BMCR 2009.04.31: Dart on Steinby, The Roman Republican Navy: From the Sixth Century to 167 B.C. Commentationes humanarum litterarum, 123

Christa Steinby, The Roman Republican Navy: From the Sixth Century to
167 B.C. Commentationes humanarum litterarum, 123.  Helsinki:  Societas
Scientiarum Fennica, 2007.  Pp. 236.  ISBN 9789516533509.  [euro
]22.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Christopher J. Dart, The University of Melbourne
([email protected])
Word count:  2216 words
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The Roman Republican Navy is one of the few recent works to address the
important issue of the early Roman navy. With the notable exception of
the works of J. H. Theil (1946 and 1954), the Roman navy during the
Republic has received little detailed attention from modern
scholarship. This work seeks to address this lack of attention and
forwards a considerable re-assessment of the extent and significance of
the Republican navy prior to 167 BCE.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of existing scholarship on ancient
navies before setting out a brief survey of ancient naval warfare in
the Mediterranean. This chapter draws heavily upon Morrison, Coates and
Rankov (2000) and principally discusses the ways in which ever larger
ships were used in the eastern Mediterranean.

Chapter 2 traces the development of the Roman navy prior to the First
Punic War. It is here that the author first mounts what is one of the
central contentions of the work; that the Romans had significant naval
interests stretching back to the sixth century BCE.

The chapter asserts that, "Roman naval history starts early. Under the
kings, Rome was already involved in international affairs in the
western Mediterranean" (p. 32). Yet the supporting evidence which is
presented for this position is slight (pp. 32-34) and for the most part
highly speculative. The potentially populous nature of Rome in the
sixth century and the importance of Rome as a point for trade passing
between the sea and the Italian interior are forwarded as evidence that
Rome may have been engaged in similar seafaring activities to that of
the cities of the Etruscan and Latin coasts.

Much of the chapter proceeds upon speculative arguments and the
sequence of these arguments rest upon subsequent speculations. For
instance, it is argued that the establishment of maritime colonies may
have been an attempt to secure ports necessary for the operation of a
Roman fleet (pp. 52-53), not for the purpose of preventing hostile
landings and "passive defence," as has usually been assumed (Theil,
1954, p. 11f. and Salmon, 1970, p. 70f.). This is extended to
speculation that a Roman fleet may have been active during the war with
Neapolis in 326 BCE (p. 58f.). Livy does describe naval activities on
the part of the Neapolitans and Tarentines (Livy, 8.22) but neither he,
nor Dionysius of Halicarnassus, make any reference to a Roman fleet.
Similarly sources such as Diodorus (16.82) and Strabo (5.3), who record
naval activity in the fourth century which was possibly associated with
the Romans, are referring to piracy.

All four treaties between Rome and Carthage prior to the First Punic
War are accepted as authentic by the author and are interpreted as
indicative of considerable naval involvement in the Mediterranean on
the part of the Romans (p. 36f.). Under the terms of the treaties of
508 and 348 BCE, Carthaginian naval interests were protected while the
Romans were guaranteed control in Latium and the right to protect their
allies. This would seem to indicate clearly that the Romans only had
small scale naval interests up until the mid-fourth century. Such an
interpretation is commonly accepted by moderns (see: Lancell, 1995, p.
86f.; Goldsworthy, 2000, p. 69f.; and Forsythe, 2005, p. 121f. and p.
280). The third treaty in 279 BCE still shows no signs of significant
Roman naval activity (Theil, 1954, p. 6 and Goldsworthy, 2000, pp.
69-70). The very existence of such treaties would seem to undermine the
core argument of Chapter 2 that prior to the First Punic War the Romans
already had a developed and significant naval presence. The chapter
very much sets itself up against the arguments forwarded by J. H.
Thiel. His work is the most substantial on the Republican navy. Thiel
tended to underplay the role of the navy prior to the First Punic War.
He argued that, while there is evidence of naval activity prior to the
First Punic War, it cannot have been of any great importance given the
near silence of surviving primary source material (1954, p. 4-5).

Chapters 3 and 4 are reprints of articles which have previously
appeared in Arctos (2000) and Ancient Society (2004) respectively.
Chapter 3 discusses the use of the Roman boarding bridge during the
First Punic War. The principle conclusion of chapter 3 is that the
boarding bridge cannot have been as instrumental an invention for Roman
naval victories as Polybios asserts. Some aspects of the argument are
contentious. The conclusion of chapter 3 asserts that during the First
Punic War "it can be stated that the Roman navy did very well, from the
first battle to the last" (p. 102). By the author's own omission, the
Romans lost about 600 ships to the Carthaginians' 450 and of these 75
per cent of Roman losses came in storms (p. 103). It is then argued
that these statistics "simply show that the Romans after all had more
resources for building and maintaining ships" (p. 103). On the
contrary, suffering a high proportion of their losses in storms would
seem to indicate that while the Romans were amateurish mariners they
were highly successful in naval combat. In turn, this supports
Polybios' argument over that of Steinby's, that the Romans were able to
apply their skills in land combat to naval engagements to give their
soldiers an advantage over experienced mariners.

Chapter 4 investigates the role of the Roman and Carthaginian navies
during the Second Punic War. The chapter seeks to show that the Roman
and Carthaginian navies were of significance during this war. This
chapter argues along far less contentious lines than chapters 2 and 3.
It is a sound feature of the structure of the work in general that the
material is discussed chronologically. However, the inclusion of these
two previously published articles (chapters 3 and 4) mean that there is
no comparable chronological assessment of the period between the First
Punic War and the end of the Second Punic War.

Chapters 5 to 7 detail naval activity against Philip, Antiochus and
Perseus, respectively. These chapters rightly highlight that
Roman-sponsored naval actions in the eastern Mediterranean were
significant to the success of military policy in the east. Even here,
however, the argument often strays onto tenuous ground. Chapter 5
forwards the premise that the campaigns against Philip and Perseus "are
not known for great sea battles. Therefore, the significance of navies
and especially the role of the Roman navy has been underestimated" (p.
143). While the absence of source material which provides detailed
discussion of naval events is not in itself evidence for the absence of
activity, these chapters consistently side with the most expansive
interpretation of references to Roman naval activity.

It is a deficiency of the work in general that it does not fully
confront the issue of there being a number of detailed and extensive
sources (Polybios, Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus amongst others)
for military activity in the period under investigation. These sources
are principally interested in the activities of the land army, manned
by Roman citizen soldiers. The role of Latins and Italian allies in
both the army and navy are consistently underplayed in the primary
source material. The navy is often represented as largely providing
logistical support to the land armies. Many of the arguments forwarded
for why sources do not devote more attention to the navy are not
particularly convincing. For instance, it is frequently observed that
it is 'curious' that sources do not mention the navy. Similarly it is
asserted that "if we think the Roman navy did not achieve much that
would lead us to think that the Romans did not accomplish much" (p.
147).

While naval actions are discussed in detail, the relationship between
the actions of the land army and those of the navy is often not
investigated. The relationship between military activity on land and
sea would seem to be of particular importance given the nature of the
arguments being mounted. Throughout the period under discussion naval
actions were carried out in direct support of land campaigns. This is
explicitly stated by sources (for instance, Livy, 37.9.6) and can often
be inferred. Particularly in the East, Roman naval decisions to secure
ports and lines of supply were not ends in themselves but were a means
to facilitating the operation of the land army while overseas. Indeed,
many of the arguments presented in chapters 5 to 7 for why the navy was
significant in the east conclude with such assertions.

An additional problem with the work is its marked tendency to label all
naval ventures carried out under the auspices of the Roman state as
'the Roman navy'. The work does not clearly draw the distinction
between the Roman navy, that is, ships built and paid for by the Roman
state and predominantly crewed by Italian allies and those ships that
were provided by their Italian allies and maritime colonies which were
manned and funded locally (see Theil, 1954, p. 73f.). These are
consistently discussed en masse as 'the Roman navy' while autonomously
commanded fleets of allied states in the East are given due analysis.

Throughout the Republic a proportion of the navy was commanded and
crewed by citizens. However, the majority of the navy in any given year
were either Italian allies or men from maritime colonies of either
citizen or Latin status with distinct requirements placed on their
military service. Considerable numbers of allies (including peoples
from the Italian interior such as Samnites) and POWs were used to crew
the fleet (see Theil, 1954, p. 74). A clear distinction between the
crews and the marines of Roman ships is also frequently absent in the
work. One of the consistent arguments forwarded is that from the
earliest stages of Roman history the Roman navy was an effective and
significant force in its own right. Yet, large numbers of legionaries
were temporarily posted to ships for naval battles. Naval battles such
as Drepana (Poly. 1.49) and Ecnomus (Poly. 1.26) would seem to
undermine the argument forwarded by the work that skills in landed
military combat were not so significant in determining the outcome of
naval engagements.

The work forwards two central arguments about our understanding of the
Roman Republican navy which carry through each of the chapters. First,
it is argued that Polybios was overly simplistic when he asserted that
the Romans first took to the sea during the First Punic War. As has
long been recognised, the treaties with Carthage, the appointment of
naval duumuiri and the supposed events which led to the Pyrrhic War are
clear evidence that Polybios' assertions cannot be taken at face value.
Theil's substantial chapter on the topic (1954, pp. 3-59) took the more
conservative position that such naval actions were of limited
significance prior to the First Punic War. The present work highlights
evidence of maritime activity on the part of Romans but its conclusion
that a Roman navy was a significant factor in Roman history prior to
the First Punic War is not convincing. The evidence for naval activity
prior to the First Punic War is slim at best and is, in the end,
analysed in a highly speculative manner. The work is critical of
Thiel's acceptance of Polybios on the basis that he was overly
dependant upon the literary source material. However, the work is also
highly dependant upon literary source material.

Second, the work argues that the Roman navy was of critical importance
to Roman military policy in the Republic. There is much more compelling
evidence forwarded for this position. Here too, however, there is a
tendency to infer a great deal from even relatively slender evidence
and, as discussed above, some of the conclusions in these sections are
not very convincing.

Many will probably be inclined to side with the more conservative
interpretation of early Roman naval endeavours suggested by Thiel, but
The Roman Republican Navy does provide an interesting counterpoint to
his work.  One of the principle values of this new book certainly is
that it highlights the need for greater attention to be given to the
Republican navy. It is unfortunate that the chapters on the First and
Second Punic Wars take the form of case studies, as it breaks the
otherwise sequential presentation of the material. The Roman Republican
Navy: from the sixth century to 167 B.C. gives welcomed attention to
the important topic of the role that Roman sea power played in Roman
military success in the Mediterranean, even if there are serious
methodological flaws and many of its conclusions cannot be, therefore,
fully accepted.

References:

Forsythe, G. A Critical History of Early Rome, Berkley, 2005.

Goldsworthy, A. The Punic Wars, London, 2000.

Lancell, S. Carthage: A History. trans. A. Nevil, Massachusetts, 1995.

Morrison, Coates and Rankov, The Athenian Trireme. The History and
Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship, Cambridge, 2000.

Salmon, E. T. Roman Colonization under the Republic. London, 1970.

Steinby, C. "The Roman Boarding-bridge in the First Punic War. A Study
of Roman Tactics and Strategy" in Arctos, (2000), pp. 193-210.

Steinby, C. "War at Sea in the Second Punic War" in Ancient Society,
(2004), pp. 77-114.

Thiel, J. H. Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican
Times. Amsterdam, 1946.

Thiel, J. H. A History of Roman Sea Power before the Second Punic War.
Amsterdam, 1954.