RE: Securing Fedora Core 4
"Charles Heselton" <[email protected]>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > -----Original Message----- > From: Will Yonker [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 5:34 AM > To: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: RE: Securing Fedora Core 4 > > <quote who="Charles Heselton"> > > > 4. Set up your firewall. I like firestarter (should come > with FC4). > > Other people like shorewall. Ultimately, it's the same outcome. > > I wasn't fond of the way Firestarter worked at all. I'll take a > close look at Shorewall. I was really worried about rolling my own > firewall but > didn't like Firestarter or the standard Fedora one. Like I said, they all provide the same outcome. They all are glorified wrappers for iptables, so they all have the same ultimate effect. I believe shorewall is a little more "low-level", and may provide more of the granularity that you are probably looking for. I haven't used shorewall, so I can't say for sure. If that one doesn't work out, I would recommend finding/writing a script (at least) to manage your iptables configuration. It makes for easy management and configurability, and you also are less likely to "fat-finger" something. ;-) > > > 5. Install/configure Bastille (this sort of overlaps some > > things, but can also affect installation of others, so it might > > be a good idea to do it early. SELinux might be better here, but > > I think SELinux depends on some of the kernel hooks and such. > > The two have really meshed over time, and I haven't followed it > > that closely. > > I abandoned my attempts at getting SELinux working quite the > way I like. > I installed LIDS and really liked the way it worked. The > ACLs are easy to > understand and just as easy to configure. My major problem > with LIDS is > it doesn't like BIND. There are things that SELinux does that LIDS > doesn't but I can live with that. I know what you mean. I haven't really followed SELinux since the days of the NSA 2.2 kernel. It seems to have advanced quite a bit, with all of the kernel hooks and such. What's important is that you know what's going on with your system, and that you're able to manage it. I haven't used LIDS, but I've heard about it some, and if it works for you then use it. I'll probably look into it a little deeper myself now. ;-) > > > 7. If you have another mail host for external mail > > (administrative messages and such), configure sendmail to only > > send mail internally (local system). You can configure spam > > assassin if you want, but unless you're actually transferring > > bulk mail, you don't really need it, nor the other 3 spam filters > > you listed. > > The hosts will receive email for the domain so spam filters > are required. So, every host will be an MTA? > Some of our users are really dumb about what sites they go to. > Their email addresses seem to get harvested every time we change > them... User > education has not worked so we will block some sites with > Dansguardian/squid + some plugins. Again with the host function segregation. Every host is going to be an HTTP proxy? > I doubt this will solve > the problem > totally, so all the spam filters... > I've always said that users are the weakest link in any chain of security. That will never change. > I've tried Spamassassin by itself but it doesn't get a lot of > spam without > a WHOLE lot of tweaking. Simply lowering the number just blocks > valid email. Lol This is understandable. But I'm still a little confused about every single host being an MTA. I mean your network, is your network. But it seems like you are going to be deploying enough servers that you should have the ability to segregate function a bit. If you really have such a big problem with "dumb users" and/or targeted spam/phishing, a commercial product (and/or a more robust linux distro) might be in order. JMHO > > > 9. Now configure tripwire (or aide). > > > > It's tough to try to generalize this into a concise format. If > > you have a large enough environment to warrant specific purpose > > hosts, you should do that. It will allow you to be much more > specific about > > your security measures, and will provide much less headache in > > regards to management. > > I took this from a spreadsheet. I really was trying to keep > the wording > down to a check list format so I could check them off as I > did them. It's > hard to put very much information in the space I left myself. lol > > Thank you for the tips. Well, once you get the general gist down, you can break it up and simplify it into a checklist. Someone else mentioned that security is an attitude. This is true. It's a way of thinking about how you manage your systems. Identify your critical assets, i.e. what data are you trying to protect? Then, build your protection scheme from the inside out. - -- - - Charlie 5A27 58D2 C791 8769 D4A4 F316 7BF8 D1F6 4829 EDCF In memoriam: http://www.militarycity.com/valor/1029976.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQzQi0Hv40fZIKe3PEQL55wCfb5PKdmQG3LWDuazcvbumDMa1AucAoJob GWCRO+3NQDbP1G7bBdp9yd6e =mgHk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----