RE: xmlsec / ECDSA problem
Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.crypto |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
It's still permitted in the policy. https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs /policy/#inclusion Section 8. -----Original Message----- From: dev-tech-crypto [mailto:dev-tech-crypto-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla.org ] On Behalf Of Martin Thomson Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2017 5:06 PM To: mozilla's crypto code discussion list <[email protected]> Cc: mozilla-dev-tech-crypto <[email protected]> Subject: Re: xmlsec / ECDSA problem On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 4:22 AM, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote: > Did things break when we disabled it? A few things. It lasted less than a day in Nightly before we got multiple bug reports. > Do we know why Chrome decided not to support it? Two NIST curves is enough? That's my understanding. P-521 isn't busted, it's just a little inefficient and not enough stronger than P-384 (or X448) that it is worth keeping around when faced with a working quantum computer. That and the fact that more options is more code to carry, more options to signal, and so forth. I think that's the reasoning. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
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