[NT] Winamp ID3v2 Buffer Overflow

The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html 

- - - - - - - - -



  Winamp ID3v2 Buffer Overflow
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

 <http://www.winamp.com/> Winamp is "a skinnable, multi-format, freeware 
audio player made by Nullsoft".

The vulnerability discovered in Winamp's ID3v2 could be used to spread 
malicious code such as a virus within MP3 files, which are commonly very 
trusted.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Winamp version 5.03a
 * Winamp version 5.09
 * Winamp version 5.091

Winamp is vulnerable to a buffer overflow vulnerability when processing 
ID3v2 tags of mp3 files. To exploit this vulnerability, a user has to add 
malformed mp3 file to the Winamp playlist, and play it. When playing mp3 
file is finished, playlist is updated, and if some part of the ID3v2 tag 
(e.g. ARTIST or TITLE) is too long, it is possible to overflow value that 
is later used as the source address in the strcpy() function. The strcpy() 
call can overflow a value (in the DATA segment) that will later, in jump 
instruction, point code execution to some attacker-supplied buffer, where 
malicious code can be executed.

Before it is possible to overflow important value in the DATA segment, a 
simple "sanity check" has to be passed. In the next piece of asm code, we 
control the EAX register (because of the first overflow), and after 
returning from the function, that EAX is used as source address for 
strcpy().

This "sanity check" code will test if there is a value 0x00000001 (ECX) in 
memory on offset 0x9B4 from EAX address. If that condition is true, then 
after returning from the function, the same EAX content will be used as 
the source address in strcpy(). If the condition is false, EAX is set to a 
value that is located on offset 0x9B8 from current EAX register address, 
and the program will jump to the beginning of the loop.
--------------------------------------------------------004371FA  /$ 
8B4424 04      MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]004371FE  |> 85C0           
/TEST EAX,EAX00437200  |. 74 14          |JE SHORT Winamp.0043721600437202 
 |. 8B88 B4090000  |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+9B4]00437208  |. 3B4C24 08   
   |CMP ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8]0043720C  |. 74 0D          |JE SHORT 
Winamp.0043721B0043720E  |. 8B80 B8090000  |MOV EAX,DWORD PTR 
DS:[EAX+9B8]00437214  |.^EB E8          \JMP SHORT Winamp.004371FE00437216 
 |> B8 DC124600    MOV EAX,Winamp.004612DC  ;  ASCII "No Entry"0043721B  
\> C3             
RETN--------------------------------------------------------

Here is that asm code roughly reversed:
char *check (char *arg, int val)  // val = 0x00000001
{
  while (arg != NULL)
  {
    if (*((int*)&arg[2484]) == val) // 0x9b4 = dec. 2484
    return arg;
    else arg = (char*)*((long*)&arg[2488]);  // 0x9b8 = dec. 2488
  }
  arg = "No Entry";
  return arg;
}

To bypass that check, EAX (arg) has to be set to the address of string 
buffer where on address EAX+9B4 is value 0x00000001 (val), and that string 
has to be still long enough to overflow onto the "jump address". The 
string needs to be at least 284 bytes long to overflow onto the "jump 
address" in the DATA segment. The ID3v2 data resides in the DATA segment 
(that is static), and there are a lot of 0x00000001 values in it, so it is 
possible to determine a static address that will work every time for some 
Winamp and Windows versions.

Due to the fact that if condition EAX+9B4=0x00000001 isn't met, EAX is set 
to value at address EAX+9B8 and condition would be tested again, maybe it 
is even possible to create some brute-force buffer(s) that will "scan" the 
memory for 0x00000001, but this is purely theoretical, and probably 
unlikely.

When the "sanity check" is bypassed, strcpy() will be executed, and the 
"jump address" will be overflowed. That strcpy() code is presented below.
--------------------------------------------------------00438D59  |. 50    
         PUSH EAX     ; /src = "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF..."00438D5A  |. FF75 
08        PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]        ; |dest00438D5D  |. E8 60D20100 
   CALL <JMP.&MSVCRT.strcpy>        ; 
\strcpy--------------------------------------------------------

The destination address for strcpy() is 280 bytes away from the "jump 
address" that has to be overflowed to redirect code execution. In this 
particular example, it is 0x00470D40.

After that is done, next piece of code will take the overflowed "jump 
address" from address 0x00470E58 and point code execution onto it.
--------------------------------------------------------0041D440  /$ A1 
580E4700    MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[470E58]0041D445  |. 85C0           TEST 
EAX,EAX0041D447  |. 74 03          JE SHORT winamp.0041D44C0041D449  |. 
FF60 48        JMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+48] <- 0wnZ Winamp0041D44C  \> C3     
        RETN--------------------------------------------------------

Its possible to reliably exploit this vulnerability on Windows XP  SP1 and 
windows 2000 SP0, with Winamp versions 5.03a, 5.09 and 5.091.

It is important to say that this vulnerability is not easy to exploit, but 
with the help of static addresses from the DATA segment, it is possible to 
create reliable exploit. Beside, there are few possible exploitation 
vectors for this vulnerability, depending on what actions are performed by 
user on malformed mp3 file. For example - in version 5.03a, if the 
malformed mp3 file is added to the playlist with 'add-folder' option, it 
isn't needed to bypass the previously mentioned "sanity check".

Proof of concept:
 <http://security.lss.hr/PoC/demo.mp3> http://security.lss.hr/PoC/demo.mp3


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The original article can be found at:  
<http://security.lss.hr/index.php?page=details&ID=LSS-2005-07-14> 
http://security.lss.hr/index.php?page=details&ID=LSS-2005-07-14
The information has been provided by  <mailto:[email protected]> Leon 
Juranic.



======================================== 


This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. 
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: [email protected] 
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: [email protected] 


==================== 
==================== 

DISCLAIMER: 
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. 
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.