Re: Internet SSH scans

[email protected] Thu, 23 Mar 2006 15:07:38 -0500
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.incidents
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:01:08 GMT, [email protected] said:

>     retrys, ... for my understanding it doesnt 
>     make sence to lockout root. there are enought 
>     exploits to gain root access anyway.

This is more an "auditing" requirement than providing extra security.

If I get called at 3:02AM because backups failed because some chucklehead made
a typo in a config file, which do I want to see in the logs?

A) Somebody ssh'ed from the terminal server as root and vi'ed /etc/back.config

B) Joe ssh'ed in from the terminal server, and did 'sudo vi /etc/back.config'

In the second case, I can call Joe at 3:09AM and ask him what crack he was
smoking at 1:15AM....  which is the whole point of the no-root restriction.

Remember - the *single* most dangerous thing to the average Cisco router isn't
a hacker with a 0-day IOS sploit - it's the "banana eater with enable"(*).  The same
is true for every other operating system....

(*) "banana eater" - the low level tech staff at a NOC are often referred to as
'NOC monkeys'. 'enable' is the IOS equivalent of a Unixoid 'su'.
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