more on a new DoD Internet voting scheme

Begin forwarded message:

From: [email protected]
Date: October 26, 2006 1:36:17 AM EDT
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [IP] a new DoD Internet voting scheme

The bigger problem (and one for which there is ABSOLUTELY no  
technical solution whatsoever, and which by itself ought to be a deal- 
breaker) is very simply that there is NO conceivable way to make sure  
that the voter is not voting under duress.

There is NO way to ensure that the voter is not voting with a gun  
held to their head (figuratively, or even LITERALLY).

Their voting could be being "watched" over their shoulder by an  
employer, a health care giver, a welfare case worker, a parent, a  
child, a college professor, a landlord, a spouse, a union shop  
steward, or indeed almost anybody in a position of power and  
influence over the voter.  There is no way to be sure that the voter  
is not "selling" their vote (for drugs, sex, alcohol, money, or  
whatever).

While the same argument can be made about mailin ballots in general,  
those in most places represent a small percentage of the total vote;   
if Internet voting were to become widespread, it could easily become  
60% or more of the total vote, and with an inherent and  
uncontrollable risk of fraud... in fact, it would be an irresistable  
target for it.

One of the key things that happens in a poll location is that the  
election workers ENSURE that the voting is anonymous and private, and  
that when the voter leaves the polling place, NOBODY can find out how  
that individual voter voted.

It is EXTREMELY important that people understand the significance of  
this problem... that is why we MUST not allow Internet voting...!



On Wed, 25 Oct 2006 13:25:54 -0400
  David Farber <[email protected]> wrote:
> Begin forwarded message:
> From: Barbara Simons <[email protected]>
> Date: October 25, 2006 1:23:21 PM EDT
> To: Dave Farber <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: a new DoD Internet voting scheme
> Dear Dave,
> PLEASE CIRCULATE:
> My colleagues David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, David Wagner and I have   
> just released a short paper about the government's IVAS system  
> that  involves absentee voting using email and fax and ballot  
> distribution  over the Internet. See
> http://servesecurityreport.org/ivas.pdf
> We wanted to bring this to your attention because we believe this   
> system poses significant risks, as described in this excerpt from  
> our  article:
> In summary, we see three main risks:
> 1. Tool One exposes soldiers to risks of identity theft. Sending   
> personally identifiable information via unencrypted email is   
> considered poor practice.  No bank would ask their customers to  
> send  SSNs over unencrypted email, yet Tool One does exactly that.   
> This  problem is exacerbated by potential phishing attacks.
> 2. Returning voted ballots by email or fax creates an opportunity  
> for  hackers, foreign governments, or other parties to tamper with  
> those  ballots while they are in transit.  FVAP's system does not  
> include  any meaningful protection against the risk of ballot  
> modification.
> 3. Ballots returned by email or fax may be handled by the DoD in  
> some  cases.  Those overseas voters using the system sign a waiver  
> of their  right to a secret ballot. However, it is one thing for a  
> voter's  ballot to be sent directly to their local election  
> official; it is another for a soldier's ballot to be sent to and  
> handled by the DoD –  who is, after all, the soldier's employer.
> Regards,
> Barbara Simons