Re: SEH and overwrite EIP
[email protected] 1 Dec 2007 00:03:37 -0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.vulnerabilities |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
maybe I have formulated badly this question. I mean that if we can overwr= ite return address of the function properly ( without access violation ) = then we can overwrite SEH properly ( without access violation ) and if we= can overwrite SEH properly then we can overwrite return address properly= . So it seems ( for me ) that SEH overwrite is equivalent to return addr= ess overwrite. Since return address is more simple to handle, so there is= no need to play with SEH. So why hackers play with it? ( I talk there on= ly about defualt SEH, which is encountered during access violation - i.e = http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/4651 ) Maybe I miss something very import= ant there.=0D =0D best,=0D =0D opexoc=20