected] http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/e-lang