Re: Information = Comprehension x Extension -- Discussion

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ICE.  Discussion Note 8

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HT = Hugh Trenchard
JA = Jon Awbrey

Re: ICE Discussion 7.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05282.html
In: ICE Discussion.    http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd1.html#05274

Hx: ICE.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/thread.html#194
Hx: ICE.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/thread.html#356

hi hugh,

one thing i know about information is that different people sure have
different capacities for it! -- the message that you sent is the sort
of file that'll take me the rest of the month to munch my way through.

HT: I'd like to add some comments about the concept of
    information.  This has been a topic of consternation
    for me ever since Bill Hibbard was good enough to point
    out my rather weak discussion of the concept in my draft
    paper "Global Consciousness -- More than a Metaphor".

consternation is the beginning of inquiry ...
so let us begin ...

HT: My view is that in looking for analogues of brain consciousness in
    a complex system such as the human socio-economic system, we should
    look for equivalencies of complexity between the respective systems.
    My suggestion is that if we can identify systems which exhibit
    interactive complexity equivalent to that of the human brain,
    then such systems may be said to exhibit similar degrees of
    consciousness.

this is formally similar to a rule-of-thumb that i use for
the "escape from solipsism" (EFS), even though i have to
substitute different words in the rubric at some sites.

but complexity is one of those things about which
i have some 2-valence, the explanation of which
may take longer than the rest of the month --
pick your favorite calendar -- to explain.

HT: A big problem is however that "complexity is notoriously hard to measure",
    to quote Alfredo Pereira from a short discussion on the Psyche-D listserv
    he and I engaged in recently.

yes, but ...

HT: I am currently reading Hans Christian von Baeyer's book, "Information --
    the New Language of Science" (2003), in which he outlines a number of
    means of describing and quantifying information, which he defines in
    its most basic form to be "the communication of relationships".

you find me in the middle of my "historical review of the literature" phase,
not to say that i can resist the temptation to speculate about the current
scene, but i will be making a conscientious effort to relate classical
"notions of information" (NOI's) to the more contemporary receptions.

HT: While I have not finished the book, it is apparent that current thinking
    is moving toward the qubit as being the fundamental unit of information.
    I understand a qubit represents essentially a unit of quantum superposition,
    and that the main difference between a bit and a qubit is the capacity of
    a qubit to be comprised of  both one and zero (as opposed to one or zero
    in the case of a bit) -- but it is a bit premature for me to attempt any
    more detailed discussion of it than that.

i have mused my way through a few lectures on quantum computing,
but this is one of those things that i'll have to take my time
trying to understand.

HT: However, I can venture the following proposition:

HT: As a fundamental description of information potentially describing macroscopic
    as well as quantum phenomena, in the qubit lies the root of determining whether
    the human socio-economic system and neural interactivity are equivalently complex.

HT: In my view this may serve to reconcile Penrose's and Hameroff's argument
    that human consciousness is non-simulable because of the special nature
    of the quantum phenomena occurring in neuron microtubule cytoskelotons;
    i.e., if consciousness is a product of these special processes, then
    they are measurable in terms of their qubit information quantity,
    and comparable with the qubit information quantity of other
    physical systems, such as the human socio-economic system.
    The information description of each system can therefore
    be compared or mapped at the fundamental qubit level.

HT: I continue to suggest that it is this fundamental informational
    description by which we will be able to discern whether systems
    other than the human brain are conscious.  We can then ask the
    question:  Do these systems exhibit equivalent descriptions of
    information?  If so then they may be said to exist at closely
    proximate regions on a continuum of complexity (which continuum
    can now appropriately be alternatively called an information
    continuum), and therefore be described as being equivalently
    conscious.

i can genuinely appreciate the boldness of this venture,
so let me respond in kind by venturing my belief that
there is a basic flaw in penrose's general approach
to inquiry, about which i'll venture more anon.

jon awbrey

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http://www.cs.bsu.edu/homepages/mighty/history.html
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