Re: New release of Solaris secuirity module Papillo
Konrad Rieck <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.sun |
|---|---|
| Organization | Roqefellaz |
| Message-ID | <1051050529.3030.67.camel@fluffy> |
Hi, On Tue, 2003-04-22 at 17:36, Dave Aitel wrote: > Good work, once again. In fact, there are probably many really cool > projects that could benefit from being built on your work - for example, > a kernel rootkit detection tool... Thanks, but I'd like to add my .02 EUR that also refer to Hal's post titled "Kernel modules" on 2003-03-06. I am one of those odd academic people, who try to split the state of a running system into "clean" and "compromised". Once a remote intruder has gained super-user privileges, he's able to unload, uninstall, tweak or reconfigure the system's security components unless there is profound and trustful separation between local (physical access) and remote. For simplicity I am referring to a remote intruder. Trusted Solaris or the secure level implementation of some *BSDs weaken the super-user privileges in order to try to solve some aspects of this general problem. But in my opinion, a simple loadable kernel module should never be used to detect effects of a compromise, e.g. loading of trojaned modules, installation of rootkits, interception of syscalls, etc... unless there is some kind of un-removable and trustful authentication that guarantees an remote intruder is unable to manipulate the module's functionality. I am still looking for such authentication methods and implementations that are able to guarantee the above security, but I know that obfuscation and blind hardening aren't solutions, because there are people who in deed patch static kernel images or inject modules into /dev/kmem. There are more bad tricks out there than good ones. Sorry for wandering of the (Sun) point... With best regards, Konrad Rieck -- Konrad Rieck <[email protected]> - http://people.roqe.org/kr PGP: 5803 E58E D1BF 9A29 AFCA 51B3 A725 EA18 ABA7 A6A3
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