Re: Fingerprinting users with cached intermediate certificates
Daniel Veditz <[email protected]> Fri, 24 Feb 2017 11:45:33 -0800
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CADYDTCD-d2ZspN-fru8SdioTO_quZaEL6pBrx4RaFtTdkaa6xg@mail.gmail.com> |
On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 9:33 PM, Martin Thomson <[email protected]> wrote: > Also, Firefox isn't alone in caching intermediates. I think > that you will find that other browsers all do the same thing. > The difference isn't that Firefox caches intermediates, it's that it doesn't fetch non-cached ones. This paper describes taking advantage of this fact to determine which intermediates have been cached in Firefox. You might be able to use timing attacks to determine whether particular intermediates have been cached in other browsers, but you'd only get one sample per intermediate because it would be a destructive test. And then it would be useless as an identifier to track the same person on a future visit. It's an interesting bit of information leakage. Less useful as a "super-cookie" than HSTS, but probably equally bad news to Tor Browser users. -Dan Veditz _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security