Re: Choir, preaching to (was Re: Proxy advantage)
Marcus Ranum <[email protected]> Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:19:38 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.firewalls.wizards |
|---|---|
| Organization | Ranum.com |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Bennett Todd wrote: > A low-tech kludge for must-have apps with unacceptable security issues > is to run them on a sandbox machine. Happily, in this day of VMs, the > cost of doing so is smaller than it used to be. I remember "back in the day" when some of us recommended running dangerous stuff on disposable machines, with the execution context under 'chroot' or whatever. Today's version of that is a VM - but the problem is that the VMs are seldom as stripped-down as a 'chroot' environment. Consequently, there are problems. One of the big problems I have with VMs is that the guarantee of isolation that the VM theoretically provides keeps getting broken. Remember - the kernel barrier between the O/S and the applications is also supposed to be inviolable, and the Windows-using community has been writhing with pain for a decade+ over the consequences of breaking down that barrier (because it was a pain for users, of course) (it was also a pain for malware, of course) I'm not confident that the same fools who made the decision to make the kernel barrier permeable aren't going to make the VM barrier permeable, as well, for exactly the same reason. And with exactly the same results.* Another problem with the idea of "must have" pieces of bad code is that since they are "must have" they wind up being critical and cannot be trivially reverted or rolled back. It's one thing if we're talking about a nameserver (which is simple, relatively static data) but it gets vastly trickier when that crappy app is trying to update your backend databases. mjr. (* Yes, we're already seeing them) -- Marcus J. Ranum CSO, Tenable Network Security, Inc. http://www.tenable.com