CRYPTO-GRAM, May 15, 2004

                  CRYPTO-GRAM

                  May 15, 2004

               by Bruce Schneier
                Founder and CTO
       Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
            [email protected]
            <http://www.schneier.com>
           <http://www.counterpane.com>


A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and 
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

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In this issue:
      Warrants as a Security Countermeasure
      Counterterrorism in Airports
      Crypto-Gram Reprints
      News
      Counterpane News
      Security Notes from All Over:  Bypassing the USPS
      The Doghouse: Markland Technologies
      The Doghouse:  IQ Networks
      National Security Consumers
      Comments from Readers


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      Warrants as a Security Countermeasure



Years ago, surveillance meant trench-coated detectives following people 
down streets.

Today's detectives are more likely to be sitting in front of a 
computer, and the surveillance is electronic.  It's cheaper, easier and 
safer.  But it's also much more prone to abuse.  In the world of cheap 
and easy surveillance, a warrant provides citizens with vital security 
against a more powerful police.

Warrants are guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and are required before 
the police can search your home or eavesdrop on your telephone 
calls.  But what other forms of search and surveillance are covered by 
warrants is still unclear.

An unusual and significant case recently heard in Nassau County's 
courts dealt with one piece of the question: Is a warrant required 
before the police can attach an electronic tracking device to someone's 
car?

It has always been possible for the police to tail a suspect, and 
wireless tracking is decades old.  The only difference is that it's now 
much easier and cheaper to use the technology.

Surveillance will continue to become cheaper and easier -- and less 
intrusive.  In the Nassau case, the police hid a tracking device on a 
car used by a burglary suspect, Richard D. Lacey.  After Lacey's 
arrest, his lawyer sought to suppress evidence gathered by the tracking 
device on the grounds that the police did not obtain a warrant 
authorizing use of the device and that Lacey's privacy was violated.

It was believed to be the first such challenge in New York State and 
one of only a handful in the nation.  A judge ruled Thursday that the 
police should have obtained a warrant.  But he declined to suppress the 
evidence -- saying the car belonged to Lacey's wife, not to him, and 
Lacey therefore had no expectation of privacy.

More and more, we are living in a society where we are all tracked 
automatically all of the time.

If the car used by Lacey had been outfitted with the OnStar system, he 
could have been tracked through that.  We can all be tracked by our 
cell phones.  E-ZPass tracks cars at tunnels and bridges.  Security 
cameras record us.  Our purchases are tracked by banks and credit card 
companies, our telephone calls by phone companies, our Internet surfing 
habits by Web site operators.

The Department of Justice claims that it needs these, and other, search 
powers to combat terrorism.  A provision slipped into an appropriations 
bill allows the FBI to obtain personal financial information from 
banks, insurance companies, travel agencies, real estate agents, 
stockbrokers, the U.S. Postal Service, jewelry stores, casinos and car 
dealerships without a warrant.

Starting this year, the U.S. government is photographing and 
fingerprinting foreign visitors coming into this country from all but 
27 other countries.  CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System) will probe the backgrounds of all passengers boarding 
flights.  Over New Year's, the FBI collected the names of 260,000 
people staying at Las Vegas hotels.  More and more, the "Big Brother is 
watching you" style of surveillance is becoming a reality.

Unfortunately, the debate often gets mischaracterized as a question 
about how much privacy we need to give up in order to be 
secure.  People ask: "Should we use this new surveillance technology to 
catch terrorists and criminals, or should we favor privacy and ban its 
use?"

This is the wrong question.  We know that new technology gives law 
enforcement new search techniques, and makes existing techniques 
cheaper and easier.  We know that we are all safer when the police can 
use them.  And the Fourth Amendment already allows even the most 
intrusive searches: The police can search your home and person.

What we need are corresponding mechanisms to prevent abuse.  This is 
the proper question: "Should we allow law enforcement to use new 
technology without any judicial oversight, or should we demand that 
they be overseen and accountable?"  And the Fourth Amendment already 
provides for this in its requirement of a warrant.

The search warrant -- a technologically neutral legal requirement -- 
basically says that before the police open the mail, listen in on the 
phone call or search the bit stream for key words, a "neutral and 
detached magistrate" reviews the basis for the search and takes 
responsibility for the outcome.  The key is independent judicial 
oversight; the warrant process is itself a security measure protecting 
us from abuse and making us more secure.

Much of the rhetoric on the "security" side of the debate cloaks one of 
its real aims: increasing law enforcement powers by decreasing its 
oversight and accountability.  It's a very dangerous road to take, and 
one that will make us all less secure.  The more surveillance 
technologies that require a warrant before use, the safer we all are.


This essay originally appeared in Newsday:
<http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpsch103794744may10,0,3318138.st 
ory> or <http://tinyurl.com/yty95>


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          Counterterrorism in Airports



It's just a pilot program, but undercover security officers are roaming 
Boston's Logan Airport, looking for suspicious people who may be 
planning a terrorist act.  It's got a fancy name, "behavior pattern 
recognition," but basically it means "be on the lookout for suspicious 
people."

I think this is the best thing to happen to airplane security since 
they reinforced the cockpit doors.

I've long argued that traditional airport security is largely 
useless.  Air travelers -- the innocent ones -- are subjected to all 
sorts of indignities in the name of security.  Again and again we read 
studies about how bad the checkpoints are at keeping weapons out of 
airports.  The system seems to do nothing more than irritate honest 
people.  (Remember, when airport security takes a pair of scissors away 
from an innocent grandma, that's a security failure.  It's a false 
positive.  It's not a success.)

Well-trained officers on the lookout for suspicious people is a great 
substitute.

The devil is in the details, of course.  All too often "he's acting 
suspicious" really translates to "he's black."  Well-trained is the key 
to avoiding racism, which is both bad for society and bad for 
security.  But security is inherently about people, and smart observant 
people are going to notice things that metal detectors and X-ray 
machines will miss.

Of course, machines are better at ducking charges of prejudice.  It may 
be less secure to have a computer decide who to wand, or to have random 
chance decide whose baggage to open, but it's easier to pretend that 
prejudice is not an issue.  "It's not the officer's fault; the computer 
selected him" plays well as a defense.  And in a world where security 
theatre still matters more than security, this is an important 
consideration.

For about a year now, I've been saying we can improve airport security 
by doing away with the security checkpoints and replacing them with 
well-trained officers looking out for suspicious activity.  It'll 
probably never happen, but at least this is a start.


<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/16/terror/main612369.shtml>


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              Crypto-Gram Reprints



Crypto-Gram is currently in its seventh year of publication.  Back 
issues cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found 
on <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.  These are a selection 
of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.

Encryption and Wiretapping
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0305.html#1>

Unique E-Mail Addresses and Spam
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0305.html#6>

Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity
<http://www.schneier.com./crypto-gram-0205.html#1>

Fun with Fingerprint Readers
<http://www.schneier.com./crypto-gram-0205.html#5>

What Military History Can Teach Network Security, Part 2
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#1>

The Futility of Digital Copy Protection
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#3>

Security Standards
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#7>

Safe Personal Computing
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#8>

Computer Security: Will we Ever Learn?
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#ComputerSecurityWillWeEve 
rLearn> or <http://tinyurl.com/2gj8x>

Trusted Client Software
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#TrustedClientSoftware> 
or <http://tinyurl.com/bo6p>

The IL*VEYOU Virus (Title bowdlerized to foil automatic e-mail filters.)
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0005.html#ilyvirus>

The Internationalization of Cryptography
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9905.html#international>

The British discovery of public-key cryptography
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9805.html#nonsecret>


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                      News



Interesting article on using vulnerability assessments to identify 
security policy problems:
<http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/security/2004/04/08/networksecurity.html>

Bill Gates's lengthy e-mail describing the company's security efforts:
<http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,91801,00.html>
<http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/execmail/2004/03-31security-print.asp> 
or <http://tinyurl.com/2umnx>

An interview with Amit Yoran, director of DHS National Cyber Security 
Division:
<http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID= 
18600292> or <http://tinyurl.com/2cetk>

The TSA is seriously looking into a trusted traveler 
program.  Honestly, I'm not sure of the need.  The long lines for 
security that plagued airports in the months after 9/11 are largely 
gone, and the top-tier frequent fliers that are likely to register for 
such a program already have a special fast lane through security.
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,9209 
9,00.html?nas=SEC-92099> or <http://tinyurl.com/3ybyt>

Good article on security companies fomenting fear to stimulate sales:
<http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1566249,00.asp>

Long, but good, study on national ID cards:
<http://books.nap.edu/html/id_questions/>

Okay, so this is gross.  But it's an interesting "security through 
obscurity" idea:
<http://www.shomertec.com/item.cfm?Action=newItems&variable=1164>

Looks like the TSA may abandon one of the post-9/11 airport rules: only 
ticketed passengers are allowed through security.  The rule made some 
sense when the security lines were long; only allowing ticketed 
passengers through meant fewer people in the lines.  But now that lines 
are shorter, the rule no longer makes sense.  On the other hand, the 
TSA is doing its "extra" screening at the security checkpoints.  Will 
everyone without a ticket be subject to this "extra" screening?
<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-04-19-airport-security_x.htm> 
or <http://tinyurl.com/yqax8>

New NSA patent on a key-escrow system.  Note that it was filed in 1996, 
when this kind of thing was in vogue.
<http://cryptome.org/nsa-access.htm>

Interesting essay on warranties of "cyberworthiness."  The author takes 
the idea of "seaworthiness" of ships and tries to apply it to 
software.  It's a way to manage liabilities.  Definitely worth reading.
<http://csdl.computer.org/comp/mags/sp/2004/02/j2073abs.htm>

How to turn a disposable camera into a stun gun.
<http://www.techtv.com/unscrewed/ihateyou/story/0,24682,3653392,00.html> 
  or <http://tinyurl.com/2xctm>
Don't tell anyone who works in airline security about this; they may 
start banning cameras on airplanes.

More than 70% of people would give their password to a stranger in 
exchange for a bar of chocolate.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3639679.stm>
This kind of thing doesn't surprise me.  Although I expect that at 
least some of those people gave a fake password, I'm sure many of them 
gave away their real passwords.

Good rebuttal to Mossberg's Wall Street Journal essay on network and 
computer security:
<http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/236>

Interesting Q&A with Paul Kocher.  I wish it were longer.
<http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105_2-5201619.html>

Massive distributed computing effort breaks a 109-bit elliptic curve 
crypto problem:
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/29/crypto_certicom/>

Good article on spyware (also read the sidebars):
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,9278 
4,00.html?SKC=home92784> or <http://tinyurl.com/2482t>

Seems that Microsoft's reward helped capture the author of the Sasser worm.
<http://news.com.com/2100-7349_3-5208762.html>

A fascinating piece of side-channel cryptanalysis: breaking RSA keys by 
listening to computers.
<http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/>

An island where everyone is constantly under surveillance:
<http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,63316,00.html>

The latest version of WinZip uses AES encryption.  (AES-CTR and 
HMAC-SHA1, if you want the details.)
<http://www.winzip.com/aes_info.htm>
Unfortunately, WinZip's encryption is vulnerable to several attacks: 
<http://www.cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/WinZip/>.
Moral (it's not a new one):  Cryptography is hard, and simply using AES 
in a product does not magically make it secure.


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                Counterpane News



Bruce Schneier is speaking at Princeton University on May 17:
<http://webserv03.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/team/webevent.cgi?cmd=showevent& 
ncmd=listmonth&cal=cal282&id=30564> or <http://tinyurl.com/2hxbf>

Schneier is speaking at EPIC's Freedom 2.0 Conference on May 20:
<http://www.epic04.org/>

Schneier is speaking at the South Sound Technology Conference on May 26:
<http://www.sstconference.com/>

Schneier is speaking at a security conference in Oslo on June 2:
<http://mnemonic.no/index.boom?cat=14&art=560>

Audio interview with Schneier:
<http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail119.html>

Counterpane's 1st quarter performance:
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20040827.html>

Counterpane announces partnership with Getronics:
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20040512.html>

Counterpane's webcast with Gartner:
<http://www.itworld.com/itwebcast/counterpane_msm/>


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    Security Notes from All Over:  Bypassing the USPS



If you're the U.S. government, you're scared about receiving 
anthrax-laden mail.  So you submit all incoming mail to various 
security screening and decontamination procedures.  But that slows mail 
down.  So you're forced to tell people how to get around those procedures:

"The Commission is requesting that any comment or request filed in 
paper form be sent by courier or overnight service, if possible, 
because U.S. postal mail in the Washington area and at the Commission 
is subject to delay due to heightened security precautions."

Now maybe we can make a case that services like FedEx are less 
anonymous than the mail, but that's not true.  Anyone with a stolen 
account number or credit card can toss a FedEx letter into a box.

<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/rfidworkshopfrn.pdf>


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       The Doghouse: Markland Technologies



Here's a fascinating website about Markland Technologies' VYN Double 
Cipher Keyless Transmission System.  The writing is more literate than 
usual for crackpots, but it has most of the standard snake-oil warning 
signs: the author displays a profound ignorance of cryptography, the 
algorithm is "perfect," it relies on impressive sounding mathematics, 
it's been reviewed and deemed correct by an unnamed expert, and the 
description is completely devoid of illuminating detail.

Interestingly, the author does admit that the algorithm has a practical 
drawback: it requires 50 bytes of overhead to transmit one byte of 
data.  No doubt being "keyless" makes up for that limitation.

In addition, naming a product "Crypto.Com" when you don't own the 
crypto.com domain seems a recipe for confusion.


<http://www.marklandtech.com/crypto.html>


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            The Doghouse:  IQ Networks



In general, the Doghouse is a showcase for stupid security companies or 
products.  Snake-oil cryptography, nonsense computer security, that 
sort of thing.  But this month we have something different: a company 
committing out-and-out fraud.

IQ Networks claims to have an impressive advisory board: Ross Anderson, 
Mihir Bellare, Steve Bellovin, Shafi Goldwasser, Peter Gutmann, Doug 
Stinson, Ron Rivest, and Markus Kuhn.  Unfortunately, none of these 
people had ever heard of the company.  Nor did they agree to have 
content of theirs on the site.  They also claim to be involved with the 
Honeynet Project -- none of the Honeynet guys had ever heard of them -- 
and Password Safe: I've never heard of them, either.

They have an impressive customer list.  I'll bet anything that all of 
them are fabrications, too.  Oh; they're under investigation by SANS 
for pirating SANS training material.

The rest of the site is also amusing, with a lot of generic security 
gobbledygook and not a whole lot of information.  The company claims to 
do pretty much anything.

Would you buy your security services from a company that lies about, 
um, everything?


Website:
<http://www.iq-net-works.com/>

Customer list (hard to find, and will probably be deleted soon):
<http://www.iq-net-works.com/clientes_english.html>

Peter Gutmann sent this link to me a few weeks ago, and has challenged 
the company about their use of his name.  In response, the company has 
pulled their list of technical advisors from its website.  It forgot, 
however, to pull the list from the Spanish website.
<http://www.iq-net-works.com/spanish/equipo.html>
Look quickly, I expect it will be gone soon.

You can also look them up on archive.org, which has saved the company's 
list of advisors (also in Spanish) from 2003.  (This website is great 
for finding old versions of webpages, or webpages that are no longer 
around.)
<http://web.archive.org/web/20030705082011/www.iq-net-works.com/equipo.h 
tml> or <http://tinyurl.com/2dbwj>


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           National Security Consumers



National security is a hot political topic right now, as both 
presidential candidates are asking us to decide which one of them is 
better fit to secure the country.

Many large and expensive government programs -- the CAPPS II airline 
profiling system, the US-VISIT program that fingerprints foreigners 
entering our country, and the various data-mining programs in research 
and development -- take as a given the need for more security.

At the end of 2005, when many provisions of the controversial Patriot 
Act expire, we will again be asked to sacrifice certain liberties for 
security, as many legislators seek to make those provisions permanent.

As a security professional, I see a vital component missing from the 
debate.  It's important to discuss different security measures, and 
determine which ones will be most effective.  But that's only half of 
the equation; it's just as important to discuss the costs.  Security is 
always a trade-off, and herein lies the real question: "Is this 
security countermeasure worth it?"

As Americans, and as citizens of the world, we need to think of 
ourselves as security consumers.  Just as a smart consumer looks for 
the best value for his dollar, we need to do the same.  Many of the 
countermeasures being proposed and implemented cost billions.  Others 
cost in other ways: convenience, privacy, civil liberties, fundamental 
freedoms, greater danger of other threats.  As consumers, we need to 
get the most security we can for what we spend.

The invasion of Iraq, for example, is presented as an important move 
for national security.  It may be true, but it's only half of the 
argument.  Invading Iraq has cost the United States enormously.  The 
monetary bill is more than $100 billion, and the cost is still 
rising.  The cost in American lives is more than 600, and the number is 
still rising.  The cost in world opinion is considerable.  There's a 
question that needs to be addressed: "Was this the best way to spend 
all of that?  As security consumers, did we get the most security we 
could have for that $100 billion, those lives, and those other things?"

If it was, then we did the right thing.  But if it wasn't, then we made 
a mistake.  Even though a free Iraq is a good thing in the abstract, we 
would have been smarter spending our money, and lives and good will, in 
the world elsewhere.

That's the proper analysis, and it's the way everyone thinks when 
making personal security choices.  Even people who say that we must do 
everything possible to prevent another Sept. 11 don't advocate 
permanently grounding every aircraft in this country.  Even though that 
would be an effective countermeasure, it's ridiculous.  It's not worth 
it.  Giving up commercial aviation is far too large a price to pay for 
the increase in security that it would buy.  Only a foolish security 
consumer would do something like that.

Oddly, when I first wrote this essay for CNet, I received a comment 
accusing me of being a pacifist.  To me, this completely misses the 
point.  I am not espousing a political philosophy; I am espousing a 
decision-making methodology.  Whether you are a pacifist or a 
militarist, a Republican or a Democrat, an American or 
European...you're a security consumer.  Different consumers will make 
different trade-offs, since much of this decision is subjective, but 
they'll use the same analysis.

We need to bring the same analysis to bear when thinking about other 
security countermeasures.  Is the added security from the CAPPS-II 
airline profiling system worth the billions of dollars it will cost, 
both in dollars and in the systematic stigmatization of certain classes 
of Americans?  Would we be smarter to spend our money on hiring Arabic 
translators within the FBI and the CIA, or on emergency response 
capabilities in our cities and towns?

As security consumers, we get to make this choice.  America doesn't 
have infinite money or freedoms.  If we're going to spend them to get 
security, we should act like smart consumers and get the most security 
we can.

The efficacy of a security countermeasure is important, but it's never 
the only consideration.  Almost none of the people reading this essay 
wear bulletproof vests.  It's not because they don't work -- in fact 
they do -- but because most people don't believe that wearing the vest 
is worth the cost.  It's not worth the money, or the inconvenience, or 
the lack of style.  The risk of being shot is low.  As security 
consumers, we don't believe that a bulletproof vest is a good security 
trade-off.

Similarly, much of what is being proposed as national security is a bad 
security trade-off.  It's not worth it, and as consumers we're getting 
ripped off.

Being a smart security consumer is hard, just as being a good citizen 
is hard.  Why?  Because both require thoughtful consideration of 
trade-offs and alternatives.  But in this election year, it is vitally 
important.  We need to learn about the issues.  We need to turn to 
experts who are nonpartisan -- who are not trying to get elected or 
stay elected.  We need to become informed.  Otherwise it's no different 
than walking into a car dealership without knowing anything about the 
different models and prices -- we're going to get ripped off.


This essay originally appeared, in a shorter form, on News.com:
<http://news.com.com/2010-7348-5204924.html>


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              Comments from Readers



From: Alan Morgan <[email protected]>
Subject: Stealing an Election

Stealing an election comes with a huge risk.  Ensuring that your 
favorite obscure political party gets 5% of the popular vote and thus 
qualifies for federal matching funds is less risky.  Suppose the Green 
Party or Libertarian Party gets 5% of the popular vote in the next 
election.  Is this a sign that their parties are resonating with the 
American public or a sign that a mad-as-hell software engineer decided 
to give them an election year present?



From: Robert <[email protected]>
Subject: Stealing an Election

In the discussions of voting machine security that I have read, most of 
the attention seems to have been paid on the vulnerability of the 
machines to "hacking," to alter the votes cast.

Here's an alternate scenario:  To alter the results of the election, 
isn't destroying the votes of the opposite side just as effective as 
adding votes for your side?  You simply target machines that are in 
areas that your opponent has a large advantage (the area is known to be 
radically for one side or the other) and cause the machines to break 
down and lose their data.

It seems to me that this would be easier to accomplish than hacking the 
code itself.  And since the machines have no paper trail or backup, 
there is no way to find out what the votes were.

You would want to wait until later in the election day, so as to have 
the largest effect possible.  It would take teams of people to do this 
though, as one or a few people would (hopefully) not be able to access 
more than one machine, or be able to enter more than one polling place, 
although fake IDs could be used to facilitate this.

The machines could be damaged with a small, battery powered "Zapper", 
like a hand held stun gun.  If hit in the right spot, the data would be 
erased from the machine, or the circuits sufficiently fried as to make 
it unreadable.

This method might raise red flags after the election, especially if 
machines in one area were shown to have a higher rate of failure than 
other areas.  But, as our court systems have shown, exactly what could 
be done about it?  They are not going to hold the election again.

This method probably would not be practical on a national or even a 
state level, but for city and other local types of elections, it could 
have an impact.



From: Ethan Sommer <[email protected]>
Subject: Stealing an Election

In your analysis, you are comparing apples and oranges.  The money 
spent on a campaign is either the candidate's own money, or donated in 
limited amounts ($2000 for presidential candidates) by donors and 
carefully tracked.  If someone wanted to spend the money illegally, 
they could (and would be better off) using money from people who wanted 
to donate more than the $2000 (probably much more) and not pulling from 
that carefully tracked bank account.

As evidence of this, you know how much money they raised, $3M-$8M; 
don't you think someone would notice if $1M went missing?  There is 
potentially much _more_ money available for illegal campaign spending 
than legal spending because campaign finance reform laws don't apply.

There is even the potential that a wealthy "interested party" (company 
or individual) might spend the money to fix the election without the 
candidate even knowing about it.



From: Ethan Benatan <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Stealing an Election

It seems that the value of an election outcome might be only loosely 
related to the investment (historically and publicly) made in an 
attempt to win it.  Campaign finance, even in the US, is fairly tightly 
controlled by law.  Actual value might be better measured by the 
influence gained by the person taking office.  This would certainly be 
a better predictor of the value of a switched vote.

It's also worth noting that potential attackers form a much larger 
group than the candidates themselves.  In many cases they are also less 
risk-averse and better funded.



From: Pierre Szwarc <[email protected]>
Subject: National ID Cards

As a French citizen living in France, carrying an ID card is a 
mandatory thing for me.  You're right, it doesn't add to ordinary 
security.  However, it doesn't add to the delays and hindrances as you 
seem to fear.  In all my 59 years, I've been asked for my ID card 
exactly *once* by the authorities in circumstances where I felt I 
didn't have to prove I'm me, and that was back in 1961, when terrorist 
attacks by French Algerian Nationalists (the OAS) were an everyday 
occurrence.  I've been asked to prove my identity in many instances, 
and the ID card is then quite handy, exactly the same way an US citizen 
would use a driver's license: for getting a drink in a bar just after I 
was of drinking age, for example, or opening a bank account.  Seen from 
Europe, the average American's concern for privacy in public places, as 
exemplified in TV serials and movies, looks like an overreaction to a 
nonexistent threat.  Having been submitted to the Nazi domination for 
almost 6 years, and even though the generation who actually lived these 
terrible times is on the way to extinction, the average French citizen 
probably wouldn't stand for the Patriot Act as it was imposed on you, 
which makes your concern about such a minor thing as an ID card appear 
ludicrous to us.



From: Pierre Honeyman <[email protected]>
Subject: National ID Cards

_Shake Hands with the Devil_, Gen. Romeo D'Allaire's account of the 
genocide in Rwanda, contains an even more chilling reason to reject 
national ID cards.

The genocidaires in Rwanda used national ID cards to both find the 
victims of their genocide, and also to eradicate all records of their 
existence.  The cards were checked to ensure that the right people were 
being murdered, then the cards were burned at the scene; meanwhile, 
bureaucrats complicit in the genocide removed records of the victims 
from that national databases, ensuring that the records confirmed these 
people had never existed.

The very thought of that potential use of national ID cards is chilling.

While it is an extremely compelling emotional argument to assert that 
such a thing could never happen here in the West, a good friend of mine 
from the former Yugoslavia assured me that that attitude was also 
prevalent there.



From: Arrigo Triulzi <[email protected]>
Subject: National ID Cards

Although I agree with everything you say about the uselessness of ID 
cards with respect to security, allow me to point out that there is a 
weak point in your discussion.

As an Italian citizen, I have been required since the age of 14 to 
carry a valid ID card (or passport) with me at all times when in 
Italy.  Ever since that age, my ID card was checked only once, in 1991 
during the first Gulf war.  It was a rather unpleasant experience, 
involving armed policemen with submachine guns pointed at me, and being 
slammed against a wall approximately 100m from home -- all for the 
simple reason that I had left home with a large bag and home happened 
to be above the then-U.S. consulate (it has since moved so pointless, 
rude and rough security checks can be performed on other unfortunate 
souls guilty of the terrible sin of their landlord renting office space 
to the USA).  Of course, it should also be mentioned that the same 
idiots who frisked me had seen me walk past their guard post 
innumerable times (the teams of four rotated between a small group of 
policemen), hence an even more pointless gesture "authorised" by the 
"heightened state of alert."

With the above exception, I have used my ID card for the following 
activities: to vote, to cross borders within Europe, to prove my 
identity when purchasing by cheque or credit card above a certain 
amount, to open a bank account, and to request other documents from the 
government.

That's pretty much it: no "interruptions" or "delays" due to "incessant 
ID checks."



From: Joao Luis Pinto <[email protected]>
Subject: National ID cards

I have the following comment on your article "National ID cards" in the 
April issue of your (excellent and interesting) CRYPTO-GRAM Newsletter:

I, for one, support the idea of a national ID card, provided it _only_ 
aims at authenticating individuals, not in providing generic 
information on them.

I live in Portugal.  The European (minus the UK) trend is to allow and 
to accept as natural the existence of national IDs, even with biometric 
information.  The problem, particularly in my country, is that several 
other documents are required for particular functions, like driving 
licenses, Social Security cards and IRS identification cards, some of 
them even asserting identity in some scenarios.  Some actions even 
require multiple documents.  This absence of information 
cross-reference creates several problems.  For example, notification of 
an address change has to be sent to several card issuing services.

I believe in a single ID replacing all the aforementioned ones, 
cross-referenced with context restricted information databases.

The sole function of that identity card would be to state that I am a 
unique person, with a particular address and a particular identifying 
number or code.  No more, no less.  All other information should reside 
in dedicated context-restricted databases, allowing easier setting of 
information access privileges (ex: the IRS should only know my fiscal 
data, not my criminal record).  The (for example, smartcard-enabled) ID 
would have my (State) digitally signed photo and digitally signed 
fingerprint and/or iris-print, allowing card-present, in-place, 
identity verification.  The ID should also provide a State Certificate 
Authority signed digital certificate that would assert my identity if 
required to do so digitally.  Naturally this CA would have to be 
created, and would only be has "strong" as the cryptographic algorithms 
behind it (to say the most)...  But this, I believe, is still stronger 
than the existing scenarios.

This would, I believe, benefit the assertion of identity, with a 
several level impact, on for example, web transaction security, credit 
card fraud and ID forgery.  Also, it would be an important step to 
reduce the "impedance mismatch" that exists between "social" and 
"digital" and/or "on-line"  authentication and identity.



From: Jonathan Bennett <[email protected]>
Subject: Bluetooth Privacy Hack

Regarding the piece in the latest Crypto-Gram on Bluesnarfing.  First, 
the trumpet-blowing bit: The Times didn't break this story.  ZDNet UK 
covered Bluesnarfing extensively during February this year, drawing it 
to the attention of both vendors and politicians.  That the journalist 
who wrote the article for The Times tried to get the details of one of 
our contacts from us illustrates this.  See:

<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/wireless/0,39020348,39145881,00. 
htm> or <http://tinyurl.com/22ptv>
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/wireless/0,39020348,39145886,00. 
htm> or <http://tinyurl.com/378l6>
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/wireless/0,39020348,39146427,00. 
htm> or <http://tinyurl.com/3ezbv>

Another reporter and I met Adam Laurie and witnessed Bluesnarfing 
taking place on a phone we took along, and were therefore sure wasn't 
tampered with.  I can offer a bit more insight than the Times article 
gives -- I'm a specialist technology journalist.  The vulnerability 
that allows Bluesnarfing appears to be an implementation problem in 
certain phones.  There is little evidence to suggest this is a flaw in 
the Bluetooth security model, and Laurie agrees with this 
assessment.  According to another consultant, the problem lies in how 
manufacturers implemented the object exchange (OBEX) protocol -- it 
allows the attacker to connect to the phone, ostensibly to use a 
service that doesn't require authentication, and then issue a request 
for a service that does, thus bypassing security.

I believe Bluesnarfing is less of an issue than Laurie or The Times 
would like you to think.  Unlike Internet-based attacks, it needs 
physical proximity to the target.  It's only certain models of phone 
that are vulnerable, and it's easy for the vendors to test for.  There 
is a very simple work-around: Turn Bluetooth off.  You can re-enable it 
for the short periods when you do need to use it.

It's also not the only way that sensitive details stored in phones are 
at risk -- it's far more likely that someone will leave a phone or PDA 
on the train after an evening's drinking.  Paper address books can be 
lost -- even newspaper reporters have been known to do this.  This is 
before we start thinking about social engineering attacks.  There are 
other things to worry about before we start to panic about Bluesnarfing.

We reported the issue since we believe that people do need to know 
about these things, and so people who have genuinely sensitive details 
stored on their phones can take steps against the attack.  Reporting 
the issue also brings pressure on manufacturers to fix such problems 
and in that respect the Times article, late as it was, will do some good.



From: Paul Leeming <[email protected]>
Subject: TSA-Approved Locks

I just read your cryptogram about TSA-approved locks, and how you don't 
consider it a big problem because they can just break your existing 
lock anyway.

Being a former airline pilot, I look at the problem from a different 
perspective -- what if someone unscrupulous wants to put something IN 
your luggage?  A master key would give luggage handlers the perfect 
tool to place drugs or other contraband into your luggage for 
collection at the other end.  You then run the risk of being "caught" 
with that contraband, essentially being framed for a crime you didn't 
commit.  It would also allow a potential terrorist to plant a small 
bomb INSIDE your case and give them plausible deniability since your 
case was "locked."

The real problem then becomes the fact that you don't KNOW that your 
luggage has been opened, whereas if your lock is missing because they 
broke it, you can report that fact to authorities and have them 
investigate (or at least create a paper trail in your defence).



From: Victor Bogado da Silva Lins <[email protected]>
Subject: License Plate Cover

You mentioned in your last crypto-gram newsletter about a cover that 
makes a license plate impossible to read from certain 
angles.  Brazilian people have thought in another low-tech solution for 
the same "problem", they simply tie some ribbons to the plate or the 
car itself; when the car is running (speeding) the ribbons fly and get 
in front of the plate making it difficult to read the plate.



From: Matthew Rubenstein <[email protected]>
Subject: Reader's Comment on "Security Benefits of Centralisation"

Drew Johnson has sent you a flawed analysis of "centralized security," 
falsely determining that "centralizing is good."  His first scenario 
protects 10 $100 deposits each with an "individual" safe that costs 
$200 to break.  But his safes are identical, so $200 buys entry to not 
only the first safe, but to every one of the 10.  So he has already 
"centralized" security, by protecting $1000 with a single $200 safe, in 
10 parts.  Bad strategy.  His second scenario merely puts all the $1000 
into a single safe, and posits a break-in cost raised to only 
$500.  Both scenarios are centralized, both cost less than the value of 
the prize, both are insecure.

If Mr. Johnson were to put $100 in each of 10 *different* $200 safes, 
which won't *all* fall once the first $200 is spent to break in, he'd 
have decentralized his security and beaten the crooks.  We have here a 
lesson not only in secure decentralization, but the security of 
polyculture, superior to the insecurity of monoculture.



From: "David Nasset, Sr." <[email protected]>
Subject: Reader's Comment on "Security Benefits of Centralisation"

Drew made three mistakes, all stemming from this statement: "However, 
as all the virtual vault computers have identical vulnerabilities, the 
same attack can be replayed at minimal marginal cost (e.g. $1)."  In 
fact, the flaw Drew found applies, not to the individual ID cards at 
all, but only to the national ID.

Mistake #1: This statement assumes that the locks are identical.  This 
is unlikely as, in the case of ID, the systems are likely to be very 
very different.  MasterCard does not use the same security system as 
VISA, and they both use a different security system than the Washington 
State Department of Licensing, which is still different than 
Immigration.  Thus, my bank card, credit card, driver's licence, and 
passport will likely not fall to the same attack.  Only if the system 
used is the same is the same attack likely to work every time.

Mistake #2: Even if the $100 locks are identical, it is still more 
profitable to go after the larger prize.

Suppose that Drew is right, and all $200-rated locks are the same, and 
can fall to a vulnerability that takes only $200 to find, and $1 to 
exploit, getting the culprit $100.  The attacker then uses ten attacks, 
and gets $1000, a profit of $790 and a 478% overall increase in his 
investment.

Now, suppose he attacks the $500 lock.  He finds an exploit he can use 
for $50 per attack (though $1 is probably almost as likely).  He now 
attacks ten different people's vaults.  His cost?  $950.  His 
gain?  $10,000, a profit of $9,050, or 1052% increase on his investment.

Mistake #3: The vulnerability that Drew described is far worse if we 
_do_ use the national ID card.  If an exploit can be repeated cheaply, 
and we are all trapped in the same system, then everyone's money is 
locked up with the same $500 lock.

Drew assumed that all of the $1 locks would fall to the same exploit, 
which we have already established is unlikely.  Thus, an attacker 
cannot get the special benefit of using the same attack cheaply over 
and over.

However, everyone who uses the $500 lock (national ID) is _required_ to 
use the _same lock_.  With the other locks, the locks are forced by 
circumstance to be different frequently, and, in many cases (Visa vs. 
MasterCard), the choice of lock is in the hands of the lock's 
purchaser.  At worse, the attacker can attack all Visas, or all 
Washington State driver's licences, or all US passports.  However, with 
national ID cards, you have no choice.  A repeatable exploit that works 
on one will work on ten, or a hundred, or a thousand different people, 
and when it works, it gets _everything_.

So, I'll stick with a system where the worst likely exploit gets many 
people's small piles, and I lose a small one, rather than go with a 
system where the same result means everybody loses everything that's 
being locked up.


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