[NEWS] Quartz Composer / QuickTime 7 Information Leakage

SecuriTeam <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.securiteam
Message-ID <[email protected]>
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html 

- - - - - - - - -



  Quartz Composer / QuickTime 7 Information Leakage
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

Quartz Composer files are created with the Quartz Composer application 
included with the developer tools. The compositions (QTZ files) it creates 
can be used as screen savers, viewed as they are in the application or 
embedded as QT atoms in a '.mov' container. As such, they can be viewed in 
a wide-ranging array of environments, including a web browser, Keynote 2 
and the Finder.

Compositions have access to a number of powerful tools (patches), each 
providing or acting-upon information, ultimately resulting in a graphic 
composition. The design assumption seems to be that these details should 
always be contained within the presentation. However, by combining patches 
that provide advanced system information with patches that load 
information from the Internet, a malicious '.mov' file (viewed for example 
by the QuickTime web plugin) can leak this information to an external 
host.

This issue has not been addressed by Apple yet, and because details of the 
potential exploit appeared in a public forum shortly after David had 
notified the vendor, a fix may still be some time away. A temporary 
work-around is disabling the QuickTime plugin and treating Quartz Composer 
files with suspicion.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Apple Mac OS X 10.4 (QuickTime 7)

Immune Systems:
 * Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 (QuickTime 6.5, 7)
 * QuickTime for Windows

Impact:
The information that can be leaked by this method includes (but may not be 
limited to):
 * Local user name (long and short)
 * Computer name
 * Local IP
 * OS / kernel version
 * CPU / RAM / GPU configuration
 * Names (human-readable) of Bonjour services on the local network
 * Local or system time
 * Volume of audio input
 * Lists of images (including pdfs) matching arbitrary spotlight queries
 * Lists of images (including pdfs) in specific directories (relative to / 
or ~)
 * The existence of image and movie files can indicate the existence of 
certain software packages

This information can be used for profiling of potential victims, for 
further use in attacks against the user's system or phising related social 
engineering.

Proof of Concept:
A proof-of-concept in the form of a Quartz Composer composition embedded 
in a '.mov' file is available at the following link. Please see that 
document for more information:  
<http://remahl.se/david/vuln/018/demo.html> 
http://remahl.se/david/vuln/018/demo.html.

Technical Details:
The basic attack works as follows:
1. A patch providing the information (for example the Host Info patch) is 
created (A)
2. The output of (A) is connected to a JavaScript patch which uses 
encodeURIComponent() to URI encode the string (B).
3. The output of (B) is connected to a String Printer which results in a 
URI, for example (C)
4. The output of (C) is connected to the URL input connection of either 
the Image Downloader patch or the RSS Feed patch. (D)
5. The output of (D) must be used somehow, otherwise this part of the 
patch graph will not be used. Rendering the output (via a String to Image) 
to a 0-sized billboard is fine.
6. When the (D) patch is activated, it will access the URI (output of 
(C)), thus leaking the restricted information to an HTTP
host of the attacker's choice.

Vendor contact:
Apple Computer's security team was contacted with information about the 
issue on 2005-05-06. Following a discussion of this problem on the public 
quartzcomposer-dev mailinglist (initiated by a third-party), the full 
details of the problems were released on May 11.

Vendor response:
Apple Computer - 2005-05-10, 04:50 UTC: Confirmed receipt of problem 
report(did not confirm issue).


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:[email protected]> David 
Remahl.
The original article can be found at:  <http://remahl.se/david/vuln/018/> 
http://remahl.se/david/vuln/018/



======================================== 


This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. 
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: [email protected] 
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: [email protected] 


==================== 
==================== 

DISCLAIMER: 
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. 
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.