CRYPTO-GRAM, June 15, 2011

Bruce Schneier <[email protected]> Wed, 15 Jun 2011 01:35:32 -0500

Newsgroups	gmane.comp.security.crypto-gram
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

CRYPTO-GRAM

June 15, 2011

by Bruce Schneier
Chief Security Technology Officer, BT
[email protected]
http://www.schneier.com

A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

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In this issue:
New Siemens SCADA Vulnerabilities Kept Secret
Yet Another Way to Avoid TSA's Full-Body Scanners
News
Keeping Sensitive Information Out of the Hands of
Terrorists Through Self-Restraint
Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against the MCAT Exam
Schneier News
Open-Source Software Feels Insecure

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New Siemens SCADA Vulnerabilities Kept Secret

SCADA systems -- computer systems that control industrial processes --
are one of the ways a computer hack can directly affect the real world.
Here, the fears multiply. It's not bad guys deleting your files, or
getting your personal information and taking out credit cards in your
name; it's bad guys spewing chemicals into the atmosphere and dumping
raw sewage into waterways. It's Stuxnet: centrifuges spinning out of
control and destroying themselves. Never mind how realistic the threat
is, it's scarier.

Last week, a researcher was successfully pressured by the Department of
Homeland Security not to disclose details "before Siemens could patch
the vulnerabilities."

Beresford wouldn't say how many vulnerabilities he found in the
Siemens products, but said he gave the company four exploit
modules to test. He believes that at least one of the
vulnerabilities he found affects multiple SCADA-system vendors,
which share "commonality" in their products. Beresford wouldn't
reveal more details, but says he hopes to do so at a later date.

We've been living with full disclosure for so long that many people have
forgotten what life was like before it was routine.

Before full disclosure was the norm, researchers would discover
vulnerabilities in software and send details to the software
companies -- who would ignore them, trusting in the security of
secrecy. Some would go so far as to threaten the researchers with
legal action if they disclosed the vulnerabilities.

Later on, researchers announced that particular vulnerabilities
existed, but did not publish details. Software companies would
then call the vulnerabilities "theoretical" and deny that they
actually existed. Of course, they would still ignore the problems,
and occasionally threaten the researcher with legal action. Then,
of course, some hacker would create an exploit using the
vulnerability -- and the company would release a really quick
patch, apologize profusely, and then go on to explain that the
whole thing was entirely the fault of the evil, vile hackers.

I wrote that in 2007. Siemens is doing it right now:

Beresford expressed frustration that Siemens appeared to imply the
flaws in its SCADA systems gear might be difficult for a typical
hacker to exploit because the vulnerabilities unearthed by NSS
Labs "were discovered while working under special laboratory
conditions with unlimited access to protocols and controllers."

There were no "'special laboratory conditions' with 'unlimited
access to the protocols,'" Beresford wrote Monday about how he
managed to find flaws in Siemens PLC gear that would allow an
attacker to compromise them. "My personal apartment on the wrong
side of town where I can hear gunshots at night hardly defines a
special laboratory." Beresford said he purchased the Siemens
controllers with funding from his company and found the
vulnerabilities, which he says hackers with bad intentions could
do as well.

That's precisely the point. Me again from 2007:

Unfortunately, secrecy *sounds* like a good idea. Keeping
software vulnerabilities secret, the argument goes, keeps them out
of the hands of the hackers.... But that assumes that hackers
can't discover vulnerabilities on their own, and that software
companies will spend time and money fixing secret vulnerabilities.
Both of those assumptions are false. Hackers have proven to be
quite adept at discovering secret vulnerabilities, and full
disclosure is the only reason vendors routinely patch their
systems.

With the pressure off, Siemens is motivated to deal with the PR problem
and ignore the underlying security problem.

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/siemens-scada-vulnerabilities/
or http://tinyurl.com/68y65xc

The history of full disclosure.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/debating_full_d.html

Siemens pressuring Bradford.
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/052311-beresford.html

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Yet Another Way to Avoid TSA's Full-Body Scanners

Last night, at the Third EPIC Champion of Freedom Awards Dinner, we gave
an award to Susie Castillo, whose blog post and video of her treatment
in the hands of the TSA has inspired thousands to complain about the
agency and their treatment of travellers.

Sitting with her at dinner, I learned yet another way to evade the TSA's
full body scanners: carry a small pet. She regularly travels with her
small dog, and has found that she is always directed away from the
full-body scanners and through the magnetometers. I suspect that the
difficulty of keeping the dog still is why TSA makes that determination.
(The carrier, of course, goes through the x-ray machine.)

I'm not sure what the TSA is going to do now that I've publicized this
unpublished exception. Those of you who travel with small pets: please
let me know what happens.

(For those of you who are appalled that I could give the terrorists
ideas on how to evade the full-body scanners, there are already so many
ways that one more can't hurt.)

http://www.susiecastillo.net/blog/2011/4/25/my-tsa-pat-down-experience.html

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News

An FBI surveillance device, designed to be attached to a car, has been
taken apart and analyzed.
http://www.ifixit.com/Teardown/Tracking-Device-Teardown/5250/1
A recent ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirms that
it's legal for law enforcement to secretly place a tracking device on
your car without a warrant, even if it's parked in a private driveway.
http://www.executivegov.com/2010/08/ninth-circuit-court-secret-gps-tracking-is-legal/
or http://tinyurl.com/2bgyc43

Scanning fingerprints from six feet away. No information on how
accurate it is, but it'll only get better.
http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/27052/

Bin Laden maintained computer security with an air gap, according to the
Associated Press. I'm impressed. It's hard to maintain this kind of
COMSEC discipline.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/bin_laden_maint.html

I haven't written about Dropbox's security problems; too busy with the
book. But here's an excellent summary article from The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/05/internet_security
The meta-issue is pretty simple. If you expect a cloud provider to do
anything more interesting than simply store your files for you and give
them back to you at a later date, they are going to have to have access
to the plaintext. For most people -- Gmail users, Google Docs users,
Flickr users, and so on -- that's fine. For some people, it isn't.
Those people should probably encrypt their files themselves before
sending them into the cloud.
Another security issue with Dropbox:
http://dereknewton.com/2011/04/dropbox-authentication-static-host-ids/

NIST has released "BIOS Protection Guidelines."
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-147/NIST-SP800-147-April2011.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/3ekvoaw
http://www.phrack.com/issues.html?issue=66&id=7

For years, an employee of Cubic Corp -- the company that makes the
automatic fare card systems for most of the subway systems around the
world -- forged and then sold monthly passes for the Boston MBTA system.
The scheme was discovered by accident. "Cubic Transportation Systems
said in a written statement that it is cooperating with authorities.
'Our company has numerous safeguards designed to prevent fraudulent
production or distribution of Charlie Tickets,' the statement said,
referring to the monthly MBTA passes." It always amuses me when
companies pretend the obvious isn't true in their press releases.
"Someone completely broke our system." "Say that we have a lot of
security." "But it didn't work." "Say it anyway; the press will just
blindly report it." To be fair, we don't -- and probably will never --
know how this proprietary system was broken. In this case, an insider
did it. But did that insider just have access to the system
specifications, or was access to blank ticket stock or specialized
equipment necessary as well?
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/forged_subway_p.html

TSA-style security is now so normal that it's part of a Disney ride at
Walt Disney World in Orlando.
http://www.mouseplanet.com/9624/Walt_Disney_World_Resort_Update

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention weigh in on preparations
for the zombie apocalypse.
http://emergency.cdc.gov/socialmedia/zombies_blog.asp

Blackhole Exploit Kit is now available as a free download.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/05/24/blackhole_exploit_kit_freebie/

Proposed new rules for automobile black boxes in the U.S.
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2011/05/automotive-black-boxes/

It's amusing to watch the presidential limo immobilized by a steep grade
at the U.S. embassy in Dublin. (You'll get a glimpse of how thick the
car doors are toward the end of the video.) It was a spare; the
president wasn't riding in it at the time.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/us_presidential.html
Related: a video of President Bush's limo breaking down in Rome:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iX4-a7VBr4c#t=1m28s

Elcomsoft has cracked Apple's iOS 4 hardware encryption. Note that they
didn't break AES-256; they figured out how to extract the keys from the
hardware (iPhones, iPads). The company "will be releasing the product
implementing this functionality for the exclusive use of law
enforcement, forensic and intelligence agencies."
http://blog.crackpassword.com/2011/05/elcomsoft-breaks-iphone-encryption-offers-forensic-access-to-file-system-dumps/
or http://tinyurl.com/4xu4qvn
http://blog.crackpassword.com/2011/05/extracting-the-file-system-from-iphone-ipad-ipod-devices/
or http://tinyurl.com/3k8xjjh

Cyber criminals are getting aggressive with their social engineering
tactics.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/aggressive_soci.html

Lockheed Martin hack linked to RSA's SecurID breach.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-usa-defense-hackers-idUSTRE74Q6VY20110527
or http://tinyurl.com/3lskr3g
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/business/28hack.html
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/05/27/hackers-penetrate-u-s-defense-contractors-security-networks/
or http://tinyurl.com/3qc3bm9
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/05/27/lockheed_securid_hack_flap/

The U.S. seems to have a secret stealth helicopter. That's what the
U.S. destroyed after a malfunction in Pakistan during the bin Laden
assassination. (For helicopters, "stealth" is less concerned with radar
signatures and more concerned with acoustical quiet.) There was some
talk about Pakistan sending it to China, but they're returning it to the
U.S. I presume that the Chinese got everything they needed quickly.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06helicopter.html

A four-volume history of counterintelligence, "CI Reader: An American
Revolution Into the New Millennium," published by the U.S. Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive. (No, I've never heard of them,
either.)
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/06/three-volume_hi.html

Reporters have been calling me pretty much constantly about spear
phishing attacks against Gmail accounts, but I can't figure out why in
the world this is news.
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386287,00.asp
http://www.schneier.com/essay-227.html
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5juCwgcN2P-wsVbu78J2KMQk8_MDw
or http://tinyurl.com/3thf98t
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/china-rejects-google-allegation-of-massive-hacking-breach-as-fabrication/2011/06/02/AGMdsEHH_story.html
or http://tinyurl.com/6zqkedd
Attacks from China -- old news.
http://www.schneier.com/essay-227.html
Attacks from China against Google -- old news.
http://www.schneier.com/essay-306.html
Attacks from China against Google Gmail accounts -- old news.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/more_details_on.html
Spear phishing attacks from China against senior government officials --
old news.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/03/massive_chinese.html
There's even a WikiLeaks cable about this stuff.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/04/wikileaks_cable.html

Daniel Solove on the security vs. privacy debate.
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/05/31/solove_privacy_security/index.html
or http://tinyurl.com/3ktoux4

World War II Tunny cryptanalysis machine rebuilt at Bletchley Park.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/05/26/bletchley_park_tunny_rebuild_project/
or http://tinyurl.com/3pdeut4

Redaction failures are so common that I stopped blogging about them
years ago. This is the first analysis I have seen of technical
redaction failures.
http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/tblee/studying-frequency-redaction-failures-pacer
or http://tinyurl.com/3upbc4p
And here's the NSA on how to redact.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/the_nsa_on_how.html

MI6 hacked into an online al-Qaeda magazine and replaced bomb-making
instructions with a cupcake recipe. It's a more polite hack than subtly
altering the recipe so it blows up during the making process. (I've
been told, although I don't know for sure, that the 1971 "Anarchist's
Cookbook" has similarly flawed recipes.)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8553366/MI6-attacks-al-Qaeda-in-Operation-Cupcake.html
or http://tinyurl.com/3wmryts

Tennessee makes password sharing illegal. Of course it won't work.
"State lawmakers in country music's capital have passed a groundbreaking
measure that would make it a crime to use a friend's login -- even with
permission -- to listen to songs or watch movies from services such as
Netflix or Rhapsody."
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110601/ap_on_hi_te/us_password_sharing_crackdown
or http://tinyurl.com/3qto2n3

According to some random news reports, 25% of U.S. criminal hackers are
police informants. I have no idea if it's true, but if I were the FBI I
would want everyone to believe that it's true.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/us-hackers-fbi-informer
or http://tinyurl.com/6anqvht

Interesting research: Kirill Levchenko, et al. (2010), "Click
Trajectories -- End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain," IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy 2011, Oakland, California, 24 May
2011. "95% of spam-advertised pharmaceutical, replica and software
products are monetized using merchant services from just a handful of
banks." This points to a fruitful avenue to reduce spam: go after the
banks.
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/Oakland11.pdf
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/client/229625599

Here's a potential new airport screen technology. I know nothing about it.
http://isconimaging.com/technology.htm
http://wholebodyimagingfacts.com/?p=201

A good rant by Patrick Gray on why we secretly love LulzSec.
http://risky.biz/lulzsec

A good rant by Robert Cringely on why we openly hate RSA.
http://www.cringely.com/2011/06/when-engineers-lie/

Adam Shostack's rant about Patrick Gray's rant.
http://newschoolsecurity.com/2011/06/are-lulz-our-best-practice/

Why is it so difficult to trace cyber attacks? I've been asked this
question by countless reporters in the past couple of weeks. Here's a
good explanation. Shorter answer: it's easy to spoof source location,
and it's easy to hijack unsuspecting middlemen and use them as proxies.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers
or http://tinyurl.com/622pphh
No, mandating attribution won't solve the problem. Any Internet design
will necessarily include anonymity.
http://www.schneier.com/essay-308.html

Status report on the war on photography: Morgan Leigh Manning, "Less
than Picture Perfect: The Legal Relationship between Photographers'
Rights and Law Enforcement," Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 78, p. 105, 2010.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1857623

The non-anonymity of "fill-in-the-bubble" forms.
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/wclarkso/new-research-result-bubble-forms-not-so-anonymous

Malware in Google's Android:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/13/android_market_still_insecure/

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Keeping Sensitive Information Out of the Hands of Terrorists
Through Self-Restraint

In my forthcoming book (available February 2012), I talk about various
mechanisms for societal security: how we as a group protect ourselves
from the "dishonest minority" within us. I have four types of societal
security systems:

* moral systems -- any internal rewards and punishments;

* reputational systems -- any informal external rewards and punishments;

* rule-based systems -- any formal system of rewards and punishments
(mostly punishments) -- laws, mostly;

* technological systems -- everything like walls, door locks, cameras,
and so on.

We spend most of our effort in the third and fourth category. I am
spending a lot of time researching how the first two categories work.

Given that, I was very interested in seeing an article by Dallas Boyd in
"Homeland Security Affairs": "Protecting Sensitive Information: The
Virtue of Self-Restraint," where he basically says that people should
not publish information that terrorists could use out of moral
responsibility (he calls it "civic duty"). Ignore for a moment the
debate about whether publishing information that could give the
terrorists ideas is actually a bad idea -- I think it's not -- what Boyd
is proposing is actually very interesting. He specifically says that
censorship is bad and won't work, and wants to see voluntary
self-restraint along with public shaming of offenders.

As an alternative to formal restrictions on communication,
professional societies and influential figures should promote
voluntary self-censorship as a civic duty. As this practice is
already accepted among many scientists, it may be transferrable to
members of other professions. As part of this effort, formal
channels should be established in which citizens can alert the
government to vulnerabilities and other sensitive information
without exposing it to a wide audience. Concurrent with this
campaign should be the stigmatization of those who recklessly
disseminate sensitive information. This censure would be aided by
the fact that many such people are unattractive figures whose
writings betray their intellectual vanity. The public should be
quick to furnish the opprobrium that presently escapes these
individuals.

I don't think it will work, and I don't even think it's possible in this
international day and age, but it's interesting to read the proposal.

Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint:
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.1.10

More articles:
http://yro.slashdot.org/story/11/05/27/2324227/DoD-Paper-Proposes-National-Security-Through-a-Culture-of-Restraint-and-Stigma
or http://tinyurl.com/3vr9ckg
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/05/self-restraint.html

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Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against the MCAT Exam

In Applied Cryptography, I wrote about the "Chess Grandmaster Problem,"
a man-in-the-middle attack. Basically, Alice plays chess remotely with
two grandmasters. She plays Grandmaster 1 as white and Grandmaster 2 as
black. After the standard opening of 1. e4, she just replays the moves
from one game to the other, and convinces both of them that she's a
grandmaster in the process.

Detecting these sorts of man-in-the-middle attacks is difficult, and
involves things like synchronous clocks, complex cryptographic
protocols, or -- more practically -- proctors. Proctors, of course, can
be fooled. Here's a real-world attempt of this type of attack on the
MCAT medical-school admissions test.

Police allege he used a pinhole camera and wireless technology to
transmit images of the questions on a computer screen back to his
co-conspirator, Ruben, at the University of British Columbia.

Investigators believe Ruben then tricked three other students, who
thought they were taking a multiple choice test for a job to be an
MCAT tutor, into answering the questions.

The answers were then transmitted back by phone to Rezazadeh-Azar,
as he continued on with the test in Victoria, police allege.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2011/05/31/bc-high-tech-mcat-scam.html
or http://tinyurl.com/3fcmmu6

And as long as we're on the topic, we can think about all the ways to
hack this system of remote exam proctoring via webcam.
http://www.ao.uiuc.edu/support/source/student_services/proctoru_tech.html or
http://tinyurl.com/3zlq8dl

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Schneier News

I'm speaking at Computers, Freedom, and Privacy in Washington DC on June 16.
http://www.cfp.org/2011/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

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Open-Source Software Feels Insecure

At first glance, this seems like a particularly dumb opening line of an
article:

Open-source software may not sound compatible with the idea of
strong cybersecurity, but....

But it's not. Open source does sound like a security risk. Why would
you want the bad guys to be able to look at the source code? They'll
figure out how it works. They'll find flaws. They'll -- in extreme
cases -- sneak back-doors into the code when no one is looking.

Of course, these statements rely on the erroneous assumptions that
security vulnerabilities are easy to find, and that proprietary source
code makes them harder to find. And that secrecy is somehow aligned
with security. I've written about this several times in the past, and
there's no need to rewrite the arguments again.

Still, we have to remember that the popular wisdom is that secrecy
equals security, and open-source software doesn't sound compatible with
the idea of strong cybersecurity.

http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/cybersecurity-open-source-2014/

Me on open-source security:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-056.html
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#1
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#OpenSourceandSecurity

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Since 1998, CRYPTO-GRAM has been a free monthly newsletter providing
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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the
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and "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish, Twofish,
Threefish, Helix, Phelix, and Skein algorithms. He is the Chief
Security Technology Officer of BT BCSG, and is on the Board of Directors
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent
writer and lecturer on security topics. See <http://www.schneier.com>.

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