Re: Unicode domain names issue (Encrypting a "fake" domain name)
Gervase Markham <[email protected]> Wed, 19 Apr 2017 12:40:56 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 19/04/17 02:13, Kyle Hamilton wrote: > How did the algorithm in > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=722299 (which points to > https://wiki.mozilla.org/IDN_Display_Algorithm#Algorithm ) fail to > help in this instance? Because it is a known issue that it does not deal with whole-script confusables. This was documented at the time we adopted it - see: https://wiki.mozilla.org/IDN_Display_Algorithm#Downsides > Are there other instances in which it could be expected to fail? No. > If there are, the hypothesis set forth in > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=843689 (that the new IDN > display algorithm was sufficient enough to prevent IDN weirdnesses > that the whitelist could be removed) is shown to be false, and Mozilla > either needs to either find a better solution, or go back to the > whitelist. That was not the hypothesis. As noted above, this edge case was a known and accepted part of the solution, because all of the alternatives are worse. The argument is that the browser only has sufficient knowledge to solve a part of this problem; we can't solve the entire thing using an algorithm without privileging some scripts over others, which is not an appropriate action for an organization which believes in a truly World Wide web. Fixing whole-script spoofing is the responsibility of those who have databases of all the existing registrations - i.e. registries. See https://wiki.mozilla.org/IDN_Display_Algorithm_FAQ for more details. Gerv