[3.14] gh-155999: `tarfile`: handle a member that leaves the destination but comes back (GH-156000) (#156041)

https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/16dea1e887ec7dfbed735beedd476b21dcc91a79
commit: 16dea1e887ec7dfbed735beedd476b21dcc91a79
branch: 3.14
author: Miss Islington (bot) <[email protected]>
committer: StanFromIreland <[email protected]>
date: 2026-08-19T13:29:34Z
summary:

[3.14] gh-155999: `tarfile`: handle a member that leaves the destination but comes back (GH-156000) (#156041)

(cherry picked from commit 97688346ada2df3e5b9c279348862c3d64ab0823)

Co-authored-by: Stan Ulbrych <[email protected]>

files:
A Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-08-13-13-08-11.gh-issue-155999.Xt4rWq.rst
M Doc/library/tarfile.rst
M Lib/tarfile.py
M Lib/test/test_tarfile.py

diff --git a/Doc/library/tarfile.rst b/Doc/library/tarfile.rst
index 28e950e8f728e2..bbb913eec89f8b 100644
--- a/Doc/library/tarfile.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/tarfile.rst
@@ -1100,6 +1100,10 @@ reused in custom filters:
     paths (in case the name is absolute
     even after stripping slashes, e.g. ``C:/foo`` on Windows).
     This raises :class:`~tarfile.AbsolutePathError`.
+  - Normalize filenames (:attr:`TarInfo.name`) that contain ``..`` components
+    using :func:`os.path.normpath`.
+    Note that this removes internal ``..`` components, which may change the
+    meaning of the name if it traverses symbolic links.
   - :ref:`Refuse <tarfile-extraction-refuse>` to extract files whose absolute
     path (after following symlinks) would end up outside the destination.
     This raises :class:`~tarfile.OutsideDestinationError`.
@@ -1108,6 +1112,10 @@ reused in custom filters:
 
   Return the modified ``TarInfo`` member.
 
+  .. versionchanged:: next
+
+     Filenames containing ``..`` components are now normalized.
+
 .. function:: data_filter(member, path)
 
   Implements the ``'data'`` filter.
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
index fe1f438ef1131c..f226a6ee4a5709 100644
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
@@ -819,6 +819,13 @@ def _get_filtered_attrs(member, dest_path, for_data=True):
         # For example, 'C:/foo' on Windows.
         raise AbsolutePathError(member)
     # Ensure we stay in the destination
+    if '..' in name.replace(os.sep, '/').split('/'):
+        # Directories are created from the name as given, so a name that
+        # leaves the destination part-way through would create them
+        # outside it even if the resolved path stays inside.
+        normalized = os.path.normpath(name)
+        if normalized != name:
+            name = new_attrs['name'] = normalized
     target_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(dest_path, name),
                                    strict=os.path.ALLOW_MISSING)
     if os.path.commonpath([target_path, dest_path]) != dest_path:
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
index 5f952aa8bef089..92954cc8c65294 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
@@ -3981,6 +3981,20 @@ def test_absolute(self):
                         tarfile.AbsolutePathError,
                         """['"].*escaped.evil['"] has an absolute path""")
 
+    def test_parent_dir_out_and_back(self):
+        # Test a member that leaves the destination and comes back.
+        # The containment check looks at the resolved path, which stays
+        # inside, but the intermediate directories are created from the
+        # name as given, which does not.
+        with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
+            arc.add(f'../escaped.evil/../{self.destdir.name}/sub/file',
+                    content='content')
+
+        for filter in 'tar', 'data':
+            with self.subTest(filter):
+                with self.check_context(arc.open(), filter):
+                    self.expect_file('sub/file', content='content')
+
     @symlink_test
     def test_parent_symlink(self):
         # Test interplaying symlinks
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-08-13-13-08-11.gh-issue-155999.Xt4rWq.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-08-13-13-08-11.gh-issue-155999.Xt4rWq.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..59b725e55bbffd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-08-13-13-08-11.gh-issue-155999.Xt4rWq.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix the :mod:`tarfile` ``tar`` and ``data`` extraction filters creating
+directories outside the destination for members whose name leaves the
+destination and returns to it, such as ``../evil/../dest/sub/file``. The
+containment check used the resolved path, but intermediate directories were
+created from the name as given.

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