How does CVE-2021-43527 impact certificate chains?
Andrew Cagney <[email protected]> Fri, 3 Dec 2021 11:34:34 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.crypto |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAJeAr6t3hcd8qHwgP9mqSSMNmk5Usgq3o43JR+vVmBV4Q8o=ow@mail.gmail.com> |
(hopefully the correct address)
I'm trying to understand CVE-2021-43527 and how it impacts verifying
an untrusted end cert starting with a trusted root cert.
In the blog https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/this-shouldnt-have-happened.html
the example uses a self signed certificate. This means we have:
vfy_CreateContext(key=untrusted, sig=untrusted)
sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
...
if (sig->len != sigLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
i.e., both SECKEY_SignatureLen(key) and sig-len are coming from the
wire (untrusted source).
However, when calling this function via CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(), the
calls look more like:
vfy_CreateContext(key=trusted, sig=untrusted)
(trusted is either the root cert, or a previously authenticated
certificate) which would mean that the (sig->len != sigLen) does the
right thing?
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