Re: Fwd: Wall Street article on a new Cooperative
"Stephen J. Turnbull" <[email protected]> Thu, 22 Apr 2004 18:34:59 +0900
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.misc.free-software-business |
|---|---|
| Organization | The XEmacs Project |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
>>>>> "Benjamin" == Benjamin J Tilly <" <[email protected]>> writes: Benjamin> I have reasonably well developed ideas of what I would Benjamin> like "the public interest" to mean on various topics. Benjamin> But I try not to impose my opinions onto others. I think there are a lot of people who would like to know what your opinions are, though. Ben> Is it intellectually dishonest if they are doing it but are Ben> not aware of doing that? My impression is that humans are Ben> great at rationalizing, and we all spend at least some of our Ben> time doing things while remaining blissfully unaware of our Ben> real motivations. No, it's not "dishonest". This is just the same point as one you agreed with: because they're not dishonest, you have to phrase the discrepancy in terms they will recognize as a discrepancy. A liar, on the other hand, would realize immediately that you're on to him. Ben> I submit that the minimal level of "real meaning" [in Pareto Ben> optimality] is minimal enough to be useless. Can you say Ben> whether it is better to tax me or you? I thought not. If we're financing a public project in a democracy, in fact, I can. There are some distributions of the tax burden that will cause the referendum on the project to fail, leaving everyone worse off. And there's a well-known theorem due to Ramsey that says to minimize distortion due to taxation you tax the person whose behavior is least elastic most. Granted, the reasoning is Paretian only in spirit. To easily demonstrate a Pareto improvement requires lump-sum transfers, which undermines the whole idea of distortionary taxes (lump-sum transfers are defined to be non-distortionary). And of course if you just want to rob Steve to pay Ben, Pareto says nothing. But I think there are interesting restrictions that Pareto places on "behavior in the public interest," and especially in a context where you can't know what others want/need. Ben> I am an atheist who lives in a country that was not founded Ben> as a democracy, and was raised in another country that was Ben> founded even farther from any democratic ideals. Your point might be? Mine was simply that there are moderately systematic ways to answer the questions that a lot of people subscribe to, in some places constituting a majority, and having serious claim to represent at least part of "the public interest." To me, "not imposing my view of the public interest on others" means that I have to start by assuming that they do know what's good for them, and that it is part of the public interest, even if I disagree. I may decide that they're misled about the consequences of what they think they want, or that there are contradictions in the positions they espouse, and bugfix :-) the definition of public interest. But that's a very serious thing. Ben> I also spot that most problematic phrase, "a moral answer". Ben> Which is yet another spectacularly undefined thing. That's why I used the indefinite article. My point was just that most people "know Right when they see it", and since they end up "knowing" different things, we're back to political workability. >> I tend to agree with Rawls that the public interest is in >> protecting people's access to "primary goods", although I would >> define those somewhat differently from Rawls. Ben> I'm unfamiliar with Rawls. Harvard philosopher, most famous work is "A Theory of Justice." Proposed the "veil of ignorance" (you know everything about human society except your own name) as a means to investigate the meaning of "justice." His conclusion was that there are primary goods such as freedom and access to employment, and that "justice" means a society in which the distribution of primary goods is according to a maximin principle: maximize the primary goods of the person with the least of them. Ben> Since we both share lots of cultural values with lots of Ben> other people, there are agreements that we can come to on Ben> those answers that will indeed be interesting to many people Ben> beyond just us. However I believe that the answers that we Ben> agree on will not have intrinsic meaning, no matter how much Ben> they have within our cultural context. "Intrinsic meaning"? What's that? Bernard Lang posed the question of "who is the public? City, province, country, world?" I would answer that "the public is composed of those who interact with you, directly or indirectly." The "bigger" the public project proposed, the weaker the indirect interaction needed to relate different segments of "the public". Conversely, the weaker the ability of "cultural context" to imbue our agreement with "meaning" (ie, relevant to the "public interest"), as the shared context becomes less. >> I used to try to take the ethical position you espouse, but >> discovered that I would persist in thinking in terms of the >> "public interest", and (embarrassingly enough) that my >> understanding of what that is was quite inadequate. I'm much >> happier having given in and postulated that it does exist, and >> that since I don't _and can't_ know, I have a moral >> responsibility to research and refine my approximation. Ben> Reification is certainly an easy answer. But I'm unable to Ben> accept it in this case. Well, if I find a better method I'll blow up my graven idol. Suggestions? >> So the "open source position", which translates into economics >> more or less as "ceteris paribus, more free software is good", >> is well-nigh indisputable. The question is can we go beyond >> that and argue for software freedom as a Rawlsian primary good? >> I'm sure the answer is yes. Can we go yet further and argue >> that intellectual property law should not apply to software? I >> would say no, that is not in the public interest. But many >> would say yes. We'll see.... Ben> Indisputable? There is a contrary argument that having Ben> ownership interests in software provides incentives for Ben> maintainance and ongoing development. My "ceteris paribus" is pretty strong here: _assuming that somehow the software gets written_, it's good if it is freely distributable. I guess that's really too weak to be "the open source position." ESR does often argue that for 80% of the software in existence, it's just _stupid_ to keep it closed, but my implicit claim that that's the whole argument was over the top. Ben> Now I don't buy [the argument "But who will pay the Ben> programmers?"], and I doubt that you do, but there are people Ben> who *would* argue that, and there is no shortage of public Ben> policy questions in which similar lines of reasoning are Ben> taken very seriously. Of course I buy that argument. I just think there will be plenty of FLOSS written anyway, and that the spillovers more than make up for any loss in incentive. I think it seriously misses the real point, which is that if we abolish property in software, we also abolish the price signal for the value of the software being written. That worries me. As for the other "public policy questions", software is unique in its production conditions. In what other field of manufacturing does a _single use_ of a product involve making fresh copies of the product every second? (I'm referring to EMACS, Eighty Megabytes And Constantly Swapping---every page fault is a copy! What the heck, put your swap on a network file system, ISTR this is possible with Linux, now you're _distributing_ fresh copies every second!) Try _that_ with your BMW 750, or your George Bush Memorial Building. -- Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences http://turnbull.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp University of Tsukuba Tennodai 1-1-1 Tsukuba 305-8573 JAPAN Ask not how you can "do" free software business; ask what your business can "do for" free software.