BMCR 2008.11.12, Catherine Darbo-Peschanski, L'Historia

Catherine Darbo-Peschanski, L'Historia. Commencements grecs. Collection
Folio essais.  Paris:  E/ditions Gallimard, 2007.  Pp. 585.  ISBN
978-2-07-034869-5.  EUR 10.30 (pb).

Reviewed by Peter Van Nuffelen, University of Exeter
([email protected])
Word count:  1827 words
-------------------------------
To read a print-formatted version of this review, see
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2008/2008-11-12.html
To comment on this review, see
http://www.bmcreview.org/2008/11/20081112.html
-------------------------------

This rich, detailed book studies the development in antiquity of the
term and concept <greek>i(stori/a</greek> from its origins as a
judicial term. As the use of the Greek noun in the title makes clear,
Darbo-Peschanski argues against the projection of the modern category
'history' onto ancient Greek 'historia'. The Greeks did not invent
history, they invented 'historia'. The thesis of the book is that
'historia' has three meanings: (1) an empirical epistemology; (2)
'historicity', i.e. the way in which change over time is
conceptualised; (3) the literary genre of history. Darbo-Peschanski
proposes to study these three in sequence, although they can never be
fully disentangled.[[1]] Arguing, among others, against those who see
the creation of history in a methodological shift caused by an emphasis
on autopsy as the method to reconstruct the past, Darbo-Peschanski
locates its origins in judicial practice. The book thus proposes a new
context in which to situate the first practice of history,[[2]] but
also an analysis of what 'historia' meant in antiquity.
Darbo-Peschanski definitely offers original insights, but the argument
could have been, as I will argue, at once more concise and more
elaborate.

The first, brief part of the book, 'Histor: judge of first instance'
argues that the <greek>i(/stwr</greek> found in Homer and in some
archaic inscriptions is a sort of judge of first instance whose
provisional judgement is to be subjected to another judgement. Chapter
1 tries to define the role of the 'histor' in the Iliad (cf. 18.501 and
23.486) and argues that he is not necessarily an individual who has
seen something (i.e. an eyewitness). Rather, he is a sort of judge who
seems to offer a first judgement that is later confirmed or rejected by
a wider body of judges. Here Darbo-Peschanski argues against a
wide-spread tendency to derive <greek>i(stori/a </greek> from a verb
meaning 'to see' and make autopsy the basis of the historical method in
antiquity. Epigraphic evidence bearing on this question is examined in
a very brief Chapter 2. Chapter 3, equally short, stresses the central
aspect of a double judgement for the role of the 'histor': he is
responsible for a first but not yet final judgement, the final verdict
being left to another group of judges.

After this retrieval of the original meaning of 'historia', the
following three parts each address one of Darbo-Peschanski's three
meanings of 'historia'.

Part 2 argues that the epistemological unity of 'historia' lies in the
fact that it is a 'judged judgement': it is a judgement by a first
instance, which will itself be judged by a second instance. This
functions very well for Herodotus' Histories, as discussed in Chapter
4. The multiple stories collected by Herodotus offer his first
judgement of the sources to the reader, who is explicitly invited to
make his own judgement. Herodotus' attitude of reporting what he has
heard and leaving it to the judgement of the reader thus reflects the
essence of 'historia'. Herodotus' view of nature is also a juridical
one: he sees nature as controlled by justice. By telling what has
happened, Herodotus reminds us of how things should have been. This
explains how we can pass from the juridical notion of 'histor' to
'historia': because reality is 'juridical' for Herodotus, one needs a
juridical approach of reality.

Chapter 5 shows that 'historia' is just a first step towards a full
knowledge as offered by a science or an art. It starts with a long
discussion of Aristotle's Analytica priora (1.30.46a, 1.27.43b) that
shows that for him 'historia' is the accumulation of judgements on
empirical data, which precedes and conditions the operations of the
mind that lead to secure knowledge and truth. The same pattern is
confirmed by a discussion of what Plato (Phaedo 96 a 8) and others say
on <greek>i(stori/a peri\ fu/sews</greek> and of the use of the term in
medical literature.

Chapter 6 picks up the notion of memory and shows that the so-called
'mnemones' are not simply magistrates that record decisions, but are
closely involved with the actual judgement. In the same way, Herodotus
does not simply collect evidence to preserve for future remembrance but
judges it before he preserves and presents it to the reader's
judgement.

Part 3 addresses 'historia' as historicity, with a focus on how time
and change are conceptualised.

Chapter 7 identifies an important shift in the way historical change
was understood. Up to Herodotus, time is a 'time of justice': time is
essentially an alternation between violence and justice which is beyond
human and even divine control. Herodotus thus cannot do more than
notice how the balance was disturbed and how the world returned to it.
Thucydides has a profoundly different view: for him, justice is no
longer a part of reality, but is only claimed in speech. Consequently,
Thucydides does not designate his own work as 'historia'. He rather
emphasises the role played by human nature. The chapter concludes with
a brief analysis on the role played by fate from the Hellenistic Period
onwards.

Chapter 8 discusses the relation between discourse and facts through
the notion of 'aitia'/'aitios'. Darbo-Peschanski argues that its
original meaning is one of sharing as part of a gift. The suggestion
seems to be that the term is originally linked to the 'time of
justice', as explored in the previous chapter, in the sense that an
'aition' is an anomaly that destabilises the order of justice and thus
calls for the intervention of Dike.

The fourth and final part focuses on the genre 'historiography' and how
it was constituted.

One of the things that set history apart is the fact that it puts
events in a sequence. Chapter 9 argues that 'historia' marks a break
with epic poetry: the epic poet is needed to perpetuate a logos,
whereas the historical logos, understood as ordered by a chronology,
seems to exist without the narrator. The substratum of 'historia' is
the chronological sequence of events ranged around a theme (e.g., wars
between Greeks and others). Darbo-Peschanski argues that this
'substratum of a temporal continuum' forms the basis for the
retro-active constitution of a corpus of similar texts: although
Thucydides distinguishes himself on purpose from Herodotus, the fact
that they were seen by later authors to share a similar approach to
reality seems to have led to them being classified as belonging to same
genre.

In Chapter 10, Darbo-Peschanski argues that another factor contributed
to the establishment of 'historia' as genre: reality is seen as
existing objectively. A historian thus simply needs to collect the
facts; no research method is needed. A truthful history is a history
that respects the truth of facts. 'Historia' consequently never was a
science, although Polybius tried to establish it as such.

The last chapter (11) explores the various meanings 'historia' has in
rhetorical handbooks. Darbo-Peschanski shows that the term can acquire
widely diverging meanings, from the past through narrative to
everything that is said. 'Historia' thus becomes so general that it
refers to many different forms of discourse; at the same time, it is
associated with a style that is as smooth as if no style were present.
Darbo-Peschanski argues that 'historia' is a weak concept that never
received a clear theoretical underpinning. As such, it never acquired
the status of art or science and could cover a variety of meanings,
especially in rhetorical theory.

Ten detailed appendices conclude the book.

The first two parts of this book generated enthusiasm in this reviewer,
as the argument presented there seemed to shed new light on the texts
and the way the concept of 'historia' functioned in them. The later
chapters present numerous interesting observations and perspectives,
especially the attempt by Darbo-Peschanski to shift emphasis away from
the idea of a 'historical method' that guides ancient historians.

But the argument in these later chapters was less clear to me than that
of the earlier ones. The way the constitution of the literary genre of
'historia' is presented by Darbo-Peschanski seemed to ignore what has
been written on genres by literary scholars. This is not wrong in
itself, but it does raise the question on how her analysis fits with
such an approach. The later chapters also focused heavily on a limited
set of texts (basically Herodotus and Thucydides) that could serve to
make the point plausible. But the changing understandings of time
Darbo-Peschanski argues for are so wide-ranging that one would expect
them to surface in other texts, such as tragedy, as well. I would also
have liked to see more evidence adduced. There is very little in the
book on the concept of 'historia' among later historians (e.g., Cassius
Dio, Herodian) and hardly anything about Latin historiography. The
suggestion on p. 309 that for Greeks under the Roman Empire history had
ended seemed a convenient trick to halt the investigation there, and is
not obviously warranted in the light of the proliferation of history
writing in this period. Although other historians such as Polybius and
Xenophon do figure, it is mainly Herodotus and Thucydides who determine
Darbo-Peschanski's argument.

On occasion, the argument seemed a bit slippery: the ease with which
the Stoa was brought to bear on an issue raised by Thucydides did not
seem warranted (370), nor is it clear how the Neo-Platonic Proclus was
combined with Aristotle (347). I cannot grant Darbo-Peschanski's claim
that 'historia' remains marginal to politics because historians are
always marginal in politics (405). The fact that historians often write
after they have ended their career says more about when it was deemed
appropriate to engage in literary pursuits than about a marginal
position of history itself. The claim that in Xenophon personal grace
is substituted for divine justice was ingenious but seemed far-fetched
to this reviewer (251-285). Sometimes I got the feeling I was going
through a long lexicographical study. Extensive passages detailed what
one author meant with a particular term but seemed often to drift away
from the overall argument (e.g. pages 132-166, 259-283). The argument
would have been clearer with a better focus on what is essential.

One cannot deny, however, that Catherine Darbo-Peschanski has added a
new perspective to our understanding of 'historia' that surely will
stimulate debate.[[3]] I wondered, for example, to what extent the
meaning of 'historia' she identifies is merely a function of Greek
epistemology: according to most Greek philosophers, sense-perception is
always judged by the soul or the mind on their truth-value. No
collection of material is thus a mere gathering of things existing, but
is always subjected to the judgement of the collector. When one looks
at it in this way, her argument for the origin of 'historia' in
judgement may be less different from those who emphasise the central
role of autopsy: autopsy always implies a judgement of
sense-perception; it can never be a mere registration.

In sum, Darbo-Peschanski has added an original voice to the history of
'historia-graphy'. She deserves to be widely read, but I suspect that
most attention will go the stronger first half of the book.

------------------
Notes:


1.   For an English summary of her argument, see C. Darbo-Peschanski,
"The Origin of Historiography", in J. Marincola (ed.), A Companion to
Greek and Roman Historiography, Oxford, 2007, 27-38.

2.   See, e.g., R. Thomas, Herodotus in Context, Cambridge, 2001, who
locates Herodotus in the contemporary 'scientific' context.

3.   There is criticism on Darbo-Peschanski in G. Schepens, "History
and Historia: Inquiry in the Greek Histories", in Marincola, A
Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, 39-55, 42. Schepens argues
that Darbo-Peschanski's emphasis on the original meaning of judgement
disregards the explicit truth-claims made by historians such as
Polybius. This is not fully justified, as judgement and truth are
clearly not two opposed notions in Darbo-Peschanski's view.