RE: Validation flaw addressed in version 2.14
"Rony Shapiro" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.passwordsafe.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Wolfgang!
My intuition is that 1000 iterations of a hash function slows down any
brute-force attack by three orders of magnitude. Even with today's hardware,
that's a significant speed bump.
Any more, and weak machines would take too much time for legitimate
authentication... again, by my intuition.
If anybody has some hard data that says otherwise, I'dbe glad to hear it.
Rony
_____
From: [email protected]
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
Wolfgang Keller
Sent: Thursday, November 24, 2005 11:05 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [Passwordsafe-devel] Validation flaw addressed in version 2.14
A question that I like to raise here, and which perhaps the experts might
wish to answer, is whether 1000 turns of quick machine code calculations
does pose a serious obstacle against brute force attackers equipped with
todays growingly fast computer hardware background? Perhaps the entire point
of verification loops is practically obsolete.
- Wolfgang Keller
(Director of JPasswords)
Rony Shapiro wrote:
Hi,
The good folks at elcomsoft have posted an item regarding a flaw in the
passphrase validation for all versions of PasswordSafe.
(http://seclists.org/lists/vulnwatch/2005/Oct-Dec/0046.html)
Briefly, it's possible to take advantage of the database structure to bypass
the deliberately slow "key stretching" method used to verify the user's
passphrase, enabling a faster brute-force dictionary attack than was
intended by the designers.
In release 2.14, I've implemented a partial fix to this, basically replacing
fixed data with randomness wherever possible in the first block. This is a
partial fix, but it's the most I can do without breaking backwards
compatability with existing implementations (and it seems that I've already
broken compatability with the Java version...).
I'd like to ask this list for suggestions for (1) a better solution that
would keep compatability with previous versions (that is, that previous
versions 2.x of PasswordSafe will be able to read the new database, and (2)
a complete solution, unencumbered by backwards-compatability (that is, a new
version of the database format).
Thanks to Jeff & Hagai for bringing the vulnwatch posting to my attention.
Cheers,
Rony
P.S. - I've decided not to announce this to the user's mailing list for two
reasons: 1. The issue is a bit subtle and therefore difficult to explain.
Conversely, it's *very* easy to misunderstand as "passwordsafe's security
is/was broken". 2. The fix isn't a complete solution to the problem (yet).
Of course,
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