RE: Bitlocker without PIN
Alexander Kurt Keller <[email protected]> Wed, 23 Feb 2011 21:45:15 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.microsoft |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Speaking as an individual and not representing my institution. If you can h= andle the support overhead I would require the PIN or physical key in addit= ion to the transparent TPM key for added protection.=20 Re: What happens if he boots with a linux live CD/USB? Can he decrypt the d= rive? The key is stored in the TPM. Does linux have access to the TPM? No. This is not a viable attack, these links explain in a nutshell how TPM = works: http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows-vista/BitLocker-Drive-Encryption= -Overview http://geekswithblogs.net/sdorman/archive/2006/07/04/84045.aspx There are a number of viable attacks (and plenty more theoretical attacks) = against all types of full drive encryption, including BitLocker, but it is = not as trivial as using a Linux bootdisk. Re: We are just not sure if the extra security worths having the users to t= ype 2 passwords to boot a laptop. If the attacker can gain physical access to the computer, and it uses TPM a= nd boots straight to Windows, then they could attack the computer at the ne= twork layer and at the console, or via one of the more advanced hardware at= tacks (chip cooling, hibernation file excavation, etc.). Requiring a PIN at= boot adds an extra layer of protection before the OS starts. It comes down to a risk analysis of your environment and what you are tryin= g to protect. For my laptop I use TrueCrypt (which by design requires a PIN= ) because it is a transient computer at risk for theft and contains informa= tion that could be leveraged in an attack against our infrastructure. Furth= ermore I use KeePass to encrypt all passwords, and AxCrypt for all sensitiv= e documents, which offers a second layer of protection should the computer = be compromised while it is booted. It should be pointed out that BitLocker/TrueCrypt/EFS/etc. will do little o= r nothing to stop an attack inbound from the network or malicious code that= has been allowed to execute on the running OS.=20 Best, alex Alex Keller Systems Administrator Academic Technology, San Francisco State University Office: Burk Hall 153 Phone: (415)338-6117 Email: [email protected] -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On= Behalf Of Shang Tsung Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2011 3:07 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Bitlocker without PIN Hello all, We are on the process of setting up Bitlocker on our laptops for OS encrypt= ion and we are wandering if we should set up a PIN or not. If we do not, th= e attacker can get to Windows login screen, but this is where he will stop. What happens if he boots with a linux live CD/USB? Can he decrypt the drive= ? The key is stored in the TPM. Does linux have access to the TPM? We are just not sure if the extra security worths having the users to type = 2 passwords to boot a laptop. ST