Re: Unicode domain names issue (Encrypting a "fake" domain name)
Justin Dolske <[email protected]> Thu, 20 Apr 2017 17:37:25 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.mozilla.security |
|---|---|
| Organization | Mozilla Corporation |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 4/20/17 3:54 PM, Eli the Bearded wrote: > In mozilla.dev.security, Justin Dolske <[email protected]> wrote: >> [As much as I hate to wade into this...] >> >> Hmm. One thing browsers do have is the user's browsing history. > > Objection. Configuration to not record history is trivial, and even > if not configured such, some confusables could easily be sites that > the user doesn't visit often enough to have in history. Yep. I don't think "browsing history disabled" is necessarily common enough to worry about (for an imperfect mitigation), but in any case not-yet-visited is certainly an issue. Hence, again, "imperfect mitigation". :-) > More baked: Using the confusables list from Unicode, if a domain label > consists entirely of letters in one script that are "confusable" to > another (single) script, start raising red flags. Sure, but the angle I found interesting here was to make a guess as to which one is the legitimate site for the user, based solely on local user data and avoiding favoring a particular script. Justin