Re: PCI DSS & Firewalls
"Paul D. Robertson" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.firewalls.wizards |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Thu, 2 Apr 2009, AMuse wrote: > Isn't the point of pen-testing to take up an attackers' perspective and > hit all your defenses to see if you missed something or misconfigured > something? I mean, unless you're the only person who set up 100% of No, it's to scare the customer into buying security. > your infrastructure, how are you to know that someone didn't > accidentally leave telnet open? If you didn't write 100% of the webapps > your company is using, how are you to know they don't have SQL injection > flaws? If you do a configuration audit, and code audits and build applications using proper design standards, then a pen test will give you no incremental value. Let's take a common and costly example: Your last administrator has the firewall set up to allow him to SSH into your main database server- but only from his home IP address. He was laid off last week and is disgruntled. Now answer these questions: What will a remote pen test show? What will an on-site pen test show? What will a configuration revew show? Given all of the above, what additional value does a pen test bring to the table? Paul ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal opinions [email protected] which may have no basis whatsoever in fact." Moderator: Firewall-Wizards mailing list Art: http://PaulDRobertson.imagekind.com/