HP SimplePass Local Privilege Escalation
Rehan Ahmed <[email protected]> Sat, 20 May 2017 01:39:36 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.fulldisclosure,gmane.comp.security.bugtraq,gmane.comp.security.news.securitytracker |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CY1PR11MB0683F3ACC3A233164313F5FBF7FA0@CY1PR11MB0683.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> |
# Vulnerability Title: HP SimplePass Local Privilege Escalation # Advisory Release Date: 05/18/2017 # Credit: Discovered By Rehan Ahmed # Contact: [email protected] # Severity Level: Medium # Type: Local # Tested Platform: Windows 8 & 10 x64 # Vendor: HP Inc. # Vendor Site: http://www.hp.com # Download Link: http://ftp.hp.com/pub/softpaq/sp64001-64500/sp64339.exe # Vulnerable Version: HP SimplePass 8.00.49, 8.00.57, 8.01.46 = # Vendor Contacted: 04/03/2017 # Vendor Response: 5/18/2017 ###########################################################################= ############# Summary: ###########################################################################= ############# HP SimplePass allows you to safely store logon information for your favorit= e websites, and use a single method of authentication for your password-pro= tected website accounts. Choose a fingerprint, password or PIN to authentic= ate your identity. Your computer must have at least one password-protected = Windows User Account to use HP SimplePass. https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/c03653209 ###########################################################################= ############## Issue Details: ###########################################################################= ############## HP SimplePass is prone to a local privilege-escalation vulnerability due to= insecure file system permissions that have been granted during installatio= n. Local adversary can exploit this issue to gain elevated privileges on af= fected system. HP SimplePass installs by default to "C:\Program Files\Hewlett-Packard\Simp= lePass" with very weak folder permissions granting any user full permission= to the contents of the directory and it's subfolders. This allows ample op= portunity for code execution against any other user running the application= . HP SimplePass has few binaries which are typically configured as a servic= e or startup program which makes this particularly easy to take leverage. =A0 ###########################################################################= ############### = Proof of Concept ###########################################################################= ############### a) C:\>icacls "C:\Program Files\Hewlett-Packard\SimplePass" C:\Program Files\Hewlett-Packard\SimplePass Everyone:(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Everyone:(OI)(CI)(IO= )(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 BUILTIN\Administrato= rs:(I)(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 BUILTIN\Administrato= rs:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:= (I)(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:= (I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 NT AUTHORITY\Authent= icated Users:(I)(M) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 NT AUTHORITY\Authent= icated Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(M) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX) =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI= )(CI)(IO)(GR,GE) =A0 = b) C:\>wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode |findstr /i "au= to" | findstr /i "HP SimplePass" HP SimplePass Cachedrv Service=A0=A0 Cachedrv server=A0=A0 "C:\Program File= s\Hewlett-Packard\SimplePass\cachesrvr.exe"=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Auto HP SimplePass Service=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 omniserv=A0=A0=A0=A0= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 C:\Program Files\Hewlett-Packard\SimplePass\OmniServ.exe= =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Auto A user can place a malicious DLL/EXE (e.g OmniServ.exe) file with one of th= e expected names into that directory and wait until the service is restarte= d. The service can not be restarted by normal users but an attacker could j= ust reboot the system or wait for the next reboot to happen. ###########################################################################= #################### 3) Mitigation: ###########################################################################= #################### = Change the permission for dirctory to group other than Administrator on Rea= d/Execute. Fix: https://support.hp.com/us-en/drivers/selfservice/hp-envy-m7-n100-noteb= ook-pc/8499292/model/8788306