CryoNet #33428 - #33434

CryoNet - Mon 7 Mar 2011

    #33428: Why nobody dares to tell the truth / Warum traut sich niemand... [Jens Rabis]
    #33429: Re: #33423: Mark Plus [MARK PLUS]
    #33430: Re: CryoNet #33423 - #33427 [Luke Parrish]
    #33431: re: debunking uploading [Jeff Davis]
    #33432: custom manufactured liposomes [Jeff Davis]
    #33433: Rabis [Ettinger]
    #33434: http://www.wfs.org/content/worldfuture-2011-conference-speake... [=?UTF-8?Q?Jonathan_Despr=C3=A9s?=]

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Message #33428
From: "Jens Rabis" <[email protected]>
Subject: Why nobody dares to tell the truth / Warum traut sich niemand...
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 13:14:01 +0100

Hi cryonauts,

why nobody dares to tell the truth?

For all people,

- be freeze in the past
- be long dead at room temperature
- be not frozen alive

shall/apply:

The unfortunates(!?) need a new brain. Whether it is an inorganic or an
organic brain is personal(!) taste.
These people need to learn biology . such as baby-brain or electronic brain
as today's most advanced robots. 
This is a reset, a new beginning ...
I think it's important to say in advance to the directors of the
freeze-service-provider ... what you want. Korrekt?

Only their curriculum vitae videos, pictures = their identity. 
Those who throws away his curriculum vitae, destroyed all the pictures and
videos ... begins definitely at 0 (zero).

Those who is curriculum vitae enough and certainly the one to whom Zero is
sufficient ... has the least(!) logistical and legal problems * smile *.
So what do you want personally? Will do the freeze service provider your
desire to meet unconditionally? 
With Cryonic Institute (http://cryonics.org) i have my doubts in the
electronic solution. If my doubts mounted / right Mr. Ettinger?
Mr. Ettinger, I will help you. I believe - if you accept electronic requests
- your number of members will grow faster. 
Alcor.org is very expensive, but have no problems with "Robots".


****

Hallo Cryonauten, 

warum traut sich niemand die Wahrheit zu sagen?

 Fur alle Menschen,

 - welche in der Vergangenheit eingefroren wurden
 - schon lange tot bei Raumtemperatur waren 
- nicht lebendig eingefroren wurden 

gilt:

 Die Unglucklichen (!?) brauchen ein neues Gehirn. Ob es sich um eine
anorganisches oder organisches Gehirn handelt, ist personliche (!)
Geschmackssache.
 Diese Menschen mussen wieder lernen, biologisch wie eine Baby-Gehirn oder
elektronisch wie die heutige modernsten Roboter.
 Dies ist ein Reset, ein Neuanfang fur sie. 
 Ich finde es wichtig, im Voraus die Direktoren der Kryoniksinstitute zu
informieren was man will. Korrekt?

Nur ihr Lebenslauf + Videos + Bilder = ihre Identitat.
Diejenigen, welche ihren Lebenslauf wegwerfen und alle Bilder und Videos
zerstoren ... beginnen definitiv bei 0 (Null).

Wem sein Lebenslauf genug ist - und erst recht diejenigen welche mit 0
beginnen wollen - haben die geringsten(!) logistischen und rechtlichen
Probleme *smile*.
Also, was willst Du personlich? Wird der Einfrier-Dienstleister Deinen
Wunsch bedingungslos erfullen?

Bei Cryonic Institut (http://cryonics.org) habe ich mit dem elektronischen
Wunsch so meine Zweifel. Sind diese Zweifel berechtigt Herr Ettinger?
Herr Ettinger, ich will Ihnen helfen. Ich glaube - wenn sie elektronische
Wunsche akzeptieren - werden Ihre Mitgliederzahlen schneller steigen. 
Alcor.org ist sehr teuer, aber die haben kein Problem mit "Robots".


Best greetings
Jens Rabis
Germany-Berlin
"The time is with us, we can ... more! Life is for my ... curiosity :-)
Cryonics is not ... immortality! Voluntary euthanasia for Cryonics ... is
not (!) analogical to the german fascist ideology!"

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Message #33429
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 07:53:03 -0700
Subject: Re: #33423: Mark Plus
From: MARK PLUS <[email protected]>

>Please find something more constructive to do with you time than frequent rickross forums. It does not help cryonics movement in anyway.

And what tangible good have you done for cryonics lately, "John
Smith"? I've done some things behind the scenes which I don't care to
advertise just yet.


--
Mark Plus
Life is short: Freeze hard!

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Message #33430
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 11:49:13 -0800 (PST)
From: Luke Parrish <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #33423 - #33427

Robert Ettinger claims that uploading to a digital substrate
does not produce a real human being, on the simple grounds that
a description is not the thing it describes 

The point Bob seems to be missing is that the value of this
distinction rests *completely* on the assumption that a
"description" does not follow the functional rules of the object
it describes. For example, a blueprint does not directly shelter
a person from the rain, which makes it useful to distinguish it
from a house. The distinction between a program and a copy of
that program is a useless one by comparison.

I suppose if Bob wants his own private definition of "human"
which is based on composition rather than function, he is as
entitled to it as he is to any other religious belief or
philosophical position. But if he wishes to force that upon the
rest of the cryonics community as though it were scientifically
factual in nature, he needs to better describe why composition
is preferable over function, or else describe convincingly why
some function essential to human nature cannot be emulated on a
state machine.


Ron Havelock brings up a different objection, that a person who
has been scanned would still not wish to commit suicide
afterward even once a duplicate has been made. This is a
completely separate objection from Robert's in that it would
apply equally to a situation where an organic copy has been
made, whereas Robert's objection is specific to the use of a
digital substrate. The logical error Ron makes in my opinion is
to assume that it is impossible for one person to anticipate
being two separate (non-telepathic) people simultaneously at
some point in the future.

My answer to his scenario is that the uploader should indeed
feel fear beforehand because they will be conscious of being
about to die in one of their future branches. However this would
not be the case if for example the duplicate was constructed
instantaneously as the original was being destroyed, e.g. in the
case of a nanotech based "portal" which continuously
disassembles the object in one location and reassembles it in
another, along a two-dimensional plane. In this scenario one
could stand halfway between two remote locations and perceive no
ill effects or distinction between the two half-selves.

A more interesting question is whether creating more duplicates
lessens the importance of the original's fate to the pre-scanned
individual. An uploader given the choice might decide to create
99 copies rather than just one, in an event where they knew the
original was about to be killed painfully, because their
anticipated chance of being the person who is subject to pain
would go from 50% to 1%. Equivalent alternative choices would be
to make the single duplicate 99 times as aware as the original
for the duration of the distress, or to diminish the awareness
of the original to around 1%, e.g. by using an anesthetic.

In the case of a cryonics patient, it can be argued that if 99
copies are made of the patient, the 100 are all just as humanely
valuable as any one. It is no different from a file copied to
100 locations, you still have a single coherent data unit, i.e.
exactly one person exists. We can examine this with a thought
experiment:

Suppose an individual knows he will be copied in an atomically
precise fashion 99 times after being cryopreserved, and that all
100 copies including the original will be shuffled around and
one picked at random to be the first reanimation. Furthermore,
the reanimated individual will be given the choice of their own
suicide followed by the reanimation of all 99 other individuals,
or their own survival at the cost of destroying the 99 frozen
copies.

If the individual is a rational uploader, they have no issue
with destroying the frozen copies as they believe that survival
is dependent only on one copy surviving. The fact that none of
them are conscious or have separate memories and experiences
renders the redundancy of their material existence as irrelevant
-- there is no additional data to be considered. The conscious
individual making the choice on the other hand does have some
amount of additional experiences and thoughts, so they take
precedence over the 99 frozen copies.

If they are a rational anti-uploader they would need to
pre-commit to suicide in the unlikely event that they should
awaken as the first individual, because there is a 99% chance
the awakening individual is just a copy remembering the
pre-commitment, and a 99% chance of the original surviving is
superior to them than a 1% chance.

Thus the anti-uploader is in the same position as the uploader
in needing to precommit to suicide in some cases to maximize
personal chances of survival. That an uploader would balk at
suicide and have mixed feelings on the topic in some situations
cannot be used as evidence against their position -- it is just
another kind of trolley problem for which the correct answer in
an unusual situation runs counter to our natural intuition.

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Message #33431
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 13:14:38 -0700
Subject: re: debunking uploading
From: Jeff Davis <[email protected]>

Here's Ron's post, with my response, below):

                  **************************************

Subject: Re: CryoNet #33401 debunking uploading
Date: Sat, 05 Mar 2011 17:43:59 -0500
From: [email protected]

>I would ask the uploaders to make this thought experiment. Upload the contents of your brain to the fullest extent allowed by future technology.  Then blow your brains out with a gun and make sure your remains are thoroughly cremated. Are you happy to do this? If not, why not?  Surely, all that is essential about you has been preserved!  Are you not now immortal?

                   **************************************

The question Ron poses is one often found in discussions of uploading,
human "copying", and the nature of personal identity.

I take it the "unhappiness" Ron expects to find, stems from the widely
held view (held by some, not held by others)  that no one can be happy
with the prospect of certain and violent death when there is nothing
theoretical about it.  I agree.

In short, I accept that the upload is an entirely different person.
Yes, the initial characteristics would be the same, but the simple
fact of separateness means it is a different person.  Two copies of
the same book are still separate and distinct objects, not the same
object.  So too with uploads and copies.  There is a difference of
course due to the dynamic nature of "personalities", whose different
experiences will cause them to immediately diverge from the sort of
sameness found in two copies of a book.  The cause: books are static
information objects, personalities are dynamic information objects.

This is a practical matter for someone planning to be cryonically
suspended.  In future, uploading may become possible before cryonic
restoration, so we need to anticipate the possibility that an uploaded
version of oneself may appear before the restoration of the flesh and
blood original.  What then?  Will the upload believe he is the real
deal and take up your identity for the adventure going forward.  Will
he look at the frozen (and "real" to some) self and decide just to
throw it in the trash?  Not a pleasant thought (to some) when viewed
from this side of suspension.  But there it is.

Here's how I deal with this problem.  The real me knows that an upload
will not be me, but rather a copy of me.  But the upload too, will
know the score, and will be viewing the situation from the more
favorable vantage of actively being alive and having agency, while his
original remains frozen and helpless.  Well, I have already committed
to being faithful to any other me.  It's the deal I make and the
decision I take from this vantage.  If uploaded, the upload will
likewise know this and will, at least initially, be committed to
making every effort to restore the frozen me. Then the two of us will
have completed our deal.  I gave him life, and he has taken care to
restore life to me.

And if t doesn't work out that way, and the upload doesn't restore the
original, well, hey, sometimes you get the bear and sometimes the bear
gets you.  It's always a crap shoot.  What else is new?

Best, Jeff Davis

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Message #33432
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 16:18:26 -0700
Subject: custom manufactured liposomes
From: Jeff Davis <[email protected]>

I've occasionally posted what I think might prove a successful
approach to achieving low cellular damage and low toxicity
cryopreservation -- essentially a cryopreservation good enough so that
only the rewarming challenge remains as the last obstacle to
reversible suspension.  A crucial element of that process would be the
perfection of a liposome-mediated cryoprotectant delivery system.
This would consist of a family of manufactured liposomes each targeted
for binding to a particular cell type by the appropriate complementary
surface-membrane protein.  Each tissue-specific liposome would contain
a cryoprotectant mix customized to optimally protect that particular
cell type. And each liposome would have surface trans-membrane protein
structures designed -- or copied from naturally occurring liposome
docking mechanisms -- to effect the injection of the cryoprotectant
across the target cell membrane.  This method of administering
cryoprotectant -- as an alternate to the blunt instrument of gross,
whole organism, "vanilla" cryoprotectant perfusion that relies on cell
penetration by simple diffusion -- will finally allow the use of more
effective and less toxic cryoprotectant mixes (trehalose as one
component is the first that comes to mind, but there are many) which
have up till now been unusable because of inadequate rates of
trans-membrane diffusion. .

I suggested this approach years ago, and have been watching since for
the commercial development of custom liposome manufacture.  Well, here
it is:

Microfluidic Assembly Line for mass producing synthetic cell-like compartments

http://nextbigfuture.com/2011/03/microfluidic-assembly-line-for-mass.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+blogspot%2Fadvancednano+%28nextbigfuture%29

Combining this tech with the new CAS freezing method,... well, I'd
like to see some experimentation with lab mice, or maybe fish, or
chicken.

Wouldn't you?

Best, Jeff Davis

              "Everything's hard till you know how to do it."
                                                   Ray Charles

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Message #33433
From: [email protected]
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 20:37:19 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Rabis

Jens Rabis wrote:
 
>Mr. Ettinger, I will help you. I believe - if you accept electronic  
requests
>- your number of members will grow faster. 
 
Sorry-- I don't know what you are asking.
 
Robert Ettinger


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Message #33434
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 07:09:35 +0100
Subject: http://www.wfs.org/content/worldfuture-2011-conference-speake...
From: =?UTF-8?Q?Jonathan_Despr=C3=A9s?= <[email protected]>

I suggest someone to go there:

http://www.wfs.org/content/worldfuture-2011-conference-speakers

to talk about cryonics, we really need a speaker representing our community.

--Jon

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