ONT Re: Information = Comprehension x Extension -- Discussion
Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> Sat, 31 Jan 2004 23:52:07 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.misc.ontology.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o ICE. Discussion Note 46 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o Hugh, I will try to dispell some of the mystification over Bayes' Rule. I learned my stats from math, stats, computer science, and psych departments. In all of these courses, Bayes' Rule was a theorem, in fact a fairly trivial corollary of the standard definition of a conditional probability. If you call somebody a Pythagorean because they use a particular formula for computing distances, then that makes me a Bayesian by dint of the fact that I use Bayes' Rule for computing the appropriate probabilities in all of the settings where it applies. But as a Bayesian, in that sense, it always sounds a little odd to me when the popular press talks about "Bayesian probabilities", because they do it in a way that is very analogous to speaking of "Pythagorean distances" only when going from Chicago to Detroit, but never when going from Detroit to Chicago. Now the type of situation in which Bayes' Rule applies is one where you have previously staked out a universe of discourse with D's and S's, and you already know a sufficient number of the conditional probabilities of the form P(S|D) that you really already know the conditional probabilities of the form P(D|S), only you don't know that you know it yet until you crank the formula. But if all your D's are "Demons" and all your S's are "Sins", and if there is no meaningful correspondence between these nominal Demons and any sorts of real Diseases, nor any significant relationship between these nominal Sins and any sorts of real Symptoms, then all the Bayesing at the moon in the world is not going to help you fix your theory or cure your patients. The first order of business in inquiry, then, is concerned with the question of how one goes about forming these initial concepts and theories, the order of groundwork that one needs before one can even begin collecting data toward the estimation of any probabilities. This is a stage of procedure where probabilistic reasoning cannot help, because it precedes the entrance of definable probabilities on the scene in question. Depending on whether one treats the dance of inquiry as a fox-trot (2-step) or a waltz (3-step), one will either treat this inchoative phase of inquiry as some kind of mystical divination or bolt out of the blue that is beyond the purview of methodological reflection and critique to examine and hope to rationalize, or execute it as a step with its own interpretive logic. The tune that Peirce piped is one that we've heard leads to waltzing. Jon Awbrey o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o http://www.cs.bsu.edu/homepages/mighty/history.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o