Re: The future of commit access policy for core Firefox

On 2017-03-10 09:39 AM, Ehsan Akhgari wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 8:49 AM, Mike Hoye <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 2017-03-10 7:49 AM, Axel Hecht wrote:
>>
>>> - We want as many people as possible to change the Firefox code base.
>>>
>>
>> For whatever it's worth, I want the Firefox development process to be as
>> accessible and participatory as possible to as many people as possible, but
>> that's not quite the same as "as many people as possible can change
>> codebase".  Automation that removes unnecessary complexity is a big help in
>> reducing barriers to participation.
>>
>
> Automation that adds unnecessary complexity is a big hindrance in
> participation also.  Maybe there is a good reason why we should be doing
> that, but the proposal doesn't really mention what problem it's actually
> trying to solve besides vague mentions of the stakeholders settings these
> four goals.
>
> For example, what problem is the first goal solving? ("Compromising a
> single individual's credentials must not be sufficient to land malicious
> code into our products.")  Does anyone believe that is the only way you can
> put malicious code into Firefox, whereas anyone can submit malicious code
> under a pseudonym in Bugzilla and we know from past experience times and
> times again that mistakes will remain uncaught during review and testing
> due to the nature of software?

I _think_ the threat model here is a bad actor or someone with a highly 
privileged account being coerced into committing something bad.