CryoNet #32870 - #32874
CryoNet <[email protected]> 27 Sep 2010 09:00:05 -0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.culture.science.cryogenics |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
CryoNet - Mon 27 Sep 2010
#32870: revision coming [Ettinger]
#32871: Re: uploading thought experiment [Luke Parrish]
#32872: survival thought experiments - inherently self-contradictory [Brook Norton]
#32873: Ethics in Biotechnology [Jonano]
#32874: Uploading [Edgar Swank - President]
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Message #32870
From: [email protected]
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 10:58:09 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: revision coming
Today's (Sep. 25) cryonet messages show again that many misunderstandings
about uploading persist.
In recent discussions on Cryonet and on the CI Yahoo groups board I had
some success--nearly unprecedented--in persuading a few uploaders to modify
their positions. This shows both that existing misunderstandings are
stubborn and that these misunderstandings are not exempt from change. I think it
is also true that the uploading stance tends to damage cryonics by diverting
attention and through guilt by association.
What I am working on is a revision of my "fourteen points" for the next
edition of YOUNIVERSE. These will probably be sent to Cryonet, the CI Yahoo
groups list, Cold Filter, and possibly others--one at a time, not all at
once. If the moderators think they are too far off topic, so be it. In any
case, readers will be warned by the subject line and can just delete without
reading if they choose. The first one should appear within a week or two.
Robert Ettinger
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Message #32871
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 09:04:50 -0700 (PDT)
From: Luke Parrish <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: uploading thought experiment
I get what you're saying, but it is wrong. Before I get duplicated, I would anticipate being either person with 50% probability, given that there will be exactly two individuals who would remember the anticipation. Afterward, I could only develop a fear of death by conscious experience of my impending demise, so the ethical question you are posing actually involves the divergent set of experiences.
Here's another thought experiment:
1. Duplicating an inanimate object is likely to be easier than duplicating an animate one.
2. While in cryostasis, a person has been duplicated 99 times by an atomically precise method.
3. One of their copies awakens, unaware of whether they are the original but only that they have a 99% chance of being a copy.
4. After one hour, they must choose between destroying all 99 of the cryonics patients (including the original) or dying themselves.
5. Supposing they remember being the original, and are committed to its survival, should they sacrifice their current form and thus increase its odds from 1% to 99%?
6. If they are given reason to suspect that they are the original, would it moral for them to sacrifice their life in order to save the lives of the 99 copies that have been created?
--- On Sun, 9/26/10, CryoNet <[email protected]> wrote:
> Message #32869
> Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2010 13:13:37 -0700 (PDT)
> From: david pizer <[email protected]>
> Subject: uploading thought experiment
>
> Here is a thought experiment that should show you why
> uploading will not work as a survival option for you.
> I explained this to Mike Perry about 25 years ago.
>
> 1. If you can upload a real person's mind into a
> computer, then you can also make a duplicate of that real
> person.
>
> 2. Imagine a duplicate of YOU has been made.
>
> 3. They bring the duplicate of YOU into the room
> across from you and you become convinced that the duplicate
> has your exact mind and is a duplicate of you in every way.
>
> 4. Then they point a gun at you and say "Since you
> are convinced the duplicate is an exact copy of you, do YOU
> mind if we kill you now and let the duplicate exist on?"
>
> 5. Even if you thought that the duplicate was an
> exact copy of you, you would not want them to shoot YOU.
>
> Why?
>
> Because somewhere in YOUR mind you would realize that the
> duplicate was not YOU. Perhaps YOU cannot completely
> realize that the duplicate is not YOU until you are faced
> with the prospect of the duplicate continuing on and YOU
> becoming dead and ceasing to exist. It is when one
> thinks of himself stopping to exist that they realize that a
> duplicate continuing on is not them surviving.
>
> Until you are ready to say "no, I don't mind" (without any
> other conditions) when they ask if you mind if they kill you
> and just let the duplicate continue on, then you don't
> really believe that any duplicate is you.
>
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Message #32872
From: Brook Norton <[email protected]>
Subject: survival thought experiments - inherently self-contradictory
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 09:53:15 -0700
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David provides a thought experiment (only the first line copied below) to
show why uploading won't work. I have found that you can do thought
experiments to show why any type of survival will OR won't work. When you do
a proof, and end up with 2 = 4, you know your initial assumptions are wrong.
The initial assumption that is wrong with all survival thought experiments
is "there is some essential human quality, that when preserved, results in
survival of that person."
I believe you have to totally step away from the mind set of "I" am a
person, unique and separate from the universe and my uniqueness must be
maintained. Instead, see yourself from a third party distant observer, where
each human is a collection of molecules, interacting with their environment
in essentially the same way as inanimate objects. The human's awareness is a
special property, but no more special than temperature or weight, to the
observer.
As time passes, the humans change; grow older, die, get frozen, get
duplicated, whatever - they change. Period. End of observation. No need to
invoke the word "survive" to describe what has happened to the observed
humans. "Survive" is a flawed word used to describe an erroneous description
of human qualities.
Take uploading for example. Say awareness IS possible in a non-organic
substrate (and I agree with Ettinger that it may not; tbd). Say the memories
and personalities ARE created on this non-organic substrate and are
conscious there. Did the person survive uploading? Wrong question. Doesn't
make sense. All we can say is that there is now an awareness in the upload
that is conscious of the memories and feelings that the human used to have.
That's all that need be said. If the person is happy or sad about this
because it seems to him like he did/didn't survive, then the person is
experiencing emotions based on a faulty foundation. Just like someone who
gets upset in an earthquake because they are afraid the Earth will fall off
the back of the turtle that holds the Earth in space.
Brook Norton
Message #32869
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 2010 13:13:37 -0700 (PDT)
From: david pizer <[email protected]>
Subject: uploading thought experiment
Here is a thought experiment that should show you why uploading will not
work as a survival option for you. (. deleted)
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Message #32873
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 21:06:03 +0200
Subject: Ethics in Biotechnology
From: Jonano <[email protected]>
Here I define some of the ethics and regulation in biotechnology:
1) The subject consent/accept to be part of the work
2) The subject has the right to know his/her disadvantages in the study
3) The subject has the right to get help for his/her disadvantages
4) The company/scientist must agree to consider ethical regulation for
the subject
5) The company/scientist must have the full ability to protect the
information of the subject with confidentiality
6) The subject must have the ability to leave or join the experiment anytime
7) The company/scientist must inform the subject about the commercial
activity arising from the research
--Jonano 20:42, September 25, 2010 (UTC)
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Message #32874
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2010 15:34:32 -0700
From: Edgar Swank - President <[email protected]>
Subject: Uploading
I'm glad a discussion of uploading has started here.
Arcturus and David Pizer discuss the copy/original conundrum.
I think the problem is that our concept of self, "you" (actually "Me")
is not sufficient to deal with the duplicate problem, which has not yet
occurred in our millions of years of evolutionary experience. Actually
both copies have an equally valid claim to be You, but neither actually
is, since the two (or more) copies start to diverge immediately. The
Star Trek transporter was designed to destroy the original as soon as
the copy was reconstituted. On the few episodes where it didn't, there
were a lot of problems. Duplicates may not be a problem if they are kept
widely separated; like on different planets. Otherwise there will be
problems, like who owns the originals bank account?
Faced with the situation of volunteering to be shot, unconcerned because
the duplicate is supposed to be really me, I would object. But I might
be willing to go into a "death chamber" with my duplicate, where by a
random selection one of us is destroyed painlessly. A more troubling
scenario is where I would authorize the creation of some number of
duplicates, and sell them into slavery. From my point of view, I get a
lot of cash for nothing. But the duplicates will not be happy at all.
They might try to escape and seek revenge.
Arcturus also wants to be reconstituted in a body of some kind and
compares living inside a computer to locked-in syndrome. But living in a
sufficiently rich virtual reality would not be like that at all. One
could have any kind of virtual body one wanted, including any super
powers one might imagine. I don't see any problem moving from the
virtual reality to an advanced android or cyborg body. But I expect most
people would choose the virtual reality, at least most of the time.
Maybe there might be a requirement to spend some minimum time in the
real world earning money to pay for upkeep on the computer hardware for
the virtual reality. But one could still earn a living in the virtual
reality, if it had a communication link to the outside, by doing various
kinds of consulting, writing stories, etc.
--
Edgar W. Swank <[email protected]>
President - American Cryonics Society
http://AmericanCryonics.org
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