Re: NetScreen / Juniper
Joseph S D Yao <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.vpn |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Mar 03, 2004 at 03:14:03PM -0700, Joel Snyder wrote: > "pure application proxy" is a marketing buzzword and does not represent > real technology. It's the rehashing of a 10-year-old argument that the > "pure application proxy" vendors have failed to live up to. Proxy-based > firewalls have never taken advantage of the architecture to the extent > they claimed they could; packet-filtering (stateful) firewalls have > created similar or better controls at the application layer than their > proxy-based cousins. > > I recently did an evaluation of both kinds of products to see which had > lived up to their promise and, frankly, the proxy-based firewalls have > come only 2 baby steps in the last 5 years while the stateful packet > inspection devices have made huge strides, in some cases supplanting the > capabilities of the "pure application proxy" folks. > > The arguments offered by proxy firewalls as to why they're "better" are > largely smoke and mirrors, and are not supported by the facts. In many > cases, they have appended shitty non-stateful packet filtering firewalls > to deal with their miserable proxy performance; in all cases, they have > failed to exploit the application-layer visibility except in very > specific cases, mostly HTTP. Their SMTP proxies are a joke, generally > reducing total system security and trading on general fear that somehow > a Microsoft TCP/IP stack is vulnerable just because it came from Microsoft. > > The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and folks who have built-in > application layer visibility and ASIC-level speed (including Check > Point, NetScreen and maybe Cisco) are at a distinct advantage. I would be interested to see your study. I have asked for proofs of the marketing phrases you use, above, and have never gotten anything useful. Of course, stateful inspection has to have come a lot further from where it was back then! ;-) But, in the end, part of this is, not what YOU [the generic "you"] want to force on customers, but what does the [perhaps educated] customer WANT? And, OBTW, do YOU trust a TCP/IP stack that has been re-engineered so many times, and has built-in [and in many cases unadvertised] places for breaking into it? -- Joe Yao [email protected] - Joseph S. D. Yao OSIS Center Systems Support EMT-B ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This message is not an official statement of OSIS Center policies.