Re: Fwd: PQC in Firefox and Thunderbird

Robert Relyea <[email protected]> Mon, 25 Sep 2023 10:22:55 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.comp.mozilla.crypto
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On 8/21/23 11:52 PM, Falko Strenzke wrote:
> Hi John,
>
> that is great to hear. Our two interests are PQC algorithms for TLS in 
> Firefox and S/MIME in Thunderbird. As I understand it you are working 
> on the former. Hash-based signatures are also interesting for us, 
> mainly stateless ones. Are you going to support SPHINCS+ certificates 
> for TLS, too?

I don't know of anyone that's talking about hash-based signatures in any 
of the on-line protocols (TLS, SSH, IKE). The stateful ones have 
deployment issues and signature limitations, the stateless ones are have 
too big of keys.

The use case for hash-based appears to be mostly code-signing. It's also 
one of the few signing operations that have long lived signatures that 
could create real problems for a signature made today and a quantum 
computer 10 years in the future.

We'll probably have SPHINCS+ support in NSS. We'll recognize the OIDS so 
if you have them in your certs, we'll validate them, but I'm pretty sure 
TLS will not define SPHINCS+ authentication, and I wouldn't bet that you 
could fit a change of SPHINCS+ signed certificates in an SSL Certificate 
Chain message. That's not exactly a next 12 months statement, though.

You best indicator on what will be supportable is what the actual 
standards bodies define.

>
> Will there also be a publicly available version of Firefox with PQC 
> support?
As we add support for PQC, they will be publicly available. NSS and 
Firefox are open source and developed out of publicly available 
repositories.
>
> And do you already have a decision or idea about the (temporary) 
> certificate standard you are going to follow? If we could agree on a 
> set of algorithms and the preliminary certificate format, that would 
> be ideal.


Temporary standards, if used, are likely to be marked experimental 
because they are transient standards and can change (so we worry about 
interoperability). Even the X25519+Kyber768 is experimental.

The two areas of most work (In the entire cyrpto industry, not just 
firefox or NSS) is getting standardize hybrid into our streaming 
protocols which are subject to 'record now/decrypt later' attacks and 
firmware/code signing. These are the two main areas where the useful 
life of the encrypted/signed objects may outstrip the potential advent 
of a crypto relevant quantum computer. I expect that will be where most 
of the work occurs in 2024. Remember: the only standardized PQ 
algorithms right now is LMS/HSS and XMSS,XMSS/MT. That will change by 
early 2024 (NIST now has drafts for Kyber, Dilithium, and SPHINCS).

>
> - Falko
>
> Am Mi., 16. Aug. 2023 um 17:55 Uhr schrieb John Schanck 
> <[email protected]>:
>
>     Hi Falko, we are adding support for the X25519+Kyber768 TLS key
>     exchange to NSS. There's work-in-progress attached to Bug 1775046,
>     although we are waiting for the (draft) NIST standard version of
>     Kyber.
>
>     We will also be adding support for some hash-based signatures to
>     NSS. I don't expect that we will do much experimentation with
>     non-hash-based PQ signatures in the near-term, although if there
>     are specific systems that you're interested in evaluating I'd be
>     happy to discuss further.
>
>     John
>
>     On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:38 AM Falko Strenzke
>     <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>         Hi,
>
>         I am interested to learn whether there are any short term or
>         medium term plans to already add experimental support for post
>         quantum cryptography to Firefox for TLS and to Thunderbird for
>         S/MIME. We are ourselves working on integrations of PQC into
>         our PKI products and would be interested to be compatible with
>         these clients in order to have a small compatible ecosystem
>         for evaluation and demonstration of PQC readiness. Maybe some
>         kind of cooperation is possible in this field?
>
>         - Falko
>
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