[glibc] Update GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 to mention A6 records
Florian Weimer via Glibc-cvs <[email protected]> Fri, 19 Jun 2026 16:59:58 +0000 (GMT)
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.lib.glibc.cvs |
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https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=glibc.git;h=1607beb5f424bff2eb84e97f013f8fda8a6ed5d4 commit 1607beb5f424bff2eb84e97f013f8fda8a6ed5d4 Author: Florian Weimer <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jun 19 18:22:20 2026 +0200 Update GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 to mention A6 records It turns out there is a missing inner length check in it, too. Also fix the vulnerable commit. It predates the glibc 2.0 release because the old stream-based formatting code in resolv/res_debug.c had the same bug in its LOC handling. Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <[email protected]> Diff: --- advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 index 6f8f00ddd7..926ca16102 100644 --- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 +++ b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0012 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Buffer overread in ns_printrrf with corrupted RDATA field The deprecated functions ns_printrrf, ns_printrr and fp_nquery in the GNU C Library version 2.2 and newer fail to validate the RDATA content -against the RDATA length in a DNS response when processing LOC, CERT, +against the RDATA length in a DNS response when processing A6, CERT, LOC, TKEY or TSIG records, which may allow an attacker to craft a DNS response, causing a target application to crash or read uninitialized memory. @@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ interfaces since they may be removed in future versions. CVE-Id: CVE-2026-6238 Public-Date: 2026-04-11 -Vulnerable-Commit: b43b13ac2544b11f35be301d1589b51a8473e32b (2.2) +Vulnerable-Commit: ee188d555b8c32ad9704a7440cab400af967292f (1.90)