Re: Preventing layer 3/4 evasions

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[Sorry, fat fingered the send key on the prior post.]

Hi Steve,

> I'm curious about the market status quo and trends in the area of  
> how network IDS/IPS products are dealing with layer 3/4 evasion  
> techniques (a la Ptacek & Newsham: ambiguous segmentation &  
> fragmentation, ttl tricks, etc.).  The Handley/Paxson/Kreibich paper  
> from Usenix01 lists three approaches (not counting "use a host-based  
> IDS" :-) ):
> 1. inline normalization
> 2. profiling the intranet and using target-specific algorithms
> 3. bifurcating analysis
>
> From what I've read, Snort is going route #2, with the Sourcefire  
> RNA system doing the profiling.
>
> - Is there any public information regarding which approach (if any)  
> other commercial systems are using?

As far as I can tell most of the commercial systems that are available  
today use static configuration for layer 3/4 anti-evasion where they  
allow configurability at all.  Some of the vendors appear to be taking  
advantage of the fact that they run inline to perform some level of  
normalization but for the most part commercial systems don't allow you  
to do very much at all, especially not in a way that reflects the  
dynamic nature of the networks in which the devices are installed.

> - Does Snort's decision indicate any sort of consensus that #2 is  
> the best approach, or would that be considered controversial?   
> (Clearly #3 isn't practical as a general technique, but the Handley  
> paper seems to make a good case for #1.)

Nope, it reflects my bias. :)  My bias is based on my experiences of  
the past 10 years as well as the realities associated with deploying  
these technologies, so there is a decent amount of thought behind them.

I'll comment on the methods.

1) Inline normalization

* Pros: Removes traffic anomalies so the codepaths for anti-evasion  
mechanisms are simpler.  One scrubber allows all devices behind it to  
enjoy a normalized packet stream.  Doesn't have to care about or track  
the network it's protecting so the normalization technology is simpler  
and, in theory, very robust.

* Cons: Deploying an inline device has very different requirements for  
uptime, latency and performance across the device than the passive  
devices it's aiding.  Some organizations react very negatively to  
introducing inline packet mangling devices.  Packet scrubbers can also  
interfere with some useful functions like passive OS fingerprinting.   
Provides no coverage for evasive attackers behind the device.

2) Network profiling and context-based analysis

* Pros: Doesn't require an inline device and concomitant political/ 
technical signoff.  Able to profile all devices continuously (assuming  
optimal deployment) and dynamically update IDS/IPS.  Gathered  
information has uses beyond just straight anti-evasion.

*Cons: Getting full coverage of the network can be challenging.  Bad  
profiles skew the anti-evasion models.  Data management and  
communication can be a challenge.  Network traffic analyzers have to  
be modified to work with the data produced by the context generator.

3) Bifurcation.

Well, suffice to say I just think bifurcation is a bad idea.

> - Do you all feel that existing approaches (like Snort's, or perhaps  
> some commercial implementation of #1) are adequate, or is there a  
> need for a more robust solution?

I think that the methods we've deployed in Snort and the ones we're  
working on for the next generation of Snort engine are certainly  
adequate.  It seems to me that evasion is moving much more heavily to  
layer 7 anyway so perhaps it's a moot point.

	-Marty

- --
Martin Roesch - Founder/CTO, Sourcefire Inc. - +1-410-290-1616
Sourcefire - Security for the Real World - http://www.sourcefire.com
Snort: Open Source IDP - http://www.snort.org


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