Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor

Richard Stallman wrote:
> [[[ To any NSA and FBI agents reading my email: please consider    ]]]
> [[[ whether defending the US Constitution against all enemies,     ]]]
> [[[ foreign or domestic, requires you to follow Snowden's example. ]]]
>
>   > My first thought was that Autoconf is a relatively trivial attack vector 
>   > since it is so complex and the syntax used for some parts (e.g. m4 and 
>   > shell scripts) is so arcane.  In particular, it is common for Autotools 
>   > stuff to be installed on a computer (e.g. by installing a package from 
>   > an OS package manager) and then used while building.  For example, there 
>   > are large collections of ".m4" files installed.  If one of the m4 files 
>   > consumed has been modified, then the resulting configure script has been 
>   > modified.
>
> Can anyone think of a feasible way to prevent this sort of attack?
>   

There have been some possibilities suggested on other branches of the 
discussion.  I have changed the subject of one of those to "checking 
aclocal m4 files" to highlight it.  There is progress being made, but 
the solutions appear to be outside the direct scope of the GNU build 
system packages.

> Someone suggested that configure should not use m4 files that are
> lying around, but rather should fetch them from standard release points,
> WDYT of that idea?
>   

Autoconf configure scripts do not use nearby m4 files and do not require 
m4 at all; aclocal collects the files in question into aclocal.m4 (I 
think) and then autoconf uses that (and other inputs) to /produce/ 
configure.  (This may seem like a trivial point, but exact derivations 
and their timing were critical to how the backdoor dropper worked.)  
Other tools (at least autopoint from GNU gettext, possibly others) are 
used to automatically scan a larger set of m4 files stored on the system 
and copy those needed into the m4/ directory of a package source tree, 
in a process conceptually similar to how the linker pulls only needed 
members from static libraries when building an executable.  All of this 
is done on the maintainer's machine, so that the finished configure 
script is included in the release tarball.

There have been past incidents where malicious code was directly added 
to autoconf-generated configure scripts, so (as I understand) 
distribution packagers often regenerate configure before building a 
package.  In /this/ case, the crackers (likely) modified the version of 
build-to-host.m4 on /their/ computer, so the modified file would be 
copied into the xz-utils/m4 directory in the release tarball and used 
when distribution packagers regenerate configure before building the 
package.

Fetching these files from standard release points would require an index 
of those standard release points, and packages are allowed to have their 
own package-specific macros as well.  The entire system dates from well 
before ubiquitous network connectivity could be assumed (anywhere---and 
that is still a bad assumption in the less prosperous parts of the 
world), so release tarballs are meant to be self-contained, including 
copies of "standard" macros needed for configure but not supplied by 
autoconf/automake/etc.


-- Jacob