RE: PasswordSafe format v3 - discussion

"Rony Shapiro" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.passwordsafe.devel
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Hi Frank,

For detection of truncated files, you're certainly correct - a special
"end-of-records" marker is sufficient. However, I was considering cut&paste
attecks as described, for example, in
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/badesp.pdf (Section 2.2 and 3). If an
attacker can, for example, splice and old password file with a new one
encrypted with the same password, then he can force a user, for example, to
use an old password instead of a new one.

I'm not entirely convinced that this is a relaistic threat scenario, though.
Also, it might be easier to protect against this by using a different B1B2
key each time the database is saved.

	Rony

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Frank Pilhofer [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Friday, December 02, 2005 2:51 PM
> To: Rony Shapiro; [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [Passwordsafe-devel] PasswordSafe format v3 - discussion
> 
> Hi,
> 
> On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 15:25:20 -0500, Rony Shapiro 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > Dave Collins:
> >> I believe we need a MAC to autheticate the data. I propose 
> HMAC-SHA256
> >
> > This is, in principle, a Good Idea. It can certainly 
> protect a database
> > against cut&paste attacks. The question is, how vulnerable is the  
> > database to such attacks in practice?
> > (2) there should be a special "End of Records" block in the 
> file before
> > the MAC, to assist parsing.
> >
> 
> The end of records block is sufficient to detect truncated files. The
> MAC is only needed if an attacker were able to break the 
> encryption, on
> the assumption that the attacker might be able to defeat Twofish but
> unable to defeat the MAC. But if there are attacks on Twofish, we're
> probably screwed anyway.
> 
> >
> >> I would not use a file extension to make any decisions on content!
> >
> > That was not my intent: A different suffix would merely be a useful
> > convention for managing versions. The logic DK outlined can 
> be used in  
> > any case.
> >
> 
> IMHO, file extensions are overrated.
> 
> What I would like to see instead/in addition is a "magic" tag at the
> beginning of the file, i.e. a well-defined string or value 
> that uniquely
> identifies the password safe format and version. (Popular "magic" tags
> are "GIF87" or "JPEG", or even "<?xml".) We could use a 
> 32-bit tag such
> as "PWS3", or the 64-bit tag "PWSafe30". With this magic value,  
> applications
> can quickly check whether a file is a Password Safe database 
> or not. And it
> allows format updates in the future to be less painful, by 
> not requiring
> the app to cycle through all known formats.
> 
> As for the fields in a database, I suggest adding a stand-alone "URL"
> field, rather than the hack of having the URL among the notes.
> 
> Also, this is a good opportunity to change the default character set
> to UTF-8 or UTF-16.
> 
> Frank
> 
> -- 
> Frank Pilhofer, [email protected]
> 
> 




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