Re: [cap-talk] RumpelTree++
Bill Frantz <[email protected]> Sat, 26 Jul 2014 15:11:26 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.lang.e.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <r422Ps-1075i-1F2A5282EB5C4029A36A4A54FBE1CACC@Williams-MacBook-Pro.local> |
On 7/26/14 at 7:34 AM, rmeijer-qWit8jRvyhVmR6Xm/[email protected] (Rob Meijer) wrote: >1) Alice stores a secret in her process memory at virtual location A >mapping to real address B. >2) A gets swapped to disk, B gets added to the pool of available pages. >3) ... >4) A gets paged back to memory but now virtual location A maps to real >address C. >5) Alice wipes virtual location A and thus real location C. > >Now at any time (during 3 or theoretically possibly even later) Mallet may >malloc a new page that just happens to be B with the non-wiped version of >the secret. I guess I'm completely obsolete. I thought all real systems with any security story at all would zero pages being allocated across security boundaries. KeyKOS/CapROS etc. do. What systems don't? Cheers - Bill ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | gets() remains as a monument | Periwinkle (408)356-8506 | to C's continuing support of | 16345 Englewood Ave www.pwpconsult.com | buffer overruns. | Los Gatos, CA 95032