CRYPTO-GRAM, January 15, 2007

                  CRYPTO-GRAM

               January 15, 2007

               by Bruce Schneier
                Founder and CTO
                 BT Counterpane
              [email protected]
             http://www.schneier.com
            http://www.counterpane.com


A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and=20
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

For back issues, or to subscribe, visit=20
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.

You can read this issue on the web at=20
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0701.html>.  These same essays=20
appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog:=20
<http://www.schneier.com/blog>.  An RSS feed is available.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

In this issue:
      Automated Targeting System
      Surveillance Cameras Catch a Cold-Blooded Killer
      Crypto-Gram Reprints
      Auditory Eavesdropping
      Tracking Automobiles Through their Tires
      Licensing Boaters
      Wal-Mart Stays Open During Bomb Scare
      News
      NSA Helps Microsoft with Windows Vista
      Microsoft Anti-Phishing and Small Businesses
      Not Paying Attention at the Virginia DMV
      More on the Unabomber's Code
      BT Counterpane News
      Radio Transmitters in Canadian Coins
      Choosing Secure Passwords
      Comments from Readers


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      Automated Targeting System



If you've traveled abroad recently, you've been investigated. You've=20
been assigned a score indicating what kind of terrorist threat you pose.=20
That score is used by the government to determine the treatment you=20
receive when you return to the U.S. and for other purposes as well.

Curious about your score? You can't see it. Interested in what=20
information was used? You can't know that. Want to clear your name if=20
you've been wrongly categorized? You can't challenge it. Want to know=20
what kind of rules the computer is using to judge you? That's secret,=20
too. So is when and how the score will be used.

U.S. customs agencies have been quietly operating this system for=20
several years. Called Automated Targeting System, it assigns a "risk=20
assessment" score to people entering or leaving the country, or engaging=20
in import or export activity. This score, and the information used to=20
derive it, can be shared with federal, state, local and even foreign=20
governments. It can be used if you apply for a government job, grant,=20
license, contract or other benefit. It can be shared with=20
nongovernmental organizations and individuals in the course of an=20
investigation. In some circumstances private contractors can get it,=20
even those outside the country. And it will be saved for 40 years.

Little is known about this program. Its bare outlines were disclosed in=20
the Federal Register in October. We do know that the score is partially=20
based on details of your flight record--where you're from, how you=20
bought your ticket, where you're sitting, any special meal requests--or=20
on motor vehicle records, as well as on information from crime,=20
watch-list and other databases.

Civil liberties groups have called the program Kafkaesque. But I have an=20
even bigger problem with it. It's a waste of money.

The idea of feeding a limited set of characteristics into a computer,=20
which then somehow divines a person's terrorist leanings, is farcical.=20
Uncovering terrorist plots requires intelligence and investigation, not=20
large-scale processing of everyone.

Additionally, any system like this will generate so many false alarms as=20
to be completely unusable. In 2005 Customs & Border Protection processed=20
431 million people. Assuming an unrealistic model that identifies=20
terrorists (and innocents) with 99.9% accuracy, that's still 431,000=20
false alarms annually.

The number of false alarms will be much higher than that. The no-fly=20
list is filled with inaccuracies; we've all read about innocent people=20
named David Nelson who can't fly without hours-long harassment. Airline=20
data, too, are riddled with errors.

The odds of this program's being implemented securely, with adequate=20
privacy protections, are not good. Last year I participated in a=20
government working group to assess the security and privacy of a similar=20
program developed by the Transportation Security Administration, called=20
Secure Flight. After five years and $100 million spent, the program=20
still can't achieve the simple task of matching airline passengers=20
against terrorist watch lists.

In 2002 we learned about yet another program, called Total Information=20
Awareness, for which the government would collect information on every=20
American and assign him or her a terrorist risk score. Congress found=20
the idea so abhorrent that it halted funding for the program. Two years=20
ago, and again this year, Secure Flight was also banned by Congress=20
until it could pass a series of tests for accuracy and privacy protection=
.

In fact, the Automated Targeting System is arguably illegal as well (a=20
point several congressmen made recently); all recent Department of=20
Homeland Security appropriations bills specifically prohibit the=20
department from using profiling systems against persons not on a watch li=
st.

There is something un-American about a government program that uses=20
secret criteria to collect dossiers on innocent people and shares that=20
information with various agencies, all without any oversight. It's the=20
sort of thing you'd expect from the former Soviet Union or East Germany=20
or China. And it doesn't make us any safer from terrorism.

News articles:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap_travel/20061208/ap_tr_ge/travel_brief_traveler=
_screening=20
or http://tinyurl.com/yygbda
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/02/AR2006110=
201810.html=20
or http://tinyurl.com/yl92on
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/local/16196947.htm=
=20
or http://tinyurl.com/y7lbnp

Federal Register posting:
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/06-9026.htm

Comments from civil liberties groups:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/pdf/ats_comments.pdf
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/ats/ats_comments.pdf
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/27593leg20061201.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/travel/ats/default.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1006/default.html

Automated terror profiling:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-108.html
http://www.schneier.com/essay-115.html
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060206fa_fact
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3D6784

No-fly list:
http://alternet.org/story/42646/
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/17468res20040406.html

Secure Flight:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/secure_flight.html

Total Information Awareness:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/

ATS may be illegal:
http://hasbrouck.org/IDP/IDP-ATS-comments.pdf
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/08/AR2006120=
801833.html=20
or http://tinyurl.com/u2j9s
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,72250-0.html
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/local/16196947.htm
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200612/120606.html

This essay, without the links, was published in Forbes.
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0108/032_print.html
They also published a rebuttal by William Baldwin, although it doesn't=20
seen to rebut any of the actual points.  "Here's an odd division of=20
labor: a corporate data consultant argues for more openness, while a=20
journalist favors more secrecy."  It's only odd if you don't understand=20
security.
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0108/014.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Surveillance Cameras Catch a Cold-Blooded Killer



I'm in the middle of writing a long essay on the psychology of security.=20
  One of the things I'm writing about is the "availability heuristic,"=20
which basically says that the human brain tends to assess the frequency=20
of a class of events based on how easy it is to bring an instance of=20
that class to mind.  It explains why people tend to be afraid of the=20
risks that are discussed in the media, or why people are afraid to fly=20
but not afraid to drive.

One of the effects of this heuristic is that people are more persuaded=20
by a vivid example than they are by statistics.  The latter might be=20
more useful, but the former is easier to remember.

That's the context in which I want you to read the very gripping story=20
about a cold-blooded killer caught by city-wide surveillance cameras.

"Federal agents showed Peterman the recordings from that morning. One=20
camera captured McDermott, 48, getting off the bus. A man wearing a=20
light jacket and dark pants got off the same bus, and followed a few=20
steps behind her.

"Another camera caught them as they rounded the corner. McDermott didn't=20
seem to notice the man following her. Halfway down the block, the man=20
suddenly raised his arm and shot her once in the back of the head.

"'I've seen shootings incidents on video before, ' Peterman said, 'but=20
the suddenness, and that he did it for no reason at all, was really scary=
.'"

I can write essay after essay about the inefficacy of security cameras.=20
  I can talk about trade-offs, and the better ways to spend the money.=20
I can cite statistics and experts and whatever I want.  But -- used=20
correctly -- stories like this one will do more to move public opinion=20
than anything I can do.

http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=3D2755037


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      Crypto-Gram Reprints



Crypto-Gram is currently in its tenth year of publication.  Back issues=20
cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found on=20
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-back.html>.  These are a selection=20
of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.

Anonymity and Accountability:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0601.html#1

NSA and Bush's Illegal Eavesdropping:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0601.html#12

The Security Threat of Unchecked Presidential Power:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0601.html#13

Fingerprinting Students:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0501.html#1

Cyberwar:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0501.html#10

Diverting Aircraft and National Intelligence:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0401.html#11

Fingerprinting Foreigners:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0401.html#3

Color-coded Terrorist Threat Levels:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0401.html#1

Militaries and Cyber-War:
http://www.schneier.com./crypto-gram-0301.html#1

A cyber Underwriters Laboratories?
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0101.html#1

Code signing:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0101.html#10

Block and stream ciphers:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0001.html#BlockandStreamCiphers


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      Auditory Eavesdropping



In the information age, surveillance isn't just for the police.=20
Marketers want to watch you, too: what you do, where you go, what you=20
buy.  Integrated Media Measurement, Inc. wants to know what you watch=20
and what you listen to -- wherever you are.

They do this by turning traditional ratings collection on its head.=20
Instead of a Nielsen-like system, which monitors individual televisions=20
in an effort to figure out who's watching, IMMI measures individual=20
people and tries to figure out what they're watching (or listening to).=20
  They do this through specially designed cell phones that automatically=20
eavesdrop on what's going on in the room they're in:

"The IMMI phone randomly samples 10 seconds of room audio every 30=20
seconds. These samples are reduced to digital signatures, which are=20
uploaded continuously to the IMMI servers.

"IMMI also tracks all local media outlets actively broadcasting in any=20
given designated media area (DMA). To identify media, IMMI compares the=20
uploaded audio signatures computed by the phones with audio signatures=20
computed on the IMMI servers monitoring TV and radio broadcasts. IMMI=20
also maintains client-provided content files, such as commercials,=20
promos, movies, and songs.

"By matching the signatures, IMMI couples media broadcasts with the=20
individuals who are exposed to them. The process takes just a few seconds=
.

"Panel Members may sometimes delay watching or listening to a program by=20
using satellite radio, DVRs, VCRs, or TiVo. IMMI captures these viewings=20
with a 'look-back' feature that recognizes when a Panel Member is=20
exposed to a program outside of its normal broadcast hour, and then goes=20
back in time (roughly two weeks) to identify it."

These cell phones are given away to test subjects, who get free service=20
in exchange for giving up all their privacy.

The company maintains that it's technology cannot possibly be used to=20
eavesdrop on in-room conversations or cell phone conversations.  But=20
their phone modifications demonstrate that cell phones can be modified=20
in other ways.  Can other eavesdropping software be installed on=20
off-the-shelf phones?  Can it be done without the owner's knowledge or=20
consent?  The potential for abuse here is enormous -- maybe not by IMMI,=20
but by someone.

Remember, the threats to privacy in the information age are not solely=20
from government; they're from private industry as well.  And the real=20
threat is the alliance between the two.

http://www.immi.com/
http://www.immi.com/dataClctn.html
http://www.immi.com/privacy.html


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      Tracking Automobiles Through their Tires



Automobile tires are now being outfitted with RFID transmitters:
I'll bet anything you can track cars with them, just as you can track=20
some joggers by their sneakers.

As I said before, the people who are designing these systems are putting=20
"zero thought into security and privacy issues. Unless we enact some=20
sort of broad law requiring companies to add security into these sorts=20
of systems, companies will continue to produce devices that erode our=20
privacy through new technologies. Not on purpose, not because they're=20
evil -- just because it's easier to ignore the externality than to worry=20
about it."

http://www.schrader-bridgeport.com/index.cfm?location_id=3D4816

Joggers and sneakers:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/tracking_people.html


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      Licensing Boaters



The U.S. Coast Guard is talking about licensing boaters.  It's being=20
talked about as an antiterrorism measure, in typical incoherent ways:

"The United States already has endured terrorism using small civilian=20
craft, albeit overseas: In 2000, suicide bombers in the port of Aden,=20
Yemen, used an inflatable boat to blow themselves up next to the U.S.=20
Navy destroyer USS Cole, killing 17 sailors and wounding 39 others.

"Terrorism experts point to other ways small boats potentially could=20
assist in attacks -- for example, a speedboat could deposit saboteurs at=20
the outlet pipes of a nuclear power plant, or hijackers aboard a cruise=20
ship. In a nightmare scenario, suicide bombers in a crowded harbor could=20
use small watercraft to detonate a tanker carrying ultra-volatile=20
liquefied natural gas, causing a powerful explosion that could kill=20
thousands."

And how exactly is licensing watercraft supposed to help?

There are lots of good reasons to license boats and boaters, just as=20
there are to license cars and drivers.  But counterterrorism is not one=20
of them.

http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=3D165344


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      Wal-Mart Stays Open During Bomb Scare



A Wal-Mart store in Mitchell, South Dakota receives a bomb threat.  The=20
store managers decide not to evacuate while the police search for the=20
bomb.  Presumably, they decided that the loss of revenue due to an=20
evacuation was not worth the additional security of an evacuation:

"During the nearly two-hour search Wal-Mart officials opted not to=20
evacuated the busy discount store even though police recomended [sic]=20
they do so. Wal-Mart officials said the call was a hoax and not a threat.=
"

I think this is a good sign.  It shows that people are thinking=20
rationally about security trade-offs, and not thoughtlessly being=20
terrorized.

Remember, though: security trade-offs are based on agenda.  From the=20
perspective of the Wal-Mart managers, the store's revenues are the most=20
important; most of the risks of the bomb threat are externalities.

Of course, the store employees have a different agenda -- there is no=20
upside to staying open, and only a downside due to the additional risk=20
-- and they didn't like the decision:

Here's one employee, quoted in the article:

"It's right before Christmas. They were swamped with people," she said.=20
"To me, they endangerd [sic] the community, customers and associates.=20
They put making a buck ahead of public safety."

http://argusleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=3D/20061227/NEWS/6122702=
8/-1/UPDATES=20
or http://tinyurl.com/y337kz


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      News



Scary story of someone who was told by his bank that he's no longer=20
welcome as a customer, because the bank's computer noticed a deposit=20
that wasn't "normal."  This is what happens when you use computer-based=20
profiling.  Expect more of this kind of thing as computers continue to=20
decide who is normal and who is not.
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/09/26/closing-in-on-suspicious-tr=
ansactions/=20
or http://tinyurl.com/jkf2n

Bill Maher's AccuTerror Forecast.  Funny.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDmnpph86B8U

Good article on airport security and the TSA. Matt Blaze and I got some=20
really good quotes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/business/yourmoney/17digi.html?ex=3D132=
4011600&en=3Ddb7ab439c0c47253&ei=3D5090&partner=3Drssuserland&emc=3Drss=20
or http://tinyurl.com/w24s2
By the way, people regularly chastise me for complaining about airline=20
security but not offering any solutions.  I generally send those people=20
to the last two paragraphs of this article.
http://www.schneier.com/essay-096.html

Cloning RFID passports in five minutes:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/6182207.stm

Airport security tip: don't put your baby through the X-ray machine:
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-baby20dec20,0,6460373.story

Here's someone who climbs a fence at the Raleigh-Durham Airport, boards=20
a Delta plane, and hangs out for a bunch of hours.  Best line of the=20
article:  "'It blows my mind that you can't get 3.5 ounces of toothpaste=20
on a plane,' he said, 'yet somebody can sneak on a plane and take a=20
nap.'"  Exactly.  We're spending millions enhancing passenger screening,=20
and we ignore the other, less secure, paths onto airplanes.  It's=20
idiotic, that's what it is.
http://www.newsobserver.com/102/story/523482.html

The TSA website is a fascinating place to spend some time wandering=20
around.  They have rules for handling monkeys:  "TSOs have been trained=20
to not touch the monkey during the screening process."
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/editorial_1056.shtm
And snow globes are prohibited in carry-on luggage:
"Snow globes regardless of size or amount of liquid inside, even with=20
documentation, are prohibited in your carry-on. Please ship these items=20
or pack them in your checked baggage."
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/prohibited/permitted-prohibited-it=
ems.shtm=20
or http://tinyurl.com/ptxdw

I get to make fun of airline security in "The New York Times."
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/business/02road.html?ex=3D1325394000&en=
=3D48df7bb5fe411ec9&ei=3D5090&partner=3Drssuserland&emc=3Drss=20
or http://tinyurl.com/ybc8aa

"The Family Guy" on airport security.  Amazingly enough, this was aired=20
before 9/11.  I think it makes much better satire now.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DJireQ-si43Q

Good essay by Matt Blaze on architecture and airport security:
http://www.crypto.com/blog/airport_architecture/

The Department of Homeland Security's own Privacy Office released a=20
report on privacy issues with Secure Flight, the new airline passenger=20
matching program.  It's not good, which is why the government tried to=20
bury it by releasing it to the public the Friday before Christmas.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-secure-flight-122006.p=
df=20
or http://tinyurl.com/yx6g5o
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/secure_flight_p_1.html
I've written about Secure Flight many times.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/secure_flight.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/secure_flight_n_1.html

The DHS Privacy Office also issued a report on MATRIX: The Multistate=20
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange.  MATRIX is a now-defunct data=20
mining and data sharing program among federal, state, and local law=20
enforcement agencies, one of the many data-mining programs going on in=20
government (TIA -- Total Information Awareness -- being the most famous,=20
and Tangram being the newest).  The report is short, and very critical=20
of the program's inattention to privacy and lack of transparency.=20
That's probably why it too was released to the public just before=20
Christmas, burying it in the media.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-matrix-122006.pdf
More on MATRIX:
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15701res20050308.html
More on data mining:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/gao_dm_rpt.pdf
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/data_mining_for.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/10/total_informati.html

OneDOJ is yet another massive U.S. government database, designed to=20
collect all federal law enforcement databases:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/25/AR2006122=
500483_pf.html=20
or http://tinyurl.com/v4jkq
Computerizing this stuff is a good idea, but any new systems need=20
privacy safeguards built in.  We need to ensure that: 1) inaccurate data=20
can be corrected, 2) data is deleted when it is no longer needed,=20
especially investigative data on people who have turned out to be=20
innocent, and 3) protections are in place to prevent abuse of the data,=20
both by people in their official capacity and people acting unofficially=20
or fraudulently.  In our rush to computerize these records, we're=20
ignoring these safeguards and building systems that will make us all=20
less secure.

US-VISIT, the program to keep better track of people coming in and out=20
of the U.S., is running into all sorts of problems.  It's being=20
scrapped, definitely temporarily and possibly permanently.  I like the=20
trade-off sentiment of this quote from one article:  "There are a lot of=20
good ideas and things that would make the country safer. But when you=20
have to sit down and compare all the good ideas people have developed=20
against each other, with a limited budget, you have to make choices that=20
are much harder."  My guess is that the program will be completely=20
killed by Congress in 2007.
http://www.navyseals.com/community/articles/article.cfm?id=3D10348
http://www.fcw.com/article97142-12-18-06-Web
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2915/1/1/
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpvis265028876dec26,0,5078413.stor=
y?coll=3Dny-editorials-headlines=20
or http://tinyurl.com/y6kyyn
More on US-VISIT:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-072.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0705
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/content_multi_image_0006.shtm
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/the_failure_of_1.html

The new Congress is -- wisely, I should add =96 also unlikely to fund the=
=20
700-mile fence along the Mexican border.
http://www.house.gov/hunter/news_prior_2006/fence.amendment.html

I hope Congress examines the Coast Guard's security failures and cost=20
overruns.
http://www.wirednewyork.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3D11761
Note that the article talks about serious infighting between the Coast=20
Guard and the FBI.  It would be nice if Congress spent some time on this=20
(actually important) problem.

The U.S. government is holding an open competition to select a vendor to=20
implement full-disk encryption on all government laptops.  Certainly,=20
encrypting everything is overkill, but it's much easier than figuring=20
out what to encrypt and what not to.  And I really like that there is a=20
open competition to choose which encryption program to use. It's=20
certainly a high-stakes competition among the vendors, but one that is=20
likely to improve the security of all products.  I've long said that one=20
of the best things the government can do to improve computer security is=20
to use its vast purchasing power to pressure vendors to improve their=20
security.  I would expect the winner to make a lot of sales outside of=20
the contract, and for the losers to correct their deficiencies so=20
they'll do better next time.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/us_government_t.html
I wonder if the NSA is involved in the evaluation at all, and if its=20
analysis will be made public.

War on Terror: the board game:
http://www.waronterrortheboardgame.com/thegame/

Peter Gutman's "A Cost Analysis of Windows Vista Content Protection" is=20
fascinating reading.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/a_cost_analysis.html
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/vista_cost.txt
http://www.miraesoft.com/karel/2006/12/25/cost-analysis-of-windows-vista-=
content-protection/=20
or http://tinyurl.com/yxdqry

The Communications Director for Montana's Congressman Denny Rehberg=20
solicited hackers to break into the computer system at his university=20
and change his grades (so they would look better when he eventually ran=20
for office, I presume).  The hackers posted the email exchange instead.=20
  Very funny.
http://www.attrition.org/postal/z/033/0871.html
http://www.networkworld.com/community/?q=3Dnode/9999

Everyone knows that writing your password on your monitor is bad=20
security.  Is it really so hard to realize that attaching your SecurID=20
token to your computer is just as bad?
http://thedailywtf.com/forums/thread/107695.aspx

AACS (Advanced Access Content System), the copy protection used in both=20
Blu Ray and HD DVD, might have been cracked =96 sort of.
http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?p=3D924730#post924730
http://www.edn.com/blog/400000040/post/1240006124.html
Excellent analysis:
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=3D1104
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=3D1106
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=3D1107
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=3D1108

A review of Rudyard Kipling's "Kim":  "Kipling packed a great deal of=20
information and concept into his stories, and in "Kim" we find The Great=20
Game: espionage and spying.  Within the first twenty pages we have=20
authentication by something you have, denial of service, impersonation,=20
stealth, masquerade, role- based authorization (with ad hoc=20
authentication by something you know), eavesdropping, and trust based on=20
data integrity.  Later on we get contingency planning against theft and=20
cryptography with key changes."
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/24.49.html#subj12
The book is out of copyright.  Read it here:
http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/prose/Ki=
m/index.html=20
or http://tinyurl.com/tpexg
http://kipling.thefreelibrary.com/Kim
http://www.readprint.com/work-935/Rudyard-Kipling

There's a proposal in Scotland to =96 believe it or not =96 issue ID card=
s=20
to children to stop bullying.  Seems like bullies take other kids' meal=20
cards, and by stopping that with ID cards bullying will magically cease.=20
  I agree with MSP Patrick Harvie's quote at the end of the article.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6210977.stm

A Florida judge ruled that the defeated candidate has no right to=20
examine the source code in the voting machines that determined the=20
winner in a disputed Congressional race.
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=3D/20061229/BREAKI=
NG/61229007=20
or http://tinyurl.com/ylydxx
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/ess-pdf.pdf

Meanwhile, Ciber Inc., the laboratory that tested most of the nation's=20
electronic voting machines, has been temporarily barred from approving=20
machines because it was found not to be following testing procedures and=20
was unable to document that it performed required tests.
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=3D171610

This molecular keypad lock is impressive:
http://www.engadget.com/2006/12/29/chemists-craft-molecular-keypad-lock/=20
or http://tinyurl.com/y94uau

The "New York Times" has a blog post on how easy it is to eavesdrop on=20
an open Wi-Fi session.  Nice to see this getting some popular attention.
http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/04/04pogue-email/

How to recover numbers from blurred images:
http://dheera.net/projects/blur.php
http://reddit.com/info/xaae/comments/cxbgy

Here's a dumb idea: MI5 terror alerts by e-mail:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6242883.stm
I've written about terror threat alerts in the UK before:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/britain_adopts.html

1933 article on crooked gambling technology.  In every generation,=20
criminals are near the leading edge in applying new technology to steal=20
things.
http://blog.modernmechanix.com/2007/01/09/strange-inventions-used-by-croo=
ked-gamblers/=20
or http://tinyurl.com/yzzchz

They're stealing the identities of our children!  Is this the kind of=20
thing that spurs legislators into action?  After all, we have to protect=20
our children.
http://www.bankrate.com/nltrack/news/debt/20070103_child_identity_theft_a=
1.asp=20
or http://tinyurl.com/vagyq


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      NSA Helps Microsoft with Windows Vista



The NSA "helped" Microsoft with Windows Vista.  They're not disclosing=20
what they did, of course, but Microsoft insiders have told me that it=20
was nothing more than assisting with assurance testing.

But I am suspicious.

It's called the "equities issue."  Basically, the NSA has two roles:=20
eavesdrop on their stuff, and protect our stuff.  When both sides use=20
the same stuff -- Windows Vista, for example -- the agency has to decide=20
whether to exploit vulnerabilities to eavesdrop on their stuff or close=20
the same vulnerabilities to protect our stuff.  In its partnership with=20
Microsoft, it could have decided to go either way: to deliberately=20
introduce vulnerabilities that it could exploit, or deliberately harden=20
the OS to protect its own interests.

A few years ago I was ready to believe the NSA recognized we're all=20
safer with more secure general-purpose computers and networks, but in=20
the post-9/11 take-the-gloves-off eavesdrop-on-everybody environment, I=20
simply don't trust the NSA to do the right thing.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010=
801352.html=20
or http://tinyurl.com/ycgv9f

Another opinion:
http://www.computerworld.com/blogs/node/4330


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Microsoft Anti-Phishing and Small Businesses



Microsoft has a new anti-phishing service in Internet Explorer 7 that=20
will turn the address bar green and display the website owner's identity=20
when surfers visit online merchants previously approved as legitimate.=20
So far, so good.  But the service is only available to corporations: not=20
to sole proprietorships, partnerships, or individuals.

Of course, if a merchant's bar doesn't turn green, it doesn't mean that=20
they're bad.  It'll be white, which indicates "no information."  There=20
are also yellow and red indications, corresponding to "suspicious" and=20
"known fraudulent site."  But small businesses are worried that=20
customers will be afraid to buy from non-green sites.

That's possible, but it's more likely that users will learn that the=20
marker isn't reliable and start to ignore it.

Any whitelist system like this has two sources of error.  False=20
positives, where phishers get the marker.  And false negatives, where=20
legitimate honest merchants don't.  Any system like this has to=20
effectively deal with both.

http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116649577602354120-5U4Afb0JPeyiOy1=
H_j3fVTUmfG8_20071218.html?mod=3Drss_free=20
or http://tinyurl.com/y7ezyr

"Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars", by L. Cranor,=20
S. Egleman, J. Hong, and Y. Zhang.
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/cmucylab06018.pdf


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Not Paying Attention at the Virginia DMV



Two men have been issued Virginia driver's licenses, even though they=20
were wearing outlandish disguises when they had their pictures taken at=20
the Department of Motor Vehicles.  The videos are on-line.

The Virginia DMV is now demanding that the two come back and get real=20
pictures taken.

I never thought I would say this, but I agree with everything Michelle=20
Malkin says on this issue:

"These guys have done the Virginia DMV -- and the nation -- a big favor.=20
Many of us have tried to argue how much of a joke these agencies and our=20
homeland security remain after 9/11--particularly the issuance of=20
driver's licenses (it was the Virginia DMV that issued state photo ID to=20
several 9/11 hijackers who were aided by illegal aliens).

"But few dissertations and policy analyses drive the message home more=20
effectively than these two damning videos."

I honestly don't know if she realizes that REAL ID won't solve this kind=20
of problem, though.  Nor will it solve the problem of people getting=20
legitimate IDs in the names of people whose identity they stole, or real=20
IDs in fake names by bribing DMV employees.

Videos:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3D_jOFf_KB3lI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DowvO640ODwA

Malkin:
http://michellemalkin.com/archives/006589.htm

REAL-ID:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/05/real_id.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      More on the Unabomber's Code



Last month I wrote about Ted Kaczynski's pencil-and-paper cryptography.=20
  It seems that he invented his own cipher, which the police couldn't=20
crack until they found a description of the code amongst his personal=20
papers.

The link I found was from KPIX, a CBS affiliate in the San Francisco=20
area.  Some time after writing it, I was contacted by the station and=20
asked to comment on some other pieces of the Unabomber's cryptography=20
for a future story (video online).

There were five new pages of Unabomber evidence that I talked about (all=20
available on the CBS5 website) All five pages were presented to me as=20
being pages written by the Unabomber, but it seems pretty obvious to me=20
that pages 4 and 5, rather than being Kaczynski's own key, are notes=20
written by a cryptanalyst trying to break the Unabomber's code.

In any case, it's all fascinating.

http://cbs5.com/investigates/local_story_363002905.html

Last month's entry:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/unabombers_code.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      BT Counterpane News



Schneier is participating on a panel on economic issues and security at=20
an OECD Security Workshop in Washington, DC on January 31st.

Schneier is speaking on "The Psychology of Security" at the RSA=20
Conference in San Francisco on February 6:
http://www.rsaconference.com/2007/US/

Schneier is speaking at the Linux World Open Solutions Summit in New=20
York on February 14:
http://www.linuxworldsummit.com/live/14/

Schneier is speaking at the 8th Annual Privacy and Security Conference=20
in Victoria, BC on February 15th:
http://www.rebootconference.com/privacy2007/about.php

DarkReading profile of Schneier:
http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=3D114230&WT.svl=3Dnews1_1

Schneier had an op-ed published in the "Arizona Star" about wholesale=20
surveillance:
http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/164048.php
The news hook I used was an article about the police testing a=20
vehicle-mounted automatic license plate scanner.  Unfortunately, I got=20
the police department wrong.  It's the Arizona State Police, not the=20
Tucson Police.
http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/144548


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Radio Transmitters in Canadian Coins



Bizarre:

"Canadian coins containing tiny transmitters have mysteriously turned up=20
in the pockets of at least three American contractors who visited=20
Canada, says a branch of the U.S. Defense Department.

"Security experts believe the miniature devices could be used to track=20
the movements of defence industry personnel dealing in sensitive=20
military technology."

Sounds implausible, really.  There are far easier ways to track someone=20
than to give him something he's going to give away the next time he buys=20
a cup of coffee.  Like, maybe, by his cell phone.

And soon after, we had an update:

"A report that some Canadian coins have been compromised by secretly=20
embedded spy transmitters is overblown, according to a U.S. official=20
familiar with the case.

"'There is no story there, ' the official, who asked not to be named,=20
told The Globe and Mail.

"He said that while some odd-looking Canadian coins briefly triggered=20
suspicions in the United States, he said that the fears proved=20
groundless: 'We have no evidence to indicate anything connected with=20
these coins poses a risk or danger.'"

Take your pick.  Either the original story was overblown, or those=20
involved are trying to spin the news to cover their tracks.  We=20
definitely don't have very many facts here.

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/spy_money
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070110.wspycoin0110/=
BNStory/National/home=20
or http://tinyurl.com/ym7zpb


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Choosing Secure Passwords



Ever since I wrote about the 34,000 MySpace passwords I analyzed, people=20
have been asking how to choose secure passwords.  There's been a lot=20
written on this topic over the years, but most of it seems to be based=20
on anecdotal suggestions rather than actual analytic evidence. What=20
follows is some serious advice.

The attack I'm evaluating against is an offline password-guessing=20
attack. This attack assumes that the attacker either has a copy of your=20
encrypted document, or a server's encrypted password file, and can try=20
passwords as fast as he can. There are instances where this attack=20
doesn't make sense. ATM cards, for example, are secure even though they=20
only have a four-digit PIN, because you can't do offline password=20
guessing. And the police are more likely to get a warrant for your=20
Hotmail account than to bother trying to crack your e-mail password.=20
Your encryption program's key-escrow system is almost certainly more=20
vulnerable than your password, as is any "secret question" you've set up=20
in case you forget your password.

Offline password guessers have gotten both fast and smart. AccessData=20
sells Password Recovery Toolkit, or PRTK. Depending on the software it's=20
attacking, PRTK can test up to hundreds of thousands of passwords per=20
second, and it tests more common passwords sooner than obscure ones.

So the security of your password depends on two things: any details of=20
the software that slow down password guessing, and in what order=20
programs like PRTK guess different passwords.

Some software includes routines deliberately designed to slow down=20
password guessing. Good encryption software doesn't use your password as=20
the encryption key; there's a process that converts your password into=20
the encryption key. And the software can make this process as slow as it=20
wants.

The results are all over the map. Microsoft Office, for example, has a=20
simple password-to-key conversion, so PRTK can test 350,000 Microsoft=20
Word passwords per second on a 3-GHz Pentium 4, which is a reasonably=20
current benchmark computer. WinZip used to be even worse -- well over a=20
million guesses per second for version 7.0 -- but with version 9.0, the=20
cryptosystem's ramp-up function has been substantially increased: PRTK=20
can only test 900 passwords per second. PGP also makes things=20
deliberately hard for programs like PRTK, also only allowing about 900=20
guesses per second.

When attacking programs with deliberately slow ramp-ups, it's important=20
to make every guess count. A simple six-character lowercase exhaustive=20
character attack, "aaaaaa" through "zzzzzz," has more than 308 million=20
combinations. And it's generally unproductive, because the program=20
spends most of its time testing improbable passwords like "pqzrwj."

According to Eric Thompson of AccessData, a typical password consists of=20
a root plus an appendage. A root isn't necessarily a dictionary word,=20
but it's something pronounceable. An appendage is either a suffix (90=20
percent of the time) or a prefix (10 percent of the time).

So the first attack PRTK performs is to test a dictionary of about 1,000=20
common passwords, things like "letmein," "password," "123456" and so on.=20
Then it tests them each with about 100 common suffix appendages: "1,"=20
"4u," "69," "abc," "!" and so on. Believe it or not, it recovers about=20
24 percent of all passwords with these 100,000 combinations.

Then, PRTK goes through a series of increasingly complex root=20
dictionaries and appendage dictionaries. The root dictionaries include:

* Common word dictionary: 5,000 entries
* Names dictionary: 10,000 entries
* Comprehensive dictionary: 100,000 entries
* Phonetic pattern dictionary: 1/10,000 of an exhaustive character search

The phonetic pattern dictionary is interesting. It's not really a=20
dictionary; it's a Markov-chain routine that generates pronounceable=20
English-language strings of a given length. For example, PRTK can=20
generate and test a dictionary of very pronounceable six-character=20
strings, or just-barely pronounceable seven-character strings. They're=20
working on generation routines for other languages.

PRTK also runs a four-character-string exhaustive search. It runs the=20
dictionaries with lowercase (the most common), initial uppercase (the=20
second most common), all uppercase and final uppercase. It runs the=20
dictionaries with common substitutions: "$" for "s," "@" for "a," "1"=20
for "l" and so on. Anything that's "leet speak" is included here, like=20
"3" for "e."

The appendage dictionaries include things like:

* All two-digit combinations
* All dates from 1900 to 2006
* All three-digit combinations
* All single symbols
* All single digit, plus single symbol
* All two-symbol combinations

AccessData's secret sauce is the order in which it runs the various root=20
and appendage dictionary combinations. The company's research indicates=20
that the password sweet spot is a seven- to nine-character root plus a=20
common appendage, and that it's much more likely for someone to choose a=20
hard-to-guess root than an uncommon appendage.

Normally, PRTK runs on a network of computers. Password guessing is a=20
trivially distributable task, and it can easily run in the background. A=20
large organization like the Secret Service can easily have hundreds of=20
computers chugging away at someone's password. A company called Tableau=20
is building a specialized FPGA hardware add-on to speed up PRTK for slow=20
programs like PGP and WinZip: roughly a 150- to 300-times performance=20
increase.

How good is all of this? Eric Thompson estimates that with a couple of=20
weeks' to a month's worth of time, his software breaks 55 percent to 65=20
percent of all passwords. (This depends, of course, very heavily on the=20
application.) Those results are good, but not great.

But that assumes no biographical data. Whenever it can, AccessData=20
collects whatever personal information it can on the subject before=20
beginning. If it can see other passwords, it can make guesses about what=20
types of passwords the subject uses. How big a root is used? What kind=20
of root? Does he put appendages at the end or the beginning? Does he use=20
substitutions? ZIP codes are common appendages, so those go into the=20
file. So do addresses, names from the address book, other passwords and=20
any other personal information. This data ups PRTK's success rate a bit,=20
but more importantly it reduces the time from weeks to days or even hours=
.

So if you want your password to be hard to guess, you should choose=20
something not on any of the root or appendage lists. You should mix=20
upper and lowercase in the middle of your root. You should add numbers=20
and symbols in the middle of your root, not as common substitutions. Or=20
drop your appendage in the middle of your root. Or use two roots with an=20
appendage in the middle.

Even something lower down on PRTK's dictionary list -- the=20
seven-character phonetic pattern dictionary -- together with an uncommon=20
appendage, is not going to be guessed. Neither is a password made up of=20
the first letters of a sentence, especially if you throw numbers and=20
symbols in the mix. And yes, these passwords are going to be hard to=20
remember, which is why you should use a program like the free and=20
open-source Password Safe to store them all in. (PRTK can test only 900=20
Password Safe 3.0 passwords per second.)

Even so, none of this might actually matter. AccessData sells another=20
program, Forensic Toolkit, that, among other things, scans a hard drive=20
for every printable character string. It looks in documents, in the=20
Registry, in e-mail, in swap files, in deleted space on the hard drive=20
... everywhere. And it creates a dictionary from that, and feeds it into=20
PRTK.

And PRTK breaks more than 50 percent of passwords from this dictionary=20
alone.

What's happening is that the Windows operating system's memory=20
management leaves data all over the place in the normal course of=20
operations. You'll type your password into a program, and it gets stored=20
in memory somewhere. Windows swaps the page out to disk, and it becomes=20
the tail end of some file. It gets moved to some far out portion of your=20
hard drive, and there it'll sit forever. Linux and Mac OS aren't any=20
better in this regard.

I should point out that none of this has anything to do with the=20
encryption algorithm or the key length. A weak 40-bit algorithm doesn't=20
make this attack easier, and a strong 256-bit algorithm doesn't make it=20
harder. These attacks simulate the process of the user entering the=20
password into the computer, so the size of the resultant key is never an=20
issue.

For years, I have said that the easiest way to break a cryptographic=20
product is almost never by breaking the algorithm, that almost=20
invariably there is a programming error that allows you to bypass the=20
mathematics and break the product. A similar thing is going on here. The=20
easiest way to guess a password isn't to guess it at all, but to exploit=20
the inherent insecurity in the underlying operating system.

Analyzing 24,000 MySpace passwords:
http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,72300-0.html

Choosing passwords:
http://psychology.wichita.edu/surl/usabilitynews/81/Passwords.htm
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/IE/community/columns/passwords.mspx
http://www.brunching.com/passwordguide.html

AccessData:
http://www.accessdata.com

Password Safe:
http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,72458-0.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

      Comments from Readers



There are hundreds of comments -- many of them interesting -- on these=20
topics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and join=20
in.

http://www.schneier.com/blog


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,=20
insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.  You can=20
subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at=20
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.  Back issues are also=20
available at that URL.

Comments on CRYPTO-GRAM should be sent to [email protected].=20
Permission to print comments is assumed unless otherwise stated.=20
Comments may be edited for length and clarity.

Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM, in whole or in part, to=20
colleagues and friends who will find it valuable.  Permission is also=20
granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as it is reprinted in its entiret=
y.

CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier.  Schneier is the author of the=20
best sellers "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied=20
Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish algorithms.=20
He is founder and CTO of BT Counterpane, and is a member of the Board of=20
Directors of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).  He is a=20
frequent writer and lecturer on security topics.  See=20
<http://www.schneier.com>.

BT Counterpane is the world's leading protector of networked information=20
- the inventor of outsourced security monitoring and the foremost=20
authority on effective mitigation of emerging IT threats.  BT=20
Counterpane protects networks for Fortune 1000 companies and governments=20
world-wide.  See <http://www.counterpane.com>.

Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter.  Opinions expressed are not=20
necessarily those of BT or BT Counterpane.

Copyright (c) 2007 by Bruce Schneier.