Re: Unicode domain names issue (Encrypting a "fake" domain name)

Kyle Hamilton <[email protected]> Fri, 21 Apr 2017 11:42:19 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.comp.mozilla.security
Message-ID <CADgtLZ6M1jpUFUUYc89sgBj6rQBnoQVTnxW3F31HKVNMCwWqwQ@mail.gmail.com>
The idea may be a variant, but it's by no means the same as what has
been presented there.

In the instant case, the font used in the address bar uses the same
glyph shapes for both Latin and Cyrillic.  Might it be appropriate to
use (and provide) a font that uses different glyphs for every
confusable code point, and then provide some kind of user training on
how if the shapes don't match what they're used to it might be
phishing?  This would be demonstrably script-neutral.

The downside is that it would unduly burden users whose
shape-recognition is sub-par, but pretty much every other idea for
protecting the users has been shot down by Mozilla reps on this list.
I'm sorry, but this is not "somebody else's problem".  The users use
your software, and you are the only ones they can hope to save them
from threats that others refuse to take responsibility for.

Mozilla has always claimed that it's focused on user security.  If
you're enforcing the rule "if it works on one Firefox, it works on all
Firefoxes" (in the context of "IDN owners might not use IDN if IDN
doesn't work everywhere") to the detriment of user security and
increasing phishability, are you really focused on user security?  Why
is IDN display a sacred cow, when it increases the risk for your users
to be scammed?  IDN owners don't apparently provide mindshare to
Mozilla, nor contribute to the installed base.

Mozilla reps on this list have tried to push the problem off on
everyone else -- the registrars (of which a subset refuse to accept
the responsibility, and cannot be compelled to do so), and the users
who have no means to differentiate in the scripts (because IDN owners
can't abide uncertainty).  For some reason, though, you're not trying
to push the problem off onto the IDN owners who, as web site owners,
already have to deal with the uncertainty of their users using
whatever browsers with whatever security policies baked in that they
choose to.

-Kyle H


On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 3:28 AM, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 21/04/17 02:36, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>> Perhaps, only display non-punycode from codepoint sets used in
>> languages already installed on the computer?
>
> Before we do another canter through the six different ideas that always
> occur to people when first presented with this issue, the very unofficial
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Gerv%27s_IDN_Display_Algorithm_FAQ
> might help shortcut the process. In this case, questions 7-9 are
> relevant, as your proposal is a variant of the one those address.
>
> Gerv
>