Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 4:33 PM, Brian Smith <[email protected]> wrote:
> Zoogtfyz <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> 3) DHE (not ECDHE) cipher suits are far too often implemented incorrectly,
>> most often with default common DH primes, DH parameter reuse, or generally
>> weak bitstrenght (equivalent to 1024bit RSA, which is already considered
>> insecure in Firefox). Hence it's better to remove support for DHE (not
>> ECDHE) cipher suits rather than give false sense of security.
>>
>
> I agree. I think if people want non-ECC DHE cipher suites, then at a
> minimum we need to define new cipher suite IDs for them that imply keys of
> at least 2048 bits. Unless/until that happens, they are more trouble than
> they are worth.
>
> Note that Chrome recently reached the same conclusion.

Is a reasonable path to implement
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10 and
treat ECDHE suites as being DHE using a Supported Group?  This would
avoid new cipher suite IDs and accomplish the same result.
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