Re: Can wrapped master secret be unwrapped only using fields from sslSessionID structure?

On Wednesday, February 1, 2017 at 10:48:52 PM UTC+2, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1183318 is a thing.  If
> this is related to a communication from Firefox, SSLKEYLOGFILE doesn't work.
> 
> Memory dumps can be created by malware.  Packet captures can be created
> by anyone who has access to what should have been (but which have been
> in practice incredibly poorly-controlled) law-enforcement-limited taps
> in intermediate routers.
> 
> Before giving any kind of assistance, I'd really want to know the
> provenance of the machine in question, the employment and role (and
> legal authority) of the investigator, suspicions as to the nature of the
> information they expect to find therein, and reasons why violating the
> sanctity of the communication might possibly be desirable.
> 
> Of course, I expect that other people don't have the same kinds of
> ethical qualms that I do.
> 
> -Kyle H
> 


On Wednesday, February 1, 2017 at 10:48:52 PM UTC+2, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1183318 is a thing.  If
> this is related to a communication from Firefox, SSLKEYLOGFILE doesn't work.
> 
> Memory dumps can be created by malware.  Packet captures can be created
> by anyone who has access to what should have been (but which have been
> in practice incredibly poorly-controlled) law-enforcement-limited taps
> in intermediate routers.
> 
> Before giving any kind of assistance, I'd really want to know the
> provenance of the machine in question, the employment and role (and
> legal authority) of the investigator, suspicions as to the nature of the
> information they expect to find therein, and reasons why violating the
> sanctity of the communication might possibly be desirable.
> 
> Of course, I expect that other people don't have the same kinds of
> ethical qualms that I do.
> 
> -Kyle H

It's my own firefox process memory dump from a virtual machine. It's for educational purposes.
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