Re: Unicode domain names issue (Encrypting a "fake" domain name)
Kai Engert <[email protected]> Tue, 18 Apr 2017 23:41:06 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 18 April 2017 23:32:44 GMT+02:00, Kai Engert <[email protected]> wrote: > > >On 18 April 2017 23:00:24 GMT+02:00, Boris Zbarsky <[email protected]> >wrote: >>Here's a question that I think any proposal here should be able to >>address: Given two strings of glyphs, both non-ASCII, which are >>homographs of each other, does the proposed solution help? >> >>I think showing two different blobs of "xn--****" noise does not help >>distinguish cases like that, unless someone is doing a careful >>side-by-side comparison. > >IIUC, Dan said, mixed scripts are always shown as xn--, never rendered. > >I think that means, if thete are two different domains, that are >rendered similarly, must originate from two different scripts. > >If correct, then displaying the name of the script next to the >rendering (cyrillic: epic.com) could be sufficient to allow them to be >distinguished, without requiring comparison of the xn-- strings? > >Kai But it would require that users notice that the shown script name isn't the expected one. Could the browser use the configured default language, to know the expected usual script, and use special hightlighting (looking like a warning) whenever the domain uses a non-matching script? A user having configured russian as their language would see the term cyrillic in neutral display. Users not using a cyrillic language would see the term cyrillic with a visually emphasized highlighting. Kai