RE: New Trojan on the block [CIA Trojan]

"Smith, Donald" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.intrusions
Message-ID <[email protected]>

[email protected] GCIA
pgpFingerPrint:9CE4 227B B9B3 601F B500  D076 43F1 0767 AF00 EDCC
Give a man a fish feed em for a day. Teach em to phish and feed em till
people quit falling for phishing attempts. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] 
> [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Nick 
> FitzGerald
> Sent: Sunday, August 29, 2004 5:08 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [Intrusions] New Trojan on the block [CIA Trojan]
> 
> 
> Chris Norton wrote:
> 
> > As far as CIA goes thats what the group who coded it is 
> calling it [not
> > refering to the government agency] as taken from the readme 
> file CIA 1.23 PB
> > 1 ( Public Beta 1 ) ...
> 
> This being but one of dozens of obvious reasons why intelligent anti-
> malware folk do not name things as their makers wish...
> 
> <<rest snipped>>
> 
> I'm intrigued that, according to your first post, you 
> "submitted it to 
> the fine folks at ISC" and later seem 
> surprised/upset/concerned that no 
> AV detect it yet:
> 
>    As of this writing there are no known AV signatures available to
>    detect this new trojan and there have been over 2,800 downloads...
> 
>    ...but the actual client program that infects the machines still
>    goes by undetected.
> 
> I have no reason to believe the "fine folks at ISC" will not have, 
> eventually, forwarded samples to their antivirus contacts, 
> but sending 
> such suspect code to a network traffic reporting group, where malware 
> research would seem to be at least a secondary priority, is surely 
> introducing at least one, if not several, unnecessary delays to the 
> process of getting AV detection for something new and perhaps already 
> deployed to close to three thousand machines.

The "fine folks at ISC" do infact submit malware to the av vendors. 
They also have a malware team that does analysis of NEW malware. If you
provided contact infomation they usually follow up.


> 
> For your future reference, here is my standard list of 
> well-known major 
> AV developer suspect file submission addresses.  Note that 
> nowadays it 
> is probably advisable to use the submission method listed for 
> NAI/McAfee for all these addresses (and mention in the accompanying 
> message body that the .ZIP is encrypted and what the password is).
> 
>    Authentium (Command Antivirus)  <[email protected]>
>    Computer Associates (US)        <[email protected]>
>    Computer Associates (Vet/EZ)    <[email protected]>
>    DialogueScience (Dr. Web)       <[email protected]>
>    Eset (NOD32)                    <[email protected]>
>    F-Secure Corp.                  <[email protected]>
>    Frisk Software (F-PROT)         <[email protected]>
>    Grisoft (AVG)                   <[email protected]>
>    H+BEDV (AntiVir, Vexira engine) <[email protected]>
>    Kaspersky Labs                  <[email protected]>
>    Network Associates (McAfee)     <[email protected]>
>      (use a ZIP file with the password 'infected' without the quotes)
>    Norman (NVC)                    <[email protected]>
>    Panda Software                  <[email protected]>
>    Sophos Plc.                     <[email protected]>
>    Symantec (Norton)               <[email protected]>
>    Trend Micro (PC-cillin)         <[email protected]>
>      (Trend may only accept files from users of its products)
> 
> Most of these addresses are monitored either by 24x365 
> malware support 
> and analysis teams, or have distributed processing around the globe 
> providing (close to) 24x365 coverage.  Several have automated code 
> analysis systems that get the "first look" at submitted files, 
> classifying them for further attention or simply sending back canned 
> reports of the "we detect it in the DEF update that should 
> ship at X or 
> you can download a pre-QA copy at Y".  Depending on the nature of the 
> files you submit, you should get several quite prompt responses, at 
> some of which you'll have to ignore (e.g. a downloader detection is 
> pretty meaningless as the target of a downloader is usually 
> considered 
> to be a non-code variable and ignored by any semi-intelligent 
> detection 
> of that downloader, so the same downloader can be used multiple times 
> configured to snag stuff from different URLs and will always be 
> detected as the same downloader and variant).
> 
> 
> -- 
> Nick FitzGerald
> Computer Virus Consulting Ltd.
> Ph/FAX: +64 3 3529854
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Intrusions mailing list
> [email protected]
> http://www.dshield.org/mailman/listinfo/intrusions
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
Intrusions mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.dshield.org/mailman/listinfo/intrusions
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.