BMCR 2009.03.24, Gareth C. Sampson, The Defeat of Rome: Crassus

Gareth C. Sampson, The Defeat of Rome: Crassus, Carrhae, and the
Invasion of the East.  Barnsley:  Pen & Sword Military, 2008.  Pp. xvi,
224.  ISBN 9781844156764.  L19.99.

Reviewed by Jason M. Schlude, University of California, Berkeley
([email protected])
Word count:  2354 words
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[Table of contents is listed at the end of the review.]

For those with a taste for military history, Gareth Sampson's study of
the clash of Rome and Parthia at the battle of Carrhae will be a
welcome addition to the corpus of modern scholarship. Yet Sampson aims
to offer more than a merely engaging and lucid reconstruction of the
battle itself -- a reconstruction, incidentally, that he brings off to
great effect. He seeks to explore and articulate the significance of
Carrhae in the broader context of the history of Rome, Parthia, and
their relations. Hence a primary argument is that the expansion of the
Roman and Parthian empires made conflict between Rome and Parthia
inevitable. Their fateful confrontation materialized with Crassus's
invasion of the Parthian empire, which resulted in an engagement at
Carrhae that would inaugurate a dominant tradition of Romano-Parthian
war. In this aim, Sampson also meets with success, providing a
sustained, coherent analysis of the growth of and interactions between
these empires before, during, and after the battle of Carrhae. Such
coherence, however, can also be a liability. Perhaps too often Sampson
tends to skip quickly over details indicative less of an inevitability
of conflict than of a potentially more progressive streak in
Romano-Parthian relations. In addition, it must be pointed out that, in
this reading, Sampson strikes notes already struck many times before in
previous scholarship. To say that Rome and Parthia were destined to
clash is less than innovatory.  Even so, Sampson's book fulfills its
promise to provide the specialist and non-specialist with a thoughtful,
clear account of the battle of Carrhae and its significance for our
understanding of the relationship between Rome and Parthia, and it does
so while achieving a remarkably good balance in the discussion of the
Roman and Parthian perspectives.

Chapters one and two are the first of several chapters designed to
provide important background information for the battle of Carrhae. In
chapter one, Sampson details in a well-organized and understandable way
some of the major features and events of the long and complex history
of Rome's imperial expansion in the Mediterranean down to the time of
Pompey's settlement of eastern affairs in the late 60s BC. In chapter
two he attempts a similar task for the Parthian empire, tracing its
ebb-and-flow growth from the foundation of its royal dynasty in the
mid-third century BC to the early 50s BC. Such expositions are not only
helpful thumbnail sketches for the general reader, but also form a
foundation for Sampson's fundamental argument: Romans and Parthians
were so relentless in the expansion of their empires that their
conflict could be the only result. A weakness in Sampson's discussion,
however, is his tendency to use concepts of "empire," "state,"
"civilisation," and "culture" almost interchangeably and uncritically
to articulate the nature of rivalry and conflict between Rome and
Parthia (29, 32, 35, 46-7, 52-5; cf. also xv-xvi). Without clearly
defining and distinguishing such terms, he builds up the
incompatibility of Rome and Parthia on a scale so grand as to be
problematic.

In chapter three, Sampson assesses Crassus's early life and political
career through his 55 BC consulship, providing an alternative to
ancient and modern accounts that emphasize Crassan greed, cruelty, and
military ineptitude. He illustrates how Crassus certainly sought to
better his financial and political standing and committed offensive
acts in the process.  Yet Sampson points out that Crassus was anything
but untested in the military sphere; he served in Spain, the social
war, the first Roman civil war, and the slave revolt of Spartacus, and
was pivotal in final victories of the last two major conflicts.
Furthermore, Sampson appropriately emphasizes the impressive political
ability and pragmatism of Crassus, as he established a formidable
network of Romans who owed him favors, i.e., Caesar, and as he often
worked with his powerful rival, Pompey, rather than against him, to
advance his own political and financial interests. Throughout Sampson
effectively avoids the hindsight that has led many others to denigrate
Crassan accomplishments and to overemphasize the power and influence of
a pre-Gallic Caesar.

Sampson utilizes chapter four to face squarely the dynamics of the
Romano-Parthian relationship from the mid-second century BC to the eve
of the Crassan campaign so as to better explain the "First
Romano-Parthian War." He argues that Rome and Parthia both sought
imperial supremacy in the Near East, and that this mutual motivation
fueled their conflict and led to the Roman invasion of the Parthian
empire, which happened to materialize with Crassus. Hence Crassus
himself merits no blame. In Sampson's own words, "the war that broke
out in the 50s BC was not due to the actions of any one man, but was
the result of the wider forces of history" (83-4).

This chapter is a welcome complement to the first two chapters,
providing a focused, synthetic analysis of the interactions of the
Romans and Parthians. In addition, Sampson's emphasis on the pre-54 BC
history of Romano-Parthian relations is right on target; one cannot
properly understand the significance of Carrhae by starting with
Crassus in 54 BC. Yet an important problem mars the analysis: an
unwillingness to appreciate evidence suggestive more of Romano-Parthian
diplomatic progress. Two examples must suffice to make the point.
Firstly, when commenting on the likelihood of a treaty linked to the
initial diplomatic contact of Rome and Parthia in the late 90's BC,
Sampson concludes, "none [is] recorded in the sources" (86). The
sources, however, are not so silent. Florus at one point has Parthian
envoys refer to Parthian "treaties (foederum) with Sulla and Pompey"
(1.46.4). And Plutarch, Sulla 5.4, Livy, Periochae 70 and 100, and
Festus 15 are all compatible with this testimony, if we consider the
flexibility of the diplomatic terminology of "alliance and friendship"
in the Graeco-Roman literary tradition, as well as the abbreviated form
of Livy here and derivative state of Festus. And, of course, if we
accept the existence of this treaty, we have a reason for the failure
of the Parthians to assist Pontus and Armenia against Lucullus in the
Mithridatic Wars that is at least as strong as Sampson's explanation of
Parthian weakness and fear of Rome (87-8). To cite a second example,
Sampson rightly notes that Pompey, in the midst of a territorial
conflict between his new ally Armenia and supposed enemy Parthia in 64
BC, did not attack the latter, but rather facilitated the arbitration
of the dispute (90). At pains to explain this reconciliation, Sampson
chalks it up to Pompey's eagerness to return to Rome and perception
that the Parthians were not worth the trouble of a war (90). In
essence, Sampson's pessimistic reading of Romano-Parthian relations
will not allow him to concede an alternative and simpler solution:
peace perhaps could also be a priority.

Chapters five and six get to the heart of the conflict. Here Sampson
covers Gabinius' abortive attack of Parthia in 55 BC, then Crassus'
embarkation for Syria also in 55 BC, initial campaign across the
Euphrates in 54 BC, and second campaign that resulted in the battle of
Carrhae in 53 BC, and finally the devastating Roman retreat. In his
treatment, Sampson forcefully argues that the total defeat of the
Romans by the Parthians in 53 BC resulted not from the incompetence of
Crassus, who consistently made strategic and logical decisions
throughout the course of his campaigns, but from the careful,
innovatory planning, preparation, and implementation of the Parthian
general Surenas. While Crassus prepared a force with sufficient cavalry
to handle the anticipated Parthian cataphracts and plenty of infantry
to tear up the Parthian ground-troops in close combat, Surenas ensured
that the battle would be fought at a distance by using his cataphracts
to keep the Romans concentrated in one area and his mounted bowmen,
supplied with unlimited arrows via camel train, to obliterate them.

The strengths of these two chapters run deep, despite some potentially
misguided speculation. To begin, not only is the writing clear and
lively, but also the tendency to provide alternating sections on Roman
and Parthian strategies (94-121) is very effective, allowing for a
thorough consideration of both perspectives. In addition, the breakdown
of the battle into distinct phases and provision of diagrams (124-45)
give the reader a good sense for the evolution of the engagement. And
Sampson must be praised for his sensitive and critical reading of
primary sources when he rightly points out where hindsight led the
ancients to inappropriately criticize Crassus and to describe Carrhae
as an inevitable Roman defeat. As for the speculation, consider the
following. Firstly, Sampson suggests that after Gabinius promised and
then postponed aid to Mithradates III, a rival of Orodes II for the
throne, he sent him into Mesopotamia to stir up Parthian civil war in
preparation for the Roman attack under Crassus (see especially 94-5).
But this assumption is based on no evidence. And though he does cite
Josephus as a source for the relationship between Gabinius and
Mithradates, he fails to note that Josephus suggests the former in fact
also postured himself as the captor of the latter (Jewish War 1.178;
Jewish Antiquities 14.103; Hegesippus 1.21)! In other words, it may be
that this Roman was doing his best to appear to support both Parthian
royal candidates at the same time. Gabinius gave Mithradates the
impression that he would assist him, but also projected the image of
having captured and confined him -- an image Orodes might be expected
to receive well. Hence Gabinius' position was not as uncompromisingly
pro-Mithradates and anti-Orodes as Sampson supposes. Secondly, Sampson
would have it that Surenas was the one to fill Crassus' decapitated
head with molten gold (143). Yet Dio 40.27.3 and Servius 7.606 fail to
specify the responsible agent, and Florus 1.46.10 and Festus 17 imply,
if anything, that this act was carried out under the supervision of the
king.

In chapter seven, Sampson turns to the aftermath of the battle of
Carrhae, focusing on the years 53 to 50 BC, when the Parthians set on
foot an unsuccessful invasion of Syria. Here Sampson argues that Rome,
consumed with problems at home, ignored the precarious condition of
their eastern empire after Carrhae, initially leaving one man, Cassius,
the highest ranking survivor of that battle, to deal with the Parthian
threat. And when Rome finally elected to send governors to Cilicia and
Syria, they did so only in 51 BC and sent Cicero and Bibulus, two men
who lacked military know-how. As for Parthians, Sampson looks to show
that they squandered this opportunity to take Syria, explaining their
failure as a result of the smart strategy of Cassius and ineptitude of
Orodes. As often, the presentation of the material is finely organized,
providing here informative sketches of the Roman and Parthian positions
in 53 BC (148-52) to prepare the reader for a review of the complex
events of 52 to 50 BC (152-65). Sampson also plausibly attempts to
explain the Roman and Parthian motivations and intentions at each step
of the way. But some weaknesses in the analysis remain. Perhaps most
jarring is Sampson's speculation that Pompey perhaps wished to send
Crassus as "an expendable general...to fight the Parthians in order to
weaken them and then move in for the kill [him]self" (166). Such a view
is entirely inconsistent with the thrust of Sampson's repeated claims
that Crassus was a recognizably accomplished military leader and that
the Romans thought the Parthians petty foes.

The eighth and final chapter  allows Sampson to sum up his
understanding of the significance of the battle of Carrhae from several
vantage points. It is a sharp review of conclusions that appear
throughout the book, and expands on the broader significance of the
engagement, especially for the history of the relationship of "East"
and "West" (see especially 178-81). Simply put, Sampson's view of
Carrhae as "inevitable" and as having kicked off a period of sustained
Romano-Parthian enmity affirms a longstanding scholarly tradition that
recognizes, only with reluctance, constructive aspects in the
interactions between the Romans and Parthians. In this regard, Sampson
does not stake out a new trajectory for discussion, but rather
entrenches more deeply than ever the idea of fundamental
incompatibility between the Roman and Parthian empires.

Only the appendices require further comment. Appendix I details what we
know about the subsequent fate of those Roman soldiers who were taken
captive at Carrhae. Appendices II and III provide a roster of the most
important preserved and unpreserved primary sources for the battle of
Carrhae and Parthian history in general. Significantly, they give the
reader a good sense for the sources of information that form the basis
of our modern understanding of Carrhae and Parthia and successfully
orient the reader among these various sources.[[1]] Appendix IV
(200-201) consists of useful lists of Parthian kings (up to 38 BC),
Macedonian kings, and Seleucid kings. Being that Sampson makes frequent
mention of Armenia and Armenian kings in his text, a list of those
monarchs would have proven useful as well.

The Defeat of Rome, then, is a vital read for anyone interested in the
battle of Carrhae, the career of Crassus, or the (especially early)
history of Romano-Parthian relations. The major strength -- and at
times weakness -- of the volume is its consistent and persistent
argument that Rome and Parthia were forever enemies. This reviewer
anticipates that others will benefit as much as him from Sampson's
labors over a topic significant for ancient and modern "East-West"
relations.[[2]]

Contents:

Chapter 1. "A New World Order -- The Roman Conquest of the East"
(3-31).

Chapter 2. "Menace from the East -- The Rise of Parthia" (32-55).

Chapter 3. "Marcus Crassus and the Lure of the East" (56-80).

Chapter 4. "An Unnecessary War? -- The Origins of the First
Romano-Parthian War (96-55 BC)" (83-93).

Chapter 5. "The Invasion of the East (55-53 BC)" (94-113).

Chapter 6. "Disaster at Carrhae" (114-47).

Chapter 7. "Storm over the East (53-50 BC)" (148-68).

Chapter 8. "Epilogue -- The Consequences of Carrhae" (169-81).

Appendix I. "The Fate of the Roman Prisoners" (182-5).

Appendix II. "Sources of the Battle of Carrhae" (186-93).

Appendix III. "Sources for Parthian History" (194-9).

Appendix IV. "King Lists" (200-1).

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Notes:


1.   For those eager to use these appendices as a jumping off point for
further study, it should be noted that there is a more recent English
translation of Justin, our most important source for Parthian history,
than Sampson suggests (196): J. C. Yardley and R. Develin, Justin:
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus (Atlanta, Georgia:
Scholars Press, 1994).

2.   As for the presentation of the volume, though there are many
typographical errors throughout (consider, for example, "peace
negations," 25), they do not significantly misguide the reader in the
vast majority of cases -- nor do they detract much from the enjoyment
of the read. Perhaps a bit more bothersome, however, is Sampson's
citation of the sources, which can seem spotty at times. For a book
produced "for the general reader as well as the scholar" (xvi), this is
slightly problematic. Yet perhaps it is a necessary result of covering
so much historical ground.