RE: Securing Fedora Core 4

"Charles Heselton" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.linux
Organization Home
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Will Yonker [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 5:34 AM
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: RE: Securing Fedora Core 4
> 
> <quote who="Charles Heselton">
> 
> > 4.  Set up your firewall.  I like firestarter (should come 
> with FC4).
> >  Other people like shorewall.  Ultimately, it's the same outcome.
> 
> I wasn't fond of the way Firestarter worked at all.  I'll take a
> close look at Shorewall.  I was really worried about rolling my own
> firewall but
> didn't like Firestarter or the standard Fedora one.

Like I said, they all provide the same outcome.  They all are
glorified wrappers for iptables, so they all have the same ultimate
effect.  I believe shorewall is a little more "low-level", and may
provide more of the granularity that you are probably looking for.  I
haven't used shorewall, so I can't say for sure.  If that one doesn't
work out, I would recommend finding/writing a script (at least) to
manage your iptables configuration.  It makes for easy management and
configurability, and you also are less likely to "fat-finger"
something.  ;-)

> 
> > 5.  Install/configure Bastille  (this sort of overlaps some
> > things, but can also affect installation of others, so it might
> > be a good idea to do it early.  SELinux might be better here, but
> > I think SELinux depends on some of the kernel hooks and such. 
> > The two have really meshed over time, and I haven't followed it
> > that closely. 
> 
> I abandoned my attempts at getting SELinux working quite the 
> way I like. 
> I installed LIDS and really liked the way it worked.  The 
> ACLs are easy to
> understand and just as easy to configure.  My major problem 
> with LIDS is
> it doesn't like BIND.  There are things that SELinux does that LIDS
> doesn't but I can live with that.

I know what you mean.  I haven't really followed SELinux since the
days of the NSA 2.2 kernel.  It seems to have advanced quite a bit,
with all of the kernel hooks and such.  What's important is that you
know what's going on with your system, and that you're able to manage
it.  I haven't used LIDS, but I've heard about it some, and if it
works for you then use it.  I'll probably look into it a little
deeper myself now.  ;-)

> 
> > 7.  If you have another mail host for external mail
> > (administrative messages and such), configure sendmail to only
> > send mail internally (local system).  You can configure spam
> > assassin if you want, but unless you're actually transferring
> > bulk mail, you don't really need it, nor the other 3 spam filters
> > you listed.
> 
> The hosts will receive email for the domain so spam filters 
> are required. 

So, every host will be an MTA?

> Some of our users are really dumb about what sites they go to. 
> Their email addresses seem to get harvested every time we change 
> them...  User
> education has not worked so we will block some sites with
> Dansguardian/squid + some plugins.

Again with the host function segregation.  Every host is going to be
an HTTP proxy?

>  I doubt this will solve 
> the problem
> totally, so all the spam filters...
> 

I've always said that users are the weakest link in any chain of
security.  That will never change.

> I've tried Spamassassin by itself but it doesn't get a lot of 
> spam without
> a WHOLE lot of tweaking.  Simply lowering the number just blocks
> valid email.  Lol

This is understandable.  But I'm still a little confused about every
single host being an MTA.  I mean your network, is your network.  But
it seems like you are going to be deploying enough servers that you
should have the ability to segregate function a bit.  If you really
have such a big problem with "dumb users" and/or targeted
spam/phishing, a commercial product (and/or a more robust linux
distro) might be in order.  JMHO

> 
> > 9.  Now configure tripwire (or aide).
> >
> > It's tough to try to generalize this into a concise format.  If
> > you have a large enough environment to warrant specific purpose
> > hosts, you should do that.  It will allow you to be much more 
> specific about
> > your security measures, and will provide much less headache in
> > regards to management.
> 
> I took this from a spreadsheet.  I really was trying to keep 
> the wording
> down to a check list format so I could check them off as I 
> did them.  It's
> hard to put very much information in the space I left myself.  lol
> 
> Thank you for the tips.

Well, once you get the general gist down, you can break it up and
simplify it into a checklist.  Someone else mentioned that security
is an attitude.  This is true.  It's a way of thinking about how you
manage your systems.  Identify your critical assets, i.e. what data
are you trying to protect?  Then, build your protection scheme from
the inside out.

- --
- - Charlie
 
5A27 58D2 C791 8769 D4A4  F316 7BF8 D1F6 4829 EDCF
 
 In memoriam:  http://www.militarycity.com/valor/1029976.html



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