Re: New release of Solaris secuirity module Papillo

Konrad Rieck <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.comp.security.sun
Organization Roqefellaz
Message-ID <1051050529.3030.67.camel@fluffy>
Hi, 

On Tue, 2003-04-22 at 17:36, Dave Aitel wrote:
> Good work, once again. In fact, there are probably many really cool
> projects that could benefit from being built on your work - for example,
> a kernel rootkit detection tool...

Thanks, but I'd like to add my .02 EUR that also refer to Hal's post
titled "Kernel modules" on 2003-03-06. 

I am one of those odd academic people, who try to split the state of a
running system into "clean" and "compromised". Once a remote intruder
has gained super-user privileges, he's able to unload, uninstall, tweak
or reconfigure the system's security components unless there is profound
and trustful separation between local (physical access) and remote. For 
simplicity I am referring to a remote intruder.

Trusted Solaris or the secure level implementation of some *BSDs weaken
the super-user privileges in order to try to solve some aspects of this
general problem.

But in my opinion, a simple loadable kernel module should never be used
to detect effects of a compromise, e.g. loading of trojaned modules,
installation of rootkits, interception of syscalls, etc... unless there
is some kind of un-removable and trustful authentication that guarantees
an remote intruder is unable to manipulate the module's functionality.

I am still looking for such authentication methods and implementations
that are able to guarantee the above security, but I know that
obfuscation and blind hardening aren't solutions, because there are
people who in deed patch static kernel images or inject modules into
/dev/kmem. There are more bad tricks out there than good ones. 

Sorry for wandering of the (Sun) point...

With best regards,
Konrad Rieck
		
-- 
 Konrad Rieck <[email protected]> - http://people.roqe.org/kr 
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