Sparta's soft underbelly

Dan Nexon, a fine international relations scholar at Georgetown, tweets
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fdhnexon%2Fstatus%2F1102617129491357697&amp;data=02%7C01%7CCLASSICS-L%40lsv.uky.edu%7C95b6e7e0ad4b458a844c08d6a121ffb8%7C2b30530b69b64457b818481cb53d42ae%7C0%7C1%7C636873564733950606&amp;sdata=BKbJjETmPpHVOrTNDvNmhQz2lLXhUj9wIJ2AqiBSh1s%3D&amp;reserved=0> about a short
article by "former intelligence officer / mercenary (!!) Myke Cole:

This passage
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmilitaryhistorynow.com%2F2019%2F03%2F03%2Fthe-myth-of-sparta-were-ancient-greeces-greatest-warriors-really-all-that-great%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7CCLASSICS-L%40lsv.uky.edu%7C95b6e7e0ad4b458a844c08d6a121ffb8%7C2b30530b69b64457b818481cb53d42ae%7C0%7C1%7C636873564733950606&amp;sdata=xeu%2ByKakpiQ7MRUf%2FOXTQAxCljpITlTexBFYvAdtcJw%3D&amp;reserved=0>
... on the "The Myth of Sparta" is a pithy summary of one of the things
that so, so many "hegemonic conflict" uses of the Peloponnesian War gloss
over: the Greek city-states were on the *periphery* of the Persian *system:*



Sparta eventually won the war, but only after accepting substantial aid
from that great enemy of Greece – Persia. Emperor Darius II provided the
money and advice that finally allowed the Spartans to snatch the final
victory from the jaws of defeat – stripping the Athenians of their mastery
of the sea at the naval Battle of Aegospotami (405 BC). But the
reputation-shattering moment of the Peloponnesian War Sparta’s defeat at
Pylos and Sphacteria in 425 BC – where 120 of the elite spartiatai were cut
off on an island and surrounded largely by light-armed missile troops.
Giving the lie to Demaratus’ quote about conquering or dying, the Spartans
opted to surrender, whining that the Athenians had only defeated them with
“spindles” (their term for arrows), implying that had the enemy engaged in
manly close-combat, Sparta would have won
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.perseus.tufts.edu%2Fhopper%2Ftext%3Fdoc%3DThuc.%2B4.40%26fromdoc%3DPerseus%253Atext%253A1999.01.0199&amp;data=02%7C01%7CCLASSICS-L%40lsv.uky.edu%7C95b6e7e0ad4b458a844c08d6a121ffb8%7C2b30530b69b64457b818481cb53d42ae%7C0%7C1%7C636873564733950606&amp;sdata=H%2F8xWm05bvSc3SEiBNp8MzIqNEm45EbKRB45m6OaFow%3D&amp;reserved=0>
.

Nexon's point about Persia, and Sparta's frequent defeats, is important.
There is of course more:  Spartans were often incompetent, hesitant, or
irrational. Too few critics mention Thucydides 8.96.4
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.perseus.tufts.edu%2Fhopper%2Ftext%3Fdoc%3DThuc.%2B8.96%26fromdoc%3DPerseus%253Atext%253A1999.01.0199&amp;data=02%7C01%7CCLASSICS-L%40lsv.uky.edu%7C95b6e7e0ad4b458a844c08d6a121ffb8%7C2b30530b69b64457b818481cb53d42ae%7C0%7C1%7C636873564733960620&amp;sdata=4STmDJoYx%2BubaaU424TiINvd2Q352M1HYcG%2BTli7t1w%3D&amp;reserved=0>
(411 BCE):



Spartans might easily have seized a weakened Athens, had they dared:but not
not only now did Sparta prove the most convenient of enemies for Athens,
but also many other times: complete opposites in character, the one swift
and the other slow, the one enterprising the other timorous, the Spartans
were particularly profitable to the naval empire. Syracuse [in Sicily]
demonstrated this: most like Athenians in character, they were their most
successful opponents."

That word "character" is pivotal also in Odysseus' success: line one of the
*Odyssey,* he's the "man of many characters [or manners]. And "profitable"
echoes Athens' embrace of "honor, fear, and profit" in a famous speech in
Book 1 (1.75, 76).


Thucydides, master of the linguistic turn.


Dan